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EXECUTIVE PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES:        
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF OWNERSHIP IN THAILAND 
by Trairong Swatdikun 
Executive compensation has been extensively studied in market orientation economy; 
consequently the conflict of interest between the Principal and the Agent is clearly 
defined in a widely-held firm. A concentration-owned firm that dominates Asian capital 
markets have not such a conflict between the shareholders and the managers, but 
groups of shareholders in conflict are a concern. Since only one group of owner 
dominates the decision, executive compensation is hardly believed to be well 
established. Using a unique Thai listed company’s data between 2002 and 2008 as a 
sample, this study presents empirical evidence on Agency theory outside the Anglo-
Saxon setting. Ordinary least square method, fixed effects, two-stages least squares, 
generalised method of moments are deployed to test the hypotheses.  
In addition to all executive receives base pay, it reveals that bonus is the most common 
incentive while fewer than 10% of listed companies provide stock option to their 
executive. The econometric results reveal positive pay-performance sensitivity in Thai 
listed companies. However, ownership structure does play a vital role in the sensitivity. 
In a widely-held firm, the positive influence of firm performance on executive 
compensation is found. The evidence supports that widely-held firms have well 
established their executive compensation package. In the foreign-owned firm, the 
positive sensitivity reveals that foreign ownership actively take part in the 
compensation policy to serve the firm interests. Furthermore; Managerial power 
suggests that in the imbalance of power between groups of shareholder, there is no 
pay-performance sensitivity in neither family-owned nor corporate-owned firms. 
Further evidences indicate that operation cash flow and stock return are the 
consequence of executive bonus pay. ii  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Many factors, such as customer orientation, global competition, information 
technology, and management innovation, have lately been changing the 
business environment and driving the world economy in a sharply different 
direction from that which it sued to follow. Such changes have given 
academia the opportunity to revise its position, since the current collective 
knowledge needs to be developed in order to create value, and by implication 
improve human living standards. Executive compensation is one of the covert 
issues which may not be seen clearly in a growing economy. Since the 
business still makes profits and the owner enjoys good returns, no one asks 
for further investigation. Unfortunately, in the middle of a financial crisis when 
a business is no longer profitable to its owner, some hidden issues have 
been dragged out for discussion. Take the Royal Bank of Scotland for 
example; soon after announcing the biggest loss in British banking history, 2  
 
the business announced that it is still going to pay large bonuses to its which 
prompted the British government to take steps to investigate the issue of 
transparency. The Chancellor of the Exchequer recommended that the 
bonuses paid out should be re-evaluated. The bank has since been obliged 
to report its pay and incentive policies in its annual report. This evidence 
confirms that executive compensation is major area of public concern. 
This chapter provides an overview of this study of the executive pay-
performance sensitivity and is consequences. The first section begins with 
the presentation of this research background. The second section provides 
the research motivation, while section 3 outlines the institutional background 
of the research setting. Section 4 identifies the research objectives and 
Section 5 provides the research questions. Then the sixth section focuses on 
the expected outcome of this study. Section 7 describes the structure of the 
whole thesis. Then the list of presentation is shown in section 8. Finally, the 
last section provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
1.1 Research background 
The economic literature takes a positive approach to designing corporate 
control systems. This is the consequence of using the principle of the division 
of labour to create a new structure for economic organisations. The 
specificity of labour skills leads to an awareness of how important 
management skills are for the control and collaboration activities within the 
organisation. When most organisations have to hire a professional manager 
to operate their business deals within the time limits set by the shareholders, 
it creates an agency cost because it separates ownership from control. The 
manager’s decision and performance are thus directly linked to the 
organisation’s success or failure. Executive compensation is an important 
issue because it not only provides incentive, but also creates a system to 3  
 
allow shareholders to investigate whether the manager is performing well in 
his task of maximising the principal’s interests and arbitrages effectively.  
Since the 1990s, academics have begun to realise the importance of 
executive compensation. This began with a series of searching factors that 
determine executive compensation; Agarwal (1981) for instance empirically 
determined executive compensation using various approaches while Deckop 
(1988) emphasised that firm performance which is economic determines 
executive compensation, and Young and Buchholtz (2002) provides evidence 
that executive human capital determines executive compensation. Later, the 
series of pay-performance sensitivities were begun from the US (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990), and then the theme spread to the UK (Conyon and Murphy, 
2000), Japan (Kubo, 2000), and China (Mengistae and Xu, 2004), 
respectively. Most of these studies offer a richer understanding of the 
advanced economy in the story of executive compensation. However, the 
benefits come with costs. A wide variety of methods have been used and so 
many different conclusions have been drawn about the relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance that none of them can be 
easily verified. In the recent financial crisis, the public understanding urgently 
needed more clarity. People demanded explanations of what was important 
in executive compensation. When a firm performance starts to go downhill, 
shareholders suffer, but the announcements of rising executive pay are 
apparently unaffected.  
 
1.2 Research motivation 
The issue of executive compensation has long been a topic of annual public 
debate. Moreover, the more expanded the capital market is, the more 
complicated the system is that is needed to deal with asymmetric information 
and other issues. As a result, this research topic still needs further 4  
 
clarification. Since quality data are still developing, panel data are emerging. 
This data structure allows estimation techniques to be developed. 2SLS is an 
econometric innovation which is currently being introduced to deal with 
endogenous issues such as the causal relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance, and vice versa. This study takes the 
opportunity to track the executive pay issue using the classic and the newly 
available techniques to better understand the whole story.  
This study also owes much to the work of Jensen and Murphy (1990) and 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) who offered new evidence in the hope of providing 
a better understanding of executive compensation under the Agency theory. 
However, only a limited amount of research on executive compensation and 
Agency theory has been done in an Asian context. Thus, there is little in the 
literature to show how Agency theory applies to executive compensation in 
Asian countries, which provide unique business environments due to the lack 
of Western cultural influence. Thus, to extend our collective knowledge and 
to fill this pronounced gap in the literature, the present study aims to examine 
the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance in 
Thailand. Thailand has a developing economy, which at one point was 
considered one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. This growth came 
to an abrupt halt in 1997 and by 1998 the country found itself in the middle of 
the worst economic crisis in its modern history. However, Thailand was one 
of Asia's best performers again in 2002-04. Boosted by increased 
consumption, high investment spending and strong export growth, the Thai 
economy grew by 6.9% in 2003 and 6.1% in 2004, despite a sluggish global 
economy. Even though growth slowed to 4.6% in 2005, the downturn can be 
attributed to high oil prices, weaker demand from Western markets and 
severe drought in its rural regions, tsunami-related declines in tourism and 
lower consumer confidence. By focusing on the sequence in Thailand of 
economic development followed by an economic crisis and now a growing 
economy once more, researchers should have a very good opportunity to 5  
 
examine executive compensation and agency theory in a new context and 
under different conditions from those usually considered. 
 
1.3 The institutional setting in Thailand 
The Thai economy shows enduring growth in performance. Bailey and 
Jagtiani (1994) indicate that the capitalisation and level of trading activity in 
the Thai stock market exceed those of some developed countries and all but 
the largest emerging markets. There is, however, very limited research on 
the way in which Thai firms employ an international approach to their 
corporate mechanism, which has spread widely due to the international 
integration of economies. The root of the unique culture of Thailand is the 
result of progress in combining the heritage of the great surrounding ancient 
empires. Also, unlike its neighbours, where Western culture exerted a strong 
influence in the colonial period, independence has kept the traditional Thai 
way of thought unique. The country was one of the first in the area to 
respond to a new form of long-term fund raising. The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) was established more than 30 years ago. Even though it is 
not a new market, however, the structure of the Thai market gives no sign of 
losing its characteristics as a strongly coordinated economy. This research 
takes the opportunity to test the fitness of compensation theory which 
originated in Agency theory. This setting is interesting because its structure 
has grown from an American foundation but its control activities are widely 
different from those expected by the designer, and it also lacks the social 
influence of Anglo-Saxon culture. 
  
   6  
 
1.3.1 Economic overview 
Thailand is classified as an agriculture-based country. The economy relies 
heavily on exporting agricultural products, namely, rice and other natural 
resources, forest resources, fishery resources, oil and natural gas and also 
the tourist industry. The country was recognised as an Asian Tiger before it 
was overtaken by the financial crisis in the late 1990s. Shortly after its stock 
market regulations were forced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to 
change, the economy became one of the fastest emerging economies in 
early 2000, although the rise in oil prices, together with the American 
financial crisis, checked the fast growth of the Thai economy before it 
reached bottom once again, due to a political crisis. 
Table 1.1 shows the overall economic situation in Thailand during the period 
2000 to 2008. The population grew steadily in this period. Both gross 
domestic product (GDP) and gross national product (GNP) increased steadily 
by 6.4% and 5.4% on average every year in that time. During the eight years, 
the inflation rate also grew, except in 2002 and 2007. Its lowest point was 
0.7% in 2002, compared with its highest, 5.5%, in 2009. The unemployment 
rate decreased overall, from 3.3% in 2000 to 1.4% in 2008. Both exports and 
imports increased by a similar range. The balance of payments grew from 
2000 to 2005, except for a sharp decline in 2003. Compared with 2005, the 
balance of payments in 2006 more than doubled. Since then the growth was 
as much as 35% in 2007 and 44% in 2008. The country’s international 
reserves grew steadily from 2000 to 2005 and have increased more steeply 
since 2005, reaching 111 billion baht (about 22 billion pounds) in 2008. Its 
total debts outstanding declined dramatically from 2000 to 2003. Then they 
stayed constant for three years before rapidly growing once again. The 
exchange rate reached its peak in 2001 with 44.48 Thai baht per 1 U.S. 
dollar before a steady and constant decline in 2003.  7  
 
Table 1.1 Thailand’s Macro Economic Indicators 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Population (Million persons)  61.08  61.31  61.80  61.88  61.97  62.42  62.83  63.04  63.39 
GDP at current price ( in Billions)  4,923  5,134  5,451  5,917  6,489  7,093  7,841  8,493  9,105 
GNP per capita (Baht : Person)  77,860  79,571  82,975  88,688  96,049  103,667  114,748  123,673  130,631 
Inflation (%)  1.6  1.6  0.7  1.8  2.7  4.5  4.7  2.3  5.5 
Unemployment rate (%)  3.3  3.1  2.3  2.4  2.6  1.8  1.5  1.4  1.4 
Export   67.9  63.0  66.0  78.1  94.9  109.3  127.9  150.0  175.2 
Import   62.4  60.5  63.3  74.3  93.4  117.6  126.9  138.4  175.1 
Current account balance  9.3  5.1  4.6  4.7  2.7  -7.6  2.3  14.0  1.6 
Net capital movement   -10.3  -3.4  -1.8  -4.7  3.6  11.0  6.8  -2.4  14.6 
Balance of payments   -1.6  1.3  4.2  0.1  5.7  5.4  12.7  17.1  24.6 
International reserves   32.7  33.0  38.9  42.1  49.8  52.1  67.0  87.4  111.0 
Total debt outstanding   79.7  67.5  59.5  51.8  51.3  52.0  59.6  61.7  65.0 
Exchange rate  (1 US$ for the amount of baht)  40.16  44.48  43.00  41.53  40.27  40.27  37.93  34.56  33.36 
Source: Bank of Thailand (2010) 8  
 
1.3.2 Capital market overview 
Regarding the successful use of the capital market to fund the economy in 
developed countries, SET had a plan to source funds to re-float the Thai 
economy (SEC, 2003). The money market was termed ‘developed’ but to rely 
on this market only would be a mistake, since it is unable to provide an 
efficient financial system because financial institutions will dominate the 
system and keep high spreads away from transaction; and also all risks will 
be transferred to the financial institutions. For these reasons, the Thai 
government decided to establish the securities market. SET’s handbook 
indicates - in the history of the establishment of SET - that the creation of the 
market was aimed to provide an efficient financial system to circulate excess 
money from private savings into the hands of business people, who needed 
the funds to expand their business. This investment was made to give 
business people more funds and reward the owners of capital with 
reasonable rates. To do this, the authority hoped to create a market for funds 
in order to support savings, an investment which directly relates to the 
extensive development of the Thai economy. 
In 1974, the Thai government passed ‘The Stock Exchange of Thailand Act 
B.E. 2517’. The first trading in the stock market occurred on 30
th April 1975 in 
what was called ‘The Securities Exchange of Thailand’. This stock exchange 
became one of the fastest growing capital markets from the moment when it 
began trading with 21 listed companies in the initial day, but more than 15 
times greater of 15 years of operation. To respond to the expansion, in 1991 
the market was renamed as ‘The Stock Exchange of Thailand’ with a fully 
automatic system called the ‘Automated System for the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand’. It was also upgraded to a self-regulatory organisation, managed by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the following year. During 
the golden period as the world’s fastest growing economy in the 1990s, the 
market enjoyed a rapid growth in the flow of investment from all over the 
world. However, the systematic problems of the banking system as well as a 9  
 
long-term high inflation rate brought the Thai economy to a bubble period 
before it crashed in the late 1990s. The situation caused many financial 
institutions to close and Thailand’s economy later become one of the worst 
casualties in Asia. The World Bank, together with the International Monetary 
Fund, required the country to reform its financial system, regulations, standards 
and requirements which involved the Stock Exchange in a huge step forward 
at the time of the millennium. Since then, the economy has returned to its 
rapid growth rate of an annual average of 5%, having left the crisis behind. 
Governed by the Public Limited Company Act and the Securities and 
Exchange Act, SET has three main tasks in its operation. First, it can be 
approached by an applicant company to be listed to trade in equities in both 
the main market and the Market of Alternative Investment (MAI). Second, it 
has a duty to provide an efficient trading system. Finally, the Stock Exchange 
has to provide sufficient shareholder protection, where information disclosure 
is compulsory. SET uses the Automatic Order Matching system to match 
price and then a system of time priority in real time. It also allows a Put-
through system in case of negotiations made in advance. There are five 
types of board; namely, the main board, odd lot, special board, big lot board 
and foreign board. After trading, an investor has to transfer the security within 
three working days using multilateral netting. The current clearing procedure 
follows the book-entry system. 
To become a listed company, the stock market requires the applicant to trade 
in something which is economically and socially beneficial to the country. The 
first specific requirement for a candidate company to be listed in the main 
stock is the possession of at least 300 million Thai baht of paid-up capital for 
common shares. The distribution of minor shareholdings is monitored and 
requires at least 1000 shareholders generally holding at least 25% of the 
outstanding shares. It also requires the candidate to have a track record of at 
least three continuous years under a single management team before joining 
the market. Regarding financial condition, the market requires the candidate 10  
 
to have accumulated at least 50 million Thai baht in net profits in the previous 
three years to joining the market, with the most recent accounting period 
showing at least 30 million Thai baht of net profit. Its financial statement and 
auditors have to be identified by specific characters. The requirements of 
independent directors, an audit committee, corporate governance and 
internal control are clearly mentioned in order to reduce conflicts of interest 
(SEC, 2007a; 2007b; 2007c). Moreover, dividend policy must be clearly 
stated. In addition to the equity market, an Alternative Investment Market in 
bonds and derivatives is also available; however, these markets are operated 
by a sub-unit of the Stock Exchange. The Market for Alternative Investment 
was introduced as a new opportunity for medium-sized businesses to gain 
access to this source of funding. These businesses had a good chance of 
growth and were operating in a new economy; they were fast-growing, 
innovative and knowledge-based, and in such areas as computers, 
technology, food, the media and professional services. Even those in key 
roles apply to the Market for Alternative Investment (MAI), but still the stock 
market provides some advantages for those who trade in it, since it has lower 
requirements for listing companies in this group. To be a candidate, the 
company must have at least 20 million baht of equity and market capitalization 
of at least 1,000 million baht. It has to continually operate for at least two 
years under a single management team and its most recent accounting 
period must show a net profit. Its security requirements are to have at least 
300 shareholders holding at least 20% of its capital. Table 5.2 displays the 
securities listed in SET both in number and in market capitalisation. 
Table 1.2 provides information about the size of SET.   It indicates that the 
stock securities have steadily grown over the past decade. In particular, the 
highest expansion of the number of listed companies was between 2004 and 
2005, while the rate of growth of financial products reached a peak. In the 
value of trading, soon after the Asian financial crisis, the market capitalisation 
of SET expanded sharply between 2002 and 2003. It continued to show 
consistent growth until it dropped sharply in 2006.  11  
 
Table 1.2 Thai stock market overview 
 
 
2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Number of listed companies                 
 Listed companies  381  385  392  399  428  474  504  535  543 
Market Capitalisation (Unit: Millions of Baht)             
 Stock Securities  1,290,997  1,607,737  1,990,035  4,803,548  4,533,598  5,119,427  5,100,515  6,674,338  7,180,752 
      Common Stocks  1,279,224  1,515,612  1,863,972  4,583,775  4,370,031  4,966,392  4,951,960  6,484,947  7,011,507 
      Preferred Stocks  n.a.  74,473  89,613  131,983  112,885  112,892  114,870  155,355  134,638 
      Stock options  11,773  17,652  36,451  87,790  50,681  40,144  33,684  34,035  34,607 
 Debt Securities   223,696  251,720  280,342  457,759  475,779  576,893  869,227  934,323  1,001,698 
 Unit Trusts   369,291  392,872  466,035  727,214  682,623  963,806  1,222,494  1,611,481  1,524,663 
 Others   n.a.  7,000  224  3,996  7,177  7,385  4,785  7,279  5,121 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand (2010) and Bank of Thailand (2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008) 12  
 
In addition to stock securities, the market also provides a bond market, which 
is called the Bond Electronic Exchange. The trading volume of bonds has 
grown about five times since it was first introduced. Alternative security is the 
Non-Voting Depository Receipts and the derivatives market. The developed 
deal, with the statement that the market needed further developing, was the 
variety of financial provision, in which 95% of volume trading came from cash 
equities. Compared to the World Federation of Exchanges, the Thai stock 
market has a very limited percentage of derivatives in its trading. Only 2% of 
its securities trading is in derivative products, whereas 47% of market 
capitalisation is the average worldwide. The stock market also provides the 
volume of transactions made by three groups of investors; local investors, 
local institutions and foreign investors.  
Table 1.3 Percentage of transactions by investor type in SET 
  Local 
investors 
Local 
institutions 
Foreign 
investors 
2000  62  6  32 
2001  77  4  19 
2002  72  5  23 
2003  76  6  18 
2004  71  8  21 
2005  62  10  28 
2006  55  11  34 
2007  54  14  32 
2008  54  17  29 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand (2010) 
Most of the transactions on the Thai stock exchange were by local investors. 
More than two thirds of listed compensation is traded by either corporations 
or individual Thais. Only one third of the listed companies are traded by 
foreign investors. The proportion of foreign investors was healthy, however, 
ranging from 18%-34% across the period. There are a few listed companies 13  
 
traded by local institutions, but the number is growing, from 6% at first to a 
level of 17% in the most recent year for which figures are available.  
Under the supervision of the SEC, SET requires listed companies to provide 
those investors with all their important information. The fully automatic trading 
system called the Automated System was introduced in 2001. Also, the stock 
market has developed the Electronic Listed Company Information Disclosure 
system, which provides both Thai and English language financial and non-
financial documents, directly transposed to the SET website. If it fails to do 
so, SET sends a warning signal to the trading board. A Notice Pending will 
be issued if the Stock Exchange continues to wait for further information or 
explanation from the company. A Notice Received will be issued should 
information or explanation be received. In the case of an abnormal 
transaction, a Trading Halt will warn investors that Security has come to a 
temporary halt. The sign deals with structural changes and gives no 
information to the public. A suspension sign will be shown if the firm fails to 
provide the needed information within the time frame. 
A financial statement, which includes the balance sheet, income statement, 
cash flow statement, statement of change in equity and note to the financial 
statement is then required. A statement of management structure is also 
required; comprising organisation structure, a list of executive managers, 
auditors, independent directors and other related information such as the 
structure of committees, which requires further information about selection 
criteria  and which director belongs to which committee, as well as the 
meetings and attendance of the directors. The executive compensation is 
required to be reported as a total, but the type of compensation must be 
specified. Details of audit fees and non-audit fees to auditing firms are also 
required in the published report. It is also required to have an audit 
committee of at least three persons, of whom at least one is a financial 
expert.  An independent committee of at least three persons is also 
mandatory. 14  
 
In 2006, SET first officially announced that it was still concerned over the 
issue of executive pay. In addition to SET, the National Corporate 
Governance Committee and the Stock Exchange Committee investigated 
those executives who were overpaid. These three bodies investigated 
executive compensation to test whether it was in line with firm performance 
and the industry to which it belonged. They found the evidence that it was 
satisfactory. The investigation of these three provides some useful 
information, available at the SET website. The data show that 341 of Thai 
listed companies (79%) paid both salary and bonus as a compensation 
package to their executives. The second package was salary alone and 90 
firms (21%) paid a salary to their executives. In addition to basic pay, 
perquisites were provided by 212 companies to their supervisors. Regarding 
warrant-package compensation, 40 firms offered this.  
The discussion of compensation is currently under debate. Concerned by this 
matter, the stock market authorities are aware that stakeholders need 
executive compensation information. This basic information provides a bird’s 
eye view that executive compensation in Thailand does follow the world 
super power of the US. In addition to the above analysis, the regulator is also 
concerned over the angle of whether executive compensation is based on 
good corporate governance. It analysed the relationship of total assets, sales 
and net income to compensation pay. Total assets would be the proxy of the 
executive responsibility, since it is assumed that bigger firms demand more 
responsibility and thus justify bigger benefits. Further, sales and net income 
were presented by the bodies as the proxies of executive performance. This 
assumption may be based on the work of writers who claim that the more 
benefits the executives provide for the firm, the more compensation they 
should receive. The results of the relationship show weak evidence of the link 
between compensation and these three proxies. Therefore, they highlight 
that this weak evidence is due to the limitations of the number of factors that 
were taken into account. 15  
 
 
1.4 The executive compensation setting in Thai listed company 
The uniqueness of Thai culture creates a stock market with its won unique 
characteristics. The concentrations of shareholders are considered as 
potential sources of a specific form of corporate governance.  Therefore, SET 
expressed its concern over executive compensation practices as a 
mechanism of corporate governance. Doumar and Schreuder (2008) 
mentioned that corporate governance is particularly important since it 
provides systems by which companies are directed and controlled; thus well 
designed governance should be able to prevent excessive pay and 
encourage the use of performance-related pay. The first documentation on 
the role of the committee is drawn in the “Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies 2006” best practice which was created by 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Kim et al (2010) indicates that 
understanding the executive compensation setting not only benefits the 
investors, but also benefits the firm itself when gathering the funds.  In 2006, 
SET issued a statement indicating that setting structures and procedures of 
relationship between managers, directors, and shareholders including other 
stakeholders is crucial for efficient, transparent, and audited management 
systems.  
Even the SEC has unambiguous concern over corporate governance 
practice in Thailand; however there is no explicit requirement for listed 
companies to deal with its governance structure. It only indicates that the 
Board of Directors should contain both executive directors and non-executive 
directors such as independent and external directors. Having issued the 
guidance, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (2006) claimed that it believes that 
corporate governance is a crucial element of internal procedures that 
arrange, accomplish, and ensure the effectiveness of the firm. Taking this 
universal approach, the SET issued its code of conduct which complies with 16  
 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s 
recommendations. However this demonstration of code of good governance 
is only guidance and the gurantee of protection is not yet active (Wali-ul-
Maroof, 2006). 
1.4.1 The governance structures 
The SET (2008) required Thai listed companies to establish boards of 
directors as the representatives of the shareholders. Since the Board of 
Directors is responsible for enhancing the firm’s interest, appointments to the 
board should remain neutral and transparent and the role of directors should 
be clearly defined. The influence of executive managers on the contracting 
process is forbidden as is controlling shareholders or management. The 
shareholders should have the right to nominate candidates for board 
positions. Besides, the nomination and election process should function as a 
means of ensuring board accountability
1. The team should include various 
qualifications of independent non-executive directors who are free from any 
relationship that might materially interfere with individual capacity in order to 
prevent inadequate divergence of interests between stockholders and 
executive managers. The members should promote the credibility of financial 
reporting and ensure that executive management acts on the stakeholder’s 
behalf at all times.  
In order to support the recommended best practice, SET (2006) issued 
remuneration committee guidelines in 2008 in the hope of adjusting the 
guidelines to fit with the company’s specific environment. It requested a 
remuneration committee to study and screen special tasks of executive 
compensation on behalf of the board. The executive compensation is 
particularly important by using incentives to align the interest between the 
                                                 
1 Jongsureyaport (2006) revealed that only half of listed companies have shareholders 
elected as members of the board of director. Also, the executive believes that it is 
difficult to discover equity ownership and the major shareholders control. 17  
 
shareholders and the manager. Since the executive compensation duties are 
important and specifically unique, it is recommending the compensation 
committee as the sub-committee of the Board of Directors to study and 
screen the compensation issue on behalf of the board.  
The compensation committee has a virtual role in determining and making 
recommendations of executive compensation to the Board of Directors, 
which would be approved or amended, and then proposes the plan to 
shareholders for approval (SET, 2008). Since the form and level of 
executives need to be well balanced in order to retain, motivate, and attract 
desirable executives at affordable cost, the committee should typically 
conduct surveys on the current market compensation practices, using 
benchmarks, and then set  the performance standard. Many compensation 
committees deploy external compensation consultants to survey the market 
conditions by comparing the pay level and structure of firms with those of 
similar size and within the same industry in order to make recommendations 
about the compensation package. To ensure neutrality, the majority of the 
compensation committee should be independent in that the board of 
director’s chairman should not be either the committee chairman or a 
member. The team should have at least three members. The appointment to 
the committee should be for three years and should coincide with the 
member’s tenure as a director. SET (2006)  indicated that the team should 
take into account the stakeholders’ interests by regularly reporting its 
recommendations on the criteria for and the amount of compensation to the 
Board of Directors and to shareholders through the firm’s annual report and 
the shareholders’ meeting.  
Jongsureyaport (2006) found that, typically, the size of aThai board was 
between eight and 12 members, with three to five independent directors. In 
fact, 36% of listed companies do not yet have a compensation committee, so 
the boards of directors have to perform the task. The author further revealed 
that reviewing of executive compensation is paid least attention, compared 18  
 
with the other functions of the board. Some firms, then, put more efforts into 
this area by liking independent directors directly to firm performance. Yet, the 
author pointed out that a new problem emerged that using a board of 
directors is a less effective way to oversee the governance of a company. 
1.4.2 The compensation process 
The SET (2008) insisted that clarifying a compensation package is crucial to 
recruit, retain, and motivate executives who are needed within levels of 
affordability but not overpaid; thus the compensation committee should 
consider and propose the criteria against which appropriate compensation 
pay is set, tailored to reflect each individual executive’s experience, 
obligations, responsibilities and workload, risk, retention, and reward through 
reviewing the current criteria, comparing the compensation package with 
those of other companies in the same industry, establishing criteria that 
create the expected result and rewarding those who contribute to the firm’s 
success. In addition, all forms, amounts and proportions of the compensation 
package should be reviewed regularly.  
The Thai institute of Directors and McKinsey and Company (2002) found that 
even though listed companies perceived the value of the approval process, 
very few companies approve executive compensation by shareholders. 
Consequence, the Director’s Handbook produced by the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand in 2004 recommended that executive pay should be set based on 
comparison with others in the same industry and holding the same 
responsibilities and financial position. It is also important that there is 
consistency between the performance evaluation and the firm’s targets. The 
handbook also indicates that executive compensation pay depends on their 
own value which is set by the Board of Directors while approval of the 
executive compensation pay is the shareholders’ duty.  However, 
Jongsureyaport (2006) found during the designing of compensation 19  
 
packages, only a few firms had a clear statement of responsibilities, where 
compensations is influenced by management’s impact on firm performance.  
1.4.3 Reporting of executive compensation plans 
Since financial reporting is vital for investors’ decisions, SET (2009) indicated 
that the Board of Directors has a duty to ensure that all important information 
relevant should be reported regularly, correctly, accurately, timely and 
transparently through easy-to-access channels that are fair and trustworthy. 
It further indicated that stakeholders expect the disclosure which is strictly 
complied with and apply with the implementation of the principles in their 
2007 annual report onward. In the case that the company does not comply 
with, or adopt, the principles, it needs to explain itself.   
Since, however, the Stock Exchange of Thailand only requires listed 
companies to state the total pay that is provided to the executive managers, 
most companies refer to executive salaries as a top executive compensation 
package. SET (2008) further suggested that the remuneration committee 
should ensure that names of committee members, numbers of committee 
meeting, rate of attendance at the committee meetings by each committee 
member, summary of the committee’s charter and compensation criteria 
should clearly set out. Also, the committee’s charter and compensation 
criteria should be disclosed in full on the company’s website; and in addition, 
full and transparent disclosure per director, including a non-technical 
explanation of the rationale for the compensation plan, should be displayed in 
annual reports in order for shareholders to make proper assessment of the 
packages. 
SET has yet to respond to CIMA’s (2010) suggestion that full details of the 
individual directors’ pay packages should be submitted as part of the annual 
report; which included: (1) the policy on executive compensation, (2) the 20  
 
components of the compensation package which broken down into the total 
base salary, details of annual performance incentive, details of long-term 
performance incentive, and other benefits, (3) the balance of components in 
terms of content and value, (4) total emoluments for all other executive 
managers, (5) an aggregate total of all taxable benefits paid to executive 
managers, and (6) duration of service contracts. 
 
1.5 Research objectives 
This empirical study investigates the pay-performance sensitivity and its 
consequences, by emphasising primarily the usefulness of contracting in 
providing public information, which is believed to mitigate the cost of 
contracting. This research also provides evidence of the way in which 
ownership structure, as the moderating variable, affects the pay-performance 
sensitivity. With its concern over ownership structure, this research intended 
to provide new evidence on how different types of owner use the incentive 
mechanism in their organisation. The unit of analysis is the listed companies 
in Thailand. There are five objectives of this study, namely: 
1. To investigate the level and form of executive pay of Thai listed companies. 
2. To investigate the executive pay-performance sensitivity in Thai listed 
companies. It intends to respond the current debate over executive pay.  
3. To investigate the role of ownership structure in the pay-performance 
sensitivity in Thai listed companies. This brand new approach will provide a 
better understanding of the way ownership affects the compensation pay. 21  
 
4. To investigate the effectiveness of existing Thai executive compensation 
by evaluating the performance consequences of executive compensation, in 
which recently developed statistical techniques are used in order to reveal 
the casual relationship between incentive and firm performance. 
5. To investigate the moderating effects of ownership structure on the 
performance consequences of executive compensation. Since most studies 
of executive compensation have focused on the pay-performance sensitivity 
debate, limited attention has been paid to the performance consequences of 
executive compensation.  
 
1.6 Research questions  
From the research objectives, this study offers research themes by which to 
study the relationship between executive compensation and the firm 
performance. The main question is as follows: 
“How effective is executive compensation pay in Thai listed companies?” 
In order to address the main question, four supplementary sets of questions 
are introduced, as follows:  
1. Does firm performance relate to the extent of its executive compensation pay? 
1.1 Does EPS relate to the extent of its executive salary pay? 
1.2 Does OCF relate to the extent of its executive salary pay? 
1.3 Does R relate to the extent of its executive salary pay? 
1.4 Does EPS relate to the extent of its executive bonus pay? 
1.5 Does OCF relate to the extent of its executive bonus pay? 22  
 
1.6 Does R relate to the extent of its executive bonus pay? 
1.7 Does EPS relate to the extent of its executive total pay? 
1.8 Does OCF relate to the extent of its executive total pay?  
1.9 Does R relate to the extent of its executive total pay? 
 
2. Do ownership structures moderate the firm performance sensitivity to 
executive compensation pay? 
2.1 Does family ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.2 Does family ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.3 Does family ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive salary? 
2.4 Does corporate ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.5 Does corporate ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.6 Does corporate ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.7 Does foreign ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.8 Does foreign ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.9 Does foreign ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive salary? 
2.10 Does dispersed ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.11 Does dispersed ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
salary? 23  
 
2.12 Does dispersed ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
salary? 
2.13 Does family ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.14 Does family ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.15 Does family ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.16 Does the corporate ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to 
executive bonus? 
2.17 Does corporate ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.18 Does corporate ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.19 Does foreign ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.20 Does foreign ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.21 Does the foreign ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.22 Does dispersed ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.23 Does dispersed ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.24 Does dispersed ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
bonus? 
2.25 Does family ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 24  
 
2.26 Does family ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
total pay?  
2.27 Does family ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive total 
pay? 
2.28 Does corporate ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 
2.29 Does corporate ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
total pay?  
2.30 Does corporate ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 
2.31 Does foreign ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 
2.32 Does foreign ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
total pay?  
2.33 Does foreign ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive total 
pay? 
2.34 Does dispersed ownership moderate the EPS sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 
2.35 Does dispersed ownership moderate the OCF sensitivity to executive 
total pay?  
2.36 Does dispersed ownership moderate the R sensitivity to executive 
total pay? 
3. Does executive compensation relate to the extent of their firm performance? 
3.1 Does executive bonus pay relate to the extent of their EPS? 
3.2 Does executive bonus pay relate to the extent of their OCF?  
3.3 Does executive bonus pay relate to the extent of their R?  
3.4 Does executive total pay relate to the extent of their EPS?  25  
 
3.5 Does executive total pay relate to the extent of their OCF?  
3.6 Does executive total pay relate to the extent of their R?  
 
4. Do ownership structures moderate the firm performance consequences of 
executive compensation? 
4.1 Does family ownership moderate the EPS consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.2 Does corporate ownership moderate the EPS consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.3 Does foreign ownership moderate the EPS consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.4 Does the dispersed ownership moderate the EPS consequences of 
executive bonus? 
4.5 Does family ownership moderate the OCF consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.6 Does corporate ownership moderate the OCF consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.7 Does foreign ownership moderate the OCF consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.8 Does dispersed ownership moderate the OCF consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.9 Does family ownership moderate the R consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.10 Does corporate ownership moderate the R consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.11 Does foreign ownership moderate the R consequences of the 
executive bonus? 26  
 
4.12 Does dispersed ownership moderate the R consequences of the 
executive bonus? 
4.13 Does family ownership moderate the EPS consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.14 Does corporate ownership moderate the EPS consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.15 Does foreign ownership moderate the EPS consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.16 Does dispersed ownership moderate the EPS consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.17 Does family ownership moderate the OCF consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.18 Does corporate ownership moderate the OCF consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.19 Does foreign ownership moderate the OCF consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.20 Does dispersed ownership moderate the OCF consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.21 Does family ownership moderate the R consequences of executive 
total pay? 
4.22 Does corporate ownership moderate the R consequences of 
executive total pay? 
4.23 Does foreign ownership moderate the R consequences of executive 
total pay? 
4.24 Does dispersed ownership moderate the R consequences of 
executive total pay? 
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1.7 Significance of the study 
This research does not expect to provide a conclusive solution for the 
protractedly debated issue of compensation design, but it does simplify the 
collective knowledge and provide empirical evidence for existing theories, as 
well as inserting new statistical techniques when appropriate. This research 
will, it is hoped, deal with at least four main issues.  
First, the study aims to either validate or challenge the social controversy 
about possible pay-performance sensitivity. New thinking has brought extra 
considerations: this study hopes to explicate the role of the ownership in which 
an economic organisation operates. The next consideration is to investigate 
the role of executive compensation in determining a firm performance. This 
result will lead to confirmation/demolition of the challenge to the current design 
of executive compensation.  
Second, regarding the unique executive compensation in Thailand, some 
companies claim that they pay compensation on the basis of performance, 
while some even report only the budget for executive compensation. This 
study will, it is hoped, bring a better understanding of the executive 
compensation pay of Thai companies. Furthermore, this research will employ 
ownership structure to investigate the pay-performance sensitivity, which will 
help Thai firms to understand the role of market structure that might provide a 
potential direction for their strategies in the future. This information will also 
encourage investors to investigate the relevant information before they make 
a decision, which will help the development of Thailand’s capital market. The 
information provided also reminds the regulators to reconsider their role in 
the design of benefits and setting of guidelines.    28  
 
Third, the developing of modern econometrics allows the endogeneity 
between executive compensation and firm performance to be studied. This 
simultaneous equation and identification specification provides an opportunity 
to understand whether a firm pays high executive compensation because it 
hopes to get better performance or because, with high performance, it can 
afford to pay high executive compensation.  
Last, the conceptual model and the research methodology will illustrate an 
approach to assess and develop executive compensation programmes in 
other developing countries. This study will, it is hoped, contribute to our 
collective understanding of executive compensation in a non-traditional 
context, specifically in an Asian context, by testing Agency theory on the 
compensation paid to Thai executives and the performance of their firms. It is 
expected that the results will show how managers’ compensation is 
influenced by firm performance, which may show whether compensation can 
reduce the conflict of interest between the principal and the agent.  
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
This study is divided into nine chapters: an introduction, literature review, 
research framework, study of research methodology, the research findings,     
a discussion and a conclusion. An overview of each chapter is presented 
below. 
Chapter 1, the present chapter, provides introductory information as a 
background to the research, and discusses first the objectives, questions and 
significance of the research and then the structure of this study of the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. 29  
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review on the theory of the firm which leads to the 
introduction of incentive compensation and control mechanisms, using 
biological order. Theory of the firm will lay the foundation while Agency theory 
is discussed later in the chapter.  
Chapter 3 follows the development of the research framework with its two 
main issues: what determines executive compensation and how it influences 
firm performance.  
Chapter 4 discusses the research methodology, which reveals the nature of 
the research design, research method, data collection and data analysis. This 
chapter aims to provide a research tool for answering the research questions.  
After this, research results of the analysis are provided in Chapter 5. The 
analysis begins with descriptive statistics which gives a general idea of 
executive compensation in Thailand.  
Chapter 6 investigates the pay-performance sensitivity. This chapter provides 
the testing of hypotheses of this study by inferential statistical tests. Statistical 
techniques such as the Pooled OLS, FE, two-stage least squares and the 
Generalised Method of Moment are employed to supply the information.  
Chapter 7 goes on to investigate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation. This chapter also provides the testing of 
hypotheses of this study by inferential statistical tests. Statistical techniques 
such as the Pooled OLS, FE, two-stage least squares and the Generalised 
Method of Moment are employed to supply the information. 
The next chapter (Chapter 8) contains a discussion of these findings, 
together with the implications of the results. Afterwards, Chapter 9 presents 
the conclusions of this study.  30  
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1.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter has provided an overview of this study of pay-performance 
sensitivity and its consequences. The first section presents the research 
background, showing how the organisation has been studied on the issue of 
incentives. The second section provides the research motivation. The 
research question is identified in section three. The next section identifies the 
research objectives and focuses on the expected outcomes of this project. 
Section five states the significance of the study. Next, the structure of the 
present study is identified. After that, a list of presentations is shown  and this 
final section has summarised the chapter. 
 
   32  
 
   33  
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter reviews the state of executive compensation research with an 
emphasis on its core theories. Until now, executive compensation has been 
viewed as a complicated issue joining the provinces of finance (Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1988), economics (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), 
accounting (Ittner and Larcker, 1998), management (Barkema and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998), and politics (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Hengartner (2006) 
believes that diversity approaches provide a comprehensive knowledge on 
executive pay. However, the diversity also leads to contradictory findings 
which leads to the acknowledgement that there is a puzzle here that needs to 
be solved.  34  
 
The original idea of this organisational study of the incentive system was 
derived from the economic study of industrial organisations. It can be traced 
to the economists’ theory of the firm, which states that market failure leads to 
the establishment of economic organisations. Together with the primary 
assumptions of the economic study of organisations, human assumptions and 
information assumptions, the different forms of the separation between 
ownership and control require the firm to design different contracts to co-
ordinate the activities within the organisation. Unfortunately, the development 
of the capital market has increased the size of firms, and which increases the 
problem of the relationship between the Principal and the Agent, so in turn it 
increases the complexity of the working contract. Altogether, these increases 
have led to the use of an incentive system to resolve the problems, but they 
create a further level of complexity in the relationship between the Principal 
and the Agent. This is because the state of asymmetric information between 
them allows the self-interest of the Agent, who has more information, to have 
an advantage over the Principal, which is well known as a cost of using an 
Agency. The key issue is that human rationale and information asymmetry 
still play a crucial role in the Principal/Agent relationship. Although the firm 
must pay for incentives, it is expected that the agency cost will be returned to 
the firm by the improvement in the firm performance. 
This study, initially, extends the famous paper of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), who move towards the relationship within the firm via the agency 
approach. They explain that any separation between ownership and control 
makes the Principal aware that the design of the working contract should 
insist on full responsibility for the hazard that the contract may be broken by 
the Agent. Therefore, all of the relevant contracting action is wrapped up with 
ex-ante incentive alignments (Williamson, 1985). However, early studies 
emphasised the traditional asset ownership studies of Coase (1937), Simon 
(1951) and Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), who all approach the firm as 
an asset of the Principal because of his physical investment. Later, this 
became the concern of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 35  
 
(1990), who highlighted a new side of the story by posting that the Agent also 
holds part of the rights of the firm because he has a right to his private 
information. Thus, the relationship is not as straightforward as that of 
employer and employee; rather it is an interrelationship of corporate control 
over the claim of the firm’s wealth. 
Furthermore, the international capital market and cross-country investment 
has brought new knowledge from all over the world in a short period. An 
emerging trend in the US is the increasing use of stock options and lack of 
fringe benefits, and the decline of the salary element in total compensation is 
expected to spread worldwide. However, the awareness of different basic 
assumptions between Anglo-Saxon and other settings raises widespread 
concern over the ignorance of authorities of copy-cat behaviour unnecessary 
to their active role and regulations. This study aims to contribute to the 
ongoing debate on executive compensation by empirically exploring issues 
relating to compensation and ownership structure and their relationship with 
firm performance in the Thai context. 
This chapter has been organised into five sections. The first section states 
the assumptions that the economists set out in organisation studies of the 
relationship between the Principal and the Agent. The second section 
presents a comprehensive review on the use of executive compensation in 
the economic organisation. Section three provides the theoretical approaches 
to executive compensation pay. This section also investigates the effect of 
ownership structure on the compensation design. Section four sets out details 
about the performance consequences of executive compensation. Then the 
last section provides brief information about the overall findings of the 
chapter. 
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2.1 Theory of the firm 
A set of propositions about governing an organisation has been in place since 
organisation theory began. Smith (1776) and later Berle and Means (1932) 
laid the foundations for thinking about the economy of the organisation. The 
first book explains the importance of the division of labour whereas the 
second emphasises the separation of ownership and control in modern 
organisations. Coase (1937) states that, in a perfect market, the ideal 
mechanism for allocating resources efficiently is the price mechanism. It is 
the equilibrium point where the buyer is willing to pay what is asked and the 
seller agrees to receive that amount.  
Unfortunately, the sophisticated characteristics of asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency lead to a contracting problem (Williamson, 1975). 
When the market is unable to provide a satisfactory price for either the buyer 
or the seller, spot deals cannot be made. For this reason, if it is a perfect 
market, the success of transactions relies on the quality of the regulations, 
information provision and accreditation, which combine to prevent 
opportunism among the parties to a transaction (Coase, 1937). An imperfect 
market leads to the establishing of organisations to fulfil those requirements 
below the market price. The firm works to control and coordinate both 
production and transaction costs. The division of labour plays a role in an 
organisation, as it does in the markets. The idea underpinning this is that, 
when tasks have been split up into small components, the unique 
characteristic of each one can be served easily, so that the common objective 
will be achieved. Williamson (1975) wanted an invisible structure of market 
features and the hierarchical and hybrid forms of the organisation to be 
systematically linked to economic consequences. A complete view of the firm 
has been introduced using contract as the explanation. Jensen and Meckling 37  
 
(1976) indicate that the firm is actually a set of contracts between stakeholders 
whom share some interest. All these relationships have to give to, and will 
take some dimension of, organisational wealth. However, problems can arise 
in any exchange process when someone has to enter a contract with 
someone else. Fama and Jensen (1983) remarkably put forward their Theory 
of the Firm, using the organisation assumption on the role of separation 
between ownership and control, and then investigated the issue of the 
governing of modern organisations. Eisenhardt (1989) extends on the 
foundation of the Theory of the Firm using the role information plays in self-
interested behaviour, which raises conflicts of interest between groups of 
people, due to their risk preferences. 
The idea of the division of labour can be traced back to the origin of modern 
economics in Smith’s Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1776). The thesis became a phenomenal success because it 
allowed resources to be allocated with greater efficiency by decomposing all 
complicated work into simple tasks. Expertise in a task will require less time 
and resources to complete the work. Later evidence shows that a firm’s size 
regresses as the marginal cost of transaction declines. Evidence of this can 
be found in the rapid development of the industrial world, since, once the 
Industrial Revolution got under way, the world was never the same again. 
The dramatic development of capital markets to deal with the gathering of 
long-term funds in the US and the UK led to the development of today’s 
international capital markets. Expanding the capacity to gather capital for a 
firm brings people together to share wealth. In the meantime, the complexity 
of the relationships between groups of people in the capital market attracted 
academic interest in explaining what drove the new economy. The concept 
first put forward was that, since, directors manage other people’s money 
rather than their own, problems may arise.  
The first economic paper dealing with assumptions about simultaneous 
relationships between the Principal and the Agent was that of Berle and 38  
 
Means (1932); under the title The Modern Corporation and Private Property; it 
found the relationship highly problematic, in fact. They queried how 
organisations should balance between their Principals, the fund owners and 
the professional Agents who have discretionary power in the firm. A possible 
more important question is how the fund owners can be sure that the Agent is 
behaving in such as way as to serve the owner’s interests. The authors found 
that modern organisations try to avoid, shape and dominate economic 
regulations in the US. 
2.1.1 Information assumption 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) placed a fundamental relationship for study 
between production, information cost and the economic organisation of 
ownership. It inserts the concept of the principal-and-agent problem by 
reviewing the emergence of the firm’s central power where information is 
available but unevenly distributed and deals with the pursuit of competitive 
advantages by the more efficient allocation of resources throughout an 
organisation. The paper was a landmark in writings on economics by recalling 
that the entrepreneur uses the organisation to produce particular activities 
through an agent, the person who makes the decisions about management 
control. The situation requires the entrepreneur to design plans for control 
and coordination, which will include methods for motivating the agent.  
One crucial issue in organisational economics comes from information 
asymmetries. Arrow, Pratt, and Zeckhauser mentioned, as far back as 1985 
in their work, Principals and Agents: the Structure of Business, that imperfect 
information influences the allocation of resources in both markets and 
organisations. The authors state that the organisation problem arises because 
one person has to give his power to another in order for the latter to make 
decisions on behalf of them both. The former has relevant information which 
the latter does not have. The discrepancy in information between the two 
sides is not costless; the shortfall is called the agency loss or agency cost.  39  
 
The concept of imperfect information in the markets was firstly introduced in 
Akerlof’s (1970) paper in a form which he called the market for lemons. The 
paper is remarkable in terms of the explanation of the problem, the 
application and its effect; it is illustrated by the example of the problems 
involved in buying a second-hand car. The seller knows more about the car 
than the buyer does and he also wants to make as much profit as he can. 
The buyer does not know the quality of the car and so he wants to pay as 
little as he can. The transaction can be made if the buyer can accept the 
price; if not, he will reject the transaction. The situation can be applied to the 
relationship between the Principal and the Agent in the stage of designing the 
contract, because the Agent always knows his own characteristics and 
abilities better than the Principal does. Consequently, the Principal has to 
design the contract, as well as control the Agent’s behaviour, only on the 
basis of such information as he has. The Agent has to decide if he will accept 
the offer and, if so, when the contract will begin; if not, he must reject the 
offer. There followed five decades of statistical proof that the theory is one of 
the most powerful theories at present (Wolk et al., 2007). Its point brings into 
play factors that lie at the root of the relationship problem; human 
assumptions, self-interest, risk aversion and bounded rationality (Jensen, 
1994), from the Principal’s point of view. In one way, the Agent knows that he 
has to act as the Principal wants, but the self-awareness of the Principal tells 
him that he should be worried about the possibility that the Agent may be 
serving his own interests. Arrow et al (1985) mention that imperfect 
information leads to two information models, named the hidden information 
model (adverse selection) and the hidden action model (moral hazard). The 
conflict becomes well known as the root of the agency problem mentioned in 
Jensen and Meckling’s world seminal research and its construction of the 
‘Theory of The Firm’.  
Arrow et al (1985) describe the situation thus, before the relationship has 
begun, if one person is ignorant or short of information about another while 
negotiating, his situation is referred to as one called ‘adverse selection’. 40  
 
Macho-Stadler et al (2001) define adverse selection problems as the difficulty 
experienced by the contractor in dealing with the private information that 
another person has held before their relationship began. Guesnerie (1992) 
adds that the problem of adverse selection is that the contractor may verify 
another person’s behaviour, but the process is costly. Macho-Stadler et al 
(2001) add that the contractor has a chance to design what the parameters of 
another person’s task should be, whereas how to reduce the private 
information is held by another. The Agent will put his best effort into the most 
important task, which he will evaluate on the basis of the reward of the task. 
Then, if he still has resources, he will continue to carry out the second task, 
the third task and so on. McKinnon and Bruns (1993) add that it is important 
to design a performance evaluation system based on the adverse selection 
model so that the system can be used to explicitly set out some of the 
Principal’s expectations about the job context and goals of performance, 
which will be measured. This gives rise to the classic phrase, ‘you may not 
get what you want, but you will get what you measure’. Of course, the chance 
of communication may be offered but it does not guarantee the success of 
the relationship, because factors such as regulations may influence the 
requirements of the contract; even so, it may not fully control how the Agent 
behaves. 
Because of the difference of risk preference between the Principal and the 
Agent and the self-interest of both of them, the Principal has to introduce 
some mechanism to make sure that the Agent is aware of what the Principal 
is looking for. A working contract has been introduced to reduce the agency 
cost when the economic interests of the Principal and Agent diverge 
substantially and monitoring is costly. Using this form of contract as a 
mechanism to reduce information asymmetries, Arrow (1963) and Holmstrom 
(1979) find the hidden action model (moral hazard). Holmstrom mentions that 
moral hazard is the ignorance or shortage of information on the part of the 
Agent after the negotiating of the agreement, which leads to anxiety about the 
performance of the agreement. The idea has been traced by Guesnerie 41  
 
(1992), who comments that the model of adverse effects also originates from 
insurance companies. Later, Macho-Stadler et al (2001) explained in detail 
that this situation arises after the contract has been signed, when the 
Principal is no longer able to fully observe the action (or the effort) of the 
Agent. This creates a chance for the Agent to use his private information to 
conceal his effort. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) highlight that this is the real 
problem of the term ‘effort’ which, although often required in the working 
contract, is not directly observable. The redundant behaviour due to the 
possession of private information diverts the Principal’s value to the Agent’s 
benefit and the Principal desires to eliminate this. The current issue in the 
moral hazard problem is finding how the Agent is behaving or risking another 
problem when the performance measurements have been settled.  
The cost of information has been revised recently, now that the cost has 
gone down with the development of information technology. Levinthal (1988) 
further mentions that the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard are 
reducible if the problems are repeated over time. Later on, economists 
realised that if the firm wants to simplify the Principal and Agent problem, 
complete agreement between them should be part of the structural design;  
but it should be borne in mind that the issue of asymmetric information still 
plays a crucial role in identifying the relationship between the Principal and 
the Agent. Whoever has more information is the key player who will not let 
the ideal contract be completed. Contracting has thus become one of the key 
elements which have dominated the study of organisations over time.  
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2.1.2 Behaviour assumptions 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that firms as professional organisations 
have costly conflicts involving self-interested behaviour between groups of 
people. Agency theory has sought to explain how incentives can optimise 
actions when two or more people are involved in economic activity under 
conditions of uncertainty. Self-interested behaviour raises the conflict of 
interests between groups of people, due to their risk preferences in such 
issues as compensation, regulation, leadership, vertical integration and 
transfer pricing (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The consideration of human assumptions is one supposition that economists 
require in order to understand human beings. The main objective for humans 
in making an economic decision is to maximise their unlimited wants from 
scarce resources. Neoclassical economics focuses on the maximising 
orientation in allocating activities between divisions, which is the most 
accurate when all the relevant costs can be identified. The strong form of 
self-interest is taken into account when determining such issues as 
technology, risk and perception. Of concern at first, though, was the lack of 
relevant information to make decisions limits the ability of the decision maker 
to maximise his benefit from the choices available. However, information 
technology has become immensely successful in providing access to various 
sources of data, so much so that this has created another problem of 
information, called information overload. Whether by lack of information or 
information overload, everything raises the cost of information in modern 
organisations. The desire to maximise benefit, which wants to select the best 
option at all times, becomes impossible to attain. Williamson (1985) states 
that either to claim economic man’s decisions as rational or to contemplate 
maximising benefits are both open to criticism as unrealistic ways to explain 
human behaviour.  43  
 
The current major platform for understanding about how economic man 
makes rational calculations was well constructed when Simon (1955) wrote 
his paper, A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice, an approach to human 
logic which later became well-known for introducing the term of ‘bounded 
rationality’. This was Simon’s particular name for his concept of ‘approximate 
rationality’. He points out that underneath the decision- making process there 
are two constraints on the individual: the limitation of information access and 
the limitation of computational capacities in complex situations. Ellison 
(2006) agrees that all human behaviour is based on reason, but thinks that 
the computability of the complexity of different situations makes for 
differences of choice. He links bounded rationality with the compensation 
issue by stating that a fully rational model could mean that a worker would be 
hired only in the case when he would contribute more profit to the firm than it 
would gain without him. However, the limitation of availability of information 
about the worker and the complexity of the tasks which he performs make it 
far from realistic to base a decision on this statement. He finally concludes 
that the ‘bounded rationality’ assumption allows economists to construct a 
model which describes how a reasonable person would behave and can 
predict in broad terms how people will act. However, almost all work on 
rationality has been done within the discipline of sociology, concerning the 
paradox inherent in statements of bounded rationality; it exists because 
emotion plays a crucial part in our behaviour as human beings (Schwartz, 
2002). As social animals, we elevate self expression above the needs of the 
social structure. The group’s standard becomes the bottom line of the 
indicator of its bounded rationality. This is the result of the complicated 
interaction within and between groups. This assumption allows us to study 
the interaction between groups of people to explain and predict each other’s 
behaviour.  
The allocation of scare resources to maximise need is key: But the question 
is, ‘the need of whom?’ ‘Opportunistic’ behaviour is the strong form of self-
interest orientation. It is another significant assumption of economists 44  
 
seeking to explain how human beings behave. It is believed to be sensible 
behaviour when humans assessing limited resources rank the significance of 
their needs. However, human beings tend to put their own needs above the 
needs of others (Jensen, 1994; Macho-Stadler et al, 2001). This can also 
explain the motivation when humans help each other; evaluating this 
realistically, they do so because they look forward to an expected reward 
rather than because they want to do good. The discussion on the nature of 
the expected reward is still continuing: some schools may take the view that 
people may not always need an economic reward, but they still look to 
increase self-satisfaction. Williamson (1985) summarises the three level of 
self-interest as opportunism, simple self-interest seeking and obedience. He 
points out that economists believe in self-interest-seeking with guile, which 
includes forms of lying, stealing and cheating. The discussion of this level of 
self-interest over human altruism is attacked by the findings of philosophy 
and psychology in religious discourse, which points to the power of humans 
to live together in peace and seems to be valid on the spiritual level. 
However, the study of mainstream economics, applied to issues of people 
making economic decisions, has so far not come across the matter of how 
the human spirit performs. Economists study the sort of situation where one 
person, the Principal, allows another, the Agent, to use his wealth to create 
more wealth. In so doing, the Principal expects to get the reward from his 
original wealth which, in modern finance studies, is called the cost of capital. 
When the Agent gets the capital from the Principal, he will try his best to 
achieve the biggest possible reward based upon the investment. Basically, 
the best the Agent can achieve is that the greater part of the capital should 
remain with him. Williamson (1985) summarises the current state-of-the-art of 
economic knowledge on human behaviour; it is not only the strong form of 
rationality but also the strong form of self-interest orientation (Baker, Gibbon 
and Murphy, 2002). 
Fama and Jensen (1983a) later established that the traditional concerns over 
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complicated by the addition of information asymmetry. This becomes even 
worse in a situation of uncertainty; the issue introduces unexpected behaviour 
into the firm, recalling the different levels of risk preference between Principal 
and Agent. Despite his concern over the Agent’s self-interest, the Principal 
still has to give the priority in making decisions to the Agent. It becomes 
worse when these two participants have different attitudes toward risk taking. 
This shows that there is inherently a risk preference problem, which stems 
from different attitudes towards risk and different areas of self-interest 
between the Agent and the Principal (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hillier, 1997). The 
Principal, generally, is risk-neutral, whereas the Agent is risk-averse. The 
Agent may well be aware that taking risks can raise the firm’s wealth, 
although when the firm is lucky, nothing will happen to it and thus to him. 
When the firm is unlucky, however, losing the firm’s wealth can incur 
penalties for the Agent. As mentioned, the Agent is following his self-interest: 
he will prefer to be risk-averse as regards his own interest. ‘Adverse 
selection’ is the name given to the Agent’s self-interest in taking action in his 
own interest when he has a different attitude toward risk from that of the 
Principal. In this regard, the Agent may not harm the Principal directly but he 
does not risk all he can afford, because his self-interest is also at stake. The 
literature on Agency theory suggests that including risk sharing in the 
compensation can improve the decision making of the Agent. The Agent will 
be rewarded for his good decisions in taking risks, even if he can also be 
penalised for bad decisions. This is fair enough; if the Agent does not take 
risks, both he and the firm get nothing; but if he does, he can either increase 
or lose wealth. It is a form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Bernard, 2005; Macho-
Stadler et al, 2001). 
2.1.3 Organisation assumptions 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) have fully revised the view that the raising of 
capital investment leads to serious issues of separation between ownership 
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how humans behave in the face of insufficient resources for all their wants 
and needs. Fama and Jensen’s study includes the expectation that the Agent 
can maximise his reward by decision making, which is always based on 
human rationality and opportunistic behaviour. The two behavioural 
assumptions play a crucial role in organisational studies, in particular when 
the information is not perfect. They move organisational studies to a search 
for organisational structures to control undesirable behaviours and to 
effectively circulate all needed information to all the parties concerned. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) believe that the agency problem arises when 
ownership and control are separated and the optimal contracting has 
limitations. This may allow the Agent to exercise power over the Principal’s 
interest. When the conflict of interest is unavoidable agency costs, there are 
three questions to address; how people behave, how information flows and 
how relationships are designed.  
The success of large firms which gained an advantage by economies of scale 
in the period of industrial revolution requires other firms to expand in order to 
compete. Since this became the norm, the owner has ceased to be the one 
who establishes the firm. The capital market also plays a part in holding the 
capital of the firm.  Burkart and Panunzi (2006) and Filatotchev and 
Mickiewicz (2006) suggest a situation where the decision maker does not 
own a substantial share of the wealth, producing a hold-up problem between 
the Principal and the Agent. The problem of control structure is aggravated in 
bigger markets where the structure of shareholders is widespread because in 
them the Principal has less bargaining power; this leads to the requirement of 
transparency within the organisation. Fama and Jensen (1983a) discuss the 
issue of residual claims, observing that the conventions of the game demand 
efficiency when the rule of the owner is not strong. The paper was warmly 
welcomed because it provided a managerial approach to the theory of the 
firm.  47  
 
The Agent has the responsibility to create the firm’s wealth, which is 
contributed as a dividend of stock return to the Principal, while the Agent 
himself receives compensation and the Board of Directors oversees the 
payment of a contribution of interest to minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Under the concepts of capitalism, Agents seem to be less 
powerful than Principals and must work under their control. This leads to the 
introduction of a board of directors, with the aim of keeping a fair balance 
between the shareholders (the Principal) and the manager (the Agent). Abell 
(2007) on the relationship between the Principal and the Agent matter 
indicates there are at least six methods which may be used by Principals to 
control and coordinate with the Agent: formalised rules/contracts, incentives, 
monitoring, power and authority; the use of bargaining power and the culture 
– the use of generated beliefs/values to achieve the Agent’s compliance, and 
a democratic voting mechanism to shape the contracts between the two. 
The shareholder, as the owner of the money and possibly of the firm, has to 
create a system to ensure that the Agent works to maximise his interests. The 
Principal can show his interest at the annual meeting but he has to 
acknowledge that almost all operating decisions are in the hands of the 
Agent. Moreover, the Agent is responsible for setting the firm’s vision, 
mission, objectives and plans and the implementation of these plans; they 
also contribute the management of the firm’s products on behalf of the 
Principal, the employees and other stakeholders (Lipman and Hall, 2008). 
Although some are concerned about how well Agents are represented, the 
executives who must perform on behalf of the Principal will be rewarded for 
their performance/effort; but, to perform at their best, the Agents may have to 
eliminate some short-term goals in order to achieve long-term success. This 
state of affairs may not always satisfy all Principals; for example, a firm which 
does not pay a dividend may experience a fall in the price of its shares. 
Agency theory calls this situation ‘the partial goal conflict’.  48  
 
A comparison of the power of the majority shareholder with that of the 
minority shareholder reveals a lack of collective bargaining power for 
dispersed shareholders on the manager’s residual claim (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). This has come to the fore of the discourse because of a development 
in the US capital market mode, in which the dispersed ownership structure 
has become more common, and thus more serious. Moreover, the minority 
interest, the ownership which holds less than 20% of outstanding shares, 
would also like more power (La Porta et al, 2000). This group is not satisfied 
to have ‘no meaningful control’; as a result, their situation requires American 
theorists to verify those control mechanisms in order to reduce the gap 
between the majority shareholders’, minority shareholders’ and manager’s 
interests.  
 
2.2 Executive compensation as a solution to the Principal-
Agent problem 
The issue of executive compensation as a solution to the agency problem is 
mentioned in The Theory of the Firm: Managerial behaviour, Agency cost 
and Capital structure by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The authors suggest 
that the fee for solving this problem is called ‘agency cost’ and this is also 
fully discussed in Arrow et al (1985), in terms of the monitoring costs to the 
Principal and the economic bonding cost to the Agent. Since the publication 
of this paper, studies of ways to manage agency cost efficiently have become 
widespread. Later, Jensen and Murphy (1990) revisited executive 
compensation by looking more closely at the classic statement of the 
Principal-Agent problem: the conflict of interests between ownership and 
control. They believe that introducing compensation pay on the basis of the 
Principal’s wealth is an appropriate mechanism. They further conclude that 
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the choices of the Agent with the interests of the Principal. They believed that 
this is the real reason why an incentive scheme is needed. Using Agency 
theory, they go back to three assumptions: that the Agent dislikes making an 
effort; that he holds some information not held by the Principal; and that the 
Principal and the Agent have different attitudes to risk. These lead to the use 
of incentives as a part of executive compensation to raise the Agent’s 
motivation. They caution that there are three examples of unobservable 
choice of action which may make the incentive mechanism unsuccessful; 
namely, the direct measure of CEO activity, the accounting measures of the 
firm performanceand relative performance, based on that of other executives 
in the same market. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) also summarise the assumption that the 
Principal designs a contract which is a linear function of measured 
performance and that the Agent is instructed to direct his efforts to the 
particular activities written into the work contract. However, the sophisticated 
activities of the multitasking Agent and the human impulse to maximise 
wealth all make performance measurement one of the key activities 
influencing organisational design of a kind which leads to the success of the 
organisation. Later, Milgrom and Robert (1992) urge that a mechanism 
should be found for the design of a contract, and find that the level of 
efficiency of the designed control system is the cause of the different degrees 
of success of the system. This idea is supported by Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991) in their paper The Firm as an Incentive System. They state clearly that 
to understand the issue of incentives requires not only the investigation of 
Incentive theory but also its alignment with a detailed study of the classic 
economics of the firm, which is closely linked with Agency theory. Differenct 
approaches to the theme of compensation are steadily expanding; the 
incentive system was introduced as part of the executive compensation 
package, in the form of a salary, bonus and stock options (Arora and Alam, 
2005; Farmer, 2008).  50  
 
Thus, executive compensation can be viewed as a mechanism to ensure that 
the manager will perform on behalf of the shareholder. The seed of Agency 
theory grew rapidly from the executive compensation literature. From the 
Principal’s point of view, setting up appropriate compensation should reduce the 
relationship problem. A compensation contract can align the interests of the 
manager and the shareholder through ownership interests. Later, this idea was 
incorporated as part of the theory of the Principal and the Agent, which 
comprises the second stream of the literature (Douma and Schreuder, 2008).  
The current spotlight on executive compensation comes from public interest 
when a statement such as ‘on average, pay to executive officers has been 
rising where the firm reports losses’ is announced. In response to such 
statements, the overall executive compensation at once becomes the subject 
of heated debate. Even though some academic papers suggest reasons with 
a view to dispelling the doubts, there is not much reaction from those people 
who raised the question. The issue of ‘how well does executive compensation 
work?’ was asked, in Abowd and Kaplan’s (1999) paper Executive 
Compensation: Six Questions That Need Answering. The authors give the 
idea that this is a great opportunity to re-investigate the Agency theory due to 
the availability of data provided. They believe that it is the right time to 
approach the issue with rigorous statistical analysis, by which they hope to 
bring out hidden information from beneath a mass of data. This idea has 
recently led the way into a well-known topic. All recent papers confirm there is 
a positive relationship between executive compensation and company size. 
However, the relationship between compensation and corporate performance 
is still uncertain. On one recent occasion, Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004) 
provided a rich literature review in their famous paper ‘Remuneration: where 
we’ve been, how we got to here, what are the problems and how to fix them’.  
To gain a better understanding of the compensation system, Gibbon (1998) 
summarises the executive compensation in terms of the simplest (linear) 
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manager. The contract requires the manager to work and then the 
shareholder will pay interest for the outcomes (observed effects, unobserved 
effects on outcomes and noise). The idea is propelled by the different 
character of those elements of executive pay of the principal-agent base. His 
salary is the constant benefit of the Agent and may be called his salary base 
compensation. His bonus and stock options are incentives per unit of required 
performance. Because of the different purposes in aligning these interests, 
the design of the compensation needs to take many perspectives into 
account. The classic issues such as base pay compensation, which is the 
constant benefit, are behaviour-oriented. Lastly, the outcome-orientation 
compensation is an incentive, which is the incentive per unit of required 
performance multiplied by the performance observed, i.e. bonus, stock 
options and a restricted shares plan. The ongoing debated issues of bonuses, 
such as how the target should be set, how performance should be measured 
and laying odds on one’s self-reported performance, are also currently 
attracting debate and many stock option issues, such as how it should be 
evaluated, still need to be answered.  
2.2.1 Base salary 
The first kind of compensation is monetary reward to the managers for doing 
their tasks. This fixed rate compensation is the reward of taking task 
responsibility as manager to the firm. Lynch and Perry (2003) and Bratton 
and Gold (2007) define base salary as a fixed benefit based on the time that 
the manager spends on tasks. It is a reflection of the natural value of the 
individual job, with certainty about the compensation payout over a certain 
period. Base pay can be measured in two main ways. One is marketing 
pricing, which is based on the ‘going industry rate’ for a particular job and on 
traditional structures whose origins ‘are shrouded in the mists of time’ 
(Armstrong and Baron, 2007). This approach relies on the economic theory of 
price mechanism. The other approach is job evaluation, which estimates the 
relative worth for each job without considering the labour market. However, 52  
 
the availability of executive vacancies, the qualified candidate and standard 
price of information make the first approach the more important. Abell (2007) 
adds that benchmarking the base salary will occur when the firm needs to 
attract, motivate and retain a manager. He further explains that the job 
evaluation approach is appropriate in a particular sector where external 
market comparison is very costly.    
Murphy (1999) further provides three reasons why base pay is important. This 
element of compensation attracts the most attention because it is a key 
component when the working agreement is signed. Because this perspective 
of compensation is fixed, it pleases the risk-averse executive when a value of 
money has been identified at first hand. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) 
and Rosen (1992) further provide evidence that, almost universally, industry 
and size influence base pay. Milkovich and Newman (2008) confirm that 
salary is the largest part of compensation, which is independent of output but 
depends on the complexity of the firm’s tasks; basically, firm size is used as a 
proxy for it. 
2.2.2 Bonus pay schemes 
The second perspective is outcome-orientation, which is aimed to motivate 
the manager to put more effort into his work in order to achieve a target, 
which is concerned with output as the employer’s desire. Prendergast (1999) 
asserts that this compensation scheme aligns the Agent’s action with his 
income and hence the actions of the Agent secure the wealth of the Principal. 
Rajagopalan and Datta (1996) and Murphy (1999) cite the advantage of 
short-term bonuses as the direct and immediate reward for the Agent’s 
actions, with no further risk or commitment required. Baker and Jorgensen 
(2004) believe that short-term incentives can increase the strength of the firm 
because the firm can put desirable output into the contract as the values to 53  
 
which it must pay attention. This is the most commonly mentioned incentive 
scheme, sometimes known as performance-related pay. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991; 1994) develop Incentive theory by extending 
the standard economic theory to cover the multitasking Agent. They raise the 
issue that the nature of executive responsibility to the Principal involves many 
small tasks, which they call the question of ‘the multi-tasking Agent’. They 
further explain that, on the one side, it is only human nature for the Agent to 
choose to perform best on the given easy-to-measure tasks and ignore the 
difficult-to-measure tasks, even if these are also given. The fact that narrow 
tasks are easier to measure creates a new level for the organisational study 
of the incentive problem. From another side, the Principal also finds difficulty 
in identifying what the Agent should do, since some tasks are subjective and 
detailed; and in ranking the importance of the existing tasks, which is an 
objective matter. This leads to increased difficulties in designing a 
compensation package for the multi-tasking agent. The authors indicate that 
the key problem is that narrowing the scope of multi-tasking may reduce the 
elements for success.  
The idea recalls those of Kerr (1975), who maintains that people decide to 
make their greatest effort in the expectation of the greatest return (reward) 
they can get. The measurement problem idea is introduced in his classic 
article, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B. The paper deals 
with the multi-task agency model, which Gibbon later claimed (1998) created 
the time-honoured phrase, ‘You get what you pay for’. He believes that the 
Agent is always able to access richer information about the firm than the 
Principal can. Decisions can be made by the Agent, which are never fully 
observable by the Principal. The hopes of the Principal entirely rely on the 
Agent’s behaviour. Kerr (1975) gives another example of the problem that 
unmentioned tasks do not mean unnecessary tasks if they are successful 
and also mentions that tasks may not be what the firm hopes for. 54  
 
Performance measurement becomes the main area to concentrate on, since 
it is extremely difficult to measure and evaluate. This statement shows the 
limitations of measurement theory, which cannot recognise the value of 
intangible assets such as the cost of human development, the customer 
relationship cost, or the process development cost. As a result, the agent’s 
action and the agent’s reward may not be aligned. The key authors of 
performance measurement on the effect of the incentive design on the firm 
performance are Abowd (1990) and Kato et al (2007). Another problem is 
that using the accounting system to evaluate stakeholders’ interests may not 
work. This is not specifically designed to measure the executive’s 
performance. (Any single stakeholder has his/her own interest, which can be 
represented via a single number, but the problem is what the number should 
be if it is to represent the executive’s performance measurement). Another 
concern is that increasing the firm value may bring in industrial, economic 
and political factors instead, which are out of the manager’s control. Lastly, 
Sloan (1993) indicates that incentives are criticised as a short-term 
mechanism reducing the degree of information asymmetry by enhancing 
agents’ rewards, instead of a long-term mechanism, such as the Principal 
might be expected to have. The statement has attracting a dramatic increase 
in interest in the last decade when stock options were introduced as 
innovations in this field.  
2.2.3 Stock option plans 
The development of an incentive instrument at this time was the product of 
the economic theory of the firm applied to the issue of multi-level incentives 
geared to multi-level tasks (Bonner et al, 2000). In the quest for a long-term 
mechanism to align Principal and Agent, the problem is constantly revised. 
Stock options were introduced in order to motivate the manager to improve 
the firm’s future performance. Aware of the increasing separation between 
ownership and control in a market-oriented economy, firms introduced stock 
options to align the Agent’s interests in wealth creation with those of the 55  
 
Principal. That is, if the Agent owns a substantial part of the business, then 
the Agent’s interests in wealth creation may be expected to parallel the 
interests of the Principal. Those in favour of stock options believe that this 
compensation scheme is the best alignment of interest between executive 
managers and shareholders, since the options are valuable only when the 
share price is higher than the option’s strike price (Kim, Nofsinger and Mohr, 
2010). In addition, it is assumed that stock options can reduce the effects of 
the incomplete information situation and lessen the uncertainty of the 
Principal.  
Murphy (1999) states that stock options are the most varied incentives across 
industries, due to the waiting time. He gives examples of longer-term 
research- and development-intensive industries, such as chemicals and 
machinery producers as compared with food and consumer industries. Since 
this type of incentive aligns with the stock market, the increases of stock 
prices become a systematic problem of the reward system. The increases in 
stock prices reflect the investors’ attitude toward shares, but they are not 
called performance measures. This indicator also reflects the ideas of future 
investors rather than current investor knowledge. One reason is that this 
incentive aligning the success to information outside the firm may link to the 
phenomenal success of a new scheme launched in early 1990 when the US 
market was booming. At the time, the use of the capital market as the 
criterion of the success of the firm was widely accepted. Later on, the 
question was raised of whether, in an economic downturn, the manager is to 
be penalised because of out-of-control factors, such as problems of economic 
structure.  
Fama and Jensen (1983b) study the problem of separating the decision and 
risk-bearing functions in situations when ownership is separate from control. 
Note that separation itself causes no problem with organisational structure; 
however, its complexity requires a sophisticated mechanism to capture the 
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that greater efficiency in the system design can reduce the gap, but, despite 
its long history, the mechanism has not yet been clearly explained. One 
reason seems to be that the treatment of the problem was not robust, even 
though the same approach of efficient design was taken; opinion was still 
divided. Prendergast (2002) reinvestigates the risk issue based on Agency 
theory by investigating the trade-off for executives between risk and 
incentive. As in most research in this area, he uses the volatility of returns as 
the risk measurement.  
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) summarise that this compensation theme is 
popular because the underlying assumption of this scheme is to give the 
manager the feeling of being a corporate owner. It then motivates the 
manager to take actions in order to serve his and the shareholder’s desire. 
Also, this incentive requires further information about either performance 
standards or performance measurement. It completely aligns the manager’s 
interest with the shareholders’ target. They add, however, that this type of 
incentive turns out to be the most complicated because it deals with the 
conditions of the capital market.  
Further, this study examines the determination of the inclusive of incentives in 
executive compensation. The first issue turns into the question of what the 
characteristics of those firms are which prefer to share a risk with the 
manager by using incentives, and promoting the alignment of interests 
between the shareholder and the manager. It also indicates the 
characteristics of firms which prefer to insure the shareholders’ right. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) state that the rationale behind including 
incentives is the transferring of the right of the shareholder to act on his behalf 
and retain all the benefits of the manager’s actions. 
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2.2.4 Fringe benefits 
This last element of executive pay is indirect pay made to the executive in 
addition to the base and performance pay for their work. It is also called 
benefits in kind, perquisites, perqs or perks. Fringe benefits are non-cash 
benefits that employee realise in  addition to salaries or wages. This 
compensation plays a part in increasing motivation and also in reducing 
agency costs (Zou, 1997). This fixed benefit arises because the specific 
requirements of a task, in knowledge-based organisations particularly, have 
to be fulfilled by a particular type of person at a particular time. Even though it 
is uncommon in a labour market, it is still important in attracting highly skilled 
workers or executive managers. Artz (2010) adds that fringe benefits can be 
a substitute for wages and that they also reduce the turnover of the highly 
skilled workers. However, the limited data and the ambiguous role of fringe 
benefits prompt almost all researchers exclude this form of compensation 
from their studies. The two types of fringe benefit are enhanced protection 
benefits and perquisites. 
Enhanced protection benefit is compensation which aims to provide 
safeguards to the executive in the future, such as health and life insurance, 
health benefits, retirement pensions and favourable tax treatment. The most 
common form of enhanced protection benefit is the pension plan. In this kind 
of compensation, the manager will receive greater benefit if he remains with 
the firm until retirement.  
Perquisites are forms of  compensation which aim to provide a better working 
environment, including working conditions, travel benefits, personal use of 
the employer’s motor vehicle, a personalised  parking slot, catering services, 
country club membership, holiday trips, travelling expenses for the 
employee’s family, employer-paid education costs, training, expense 
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house purchase benefits, rent-free housing, low-rent housing, free coupons, 
entertainment and personal support such as a secretary.  
In conclusion, instead of paying attention to the elements of pay, almost all 
researchers use total pay to find its relationship with performance. Literature 
provides evidence that there is always a unique reason to provide particular 
compensation. The (un)satisfactory result of previous research may deal with 
this under-estimating effect. Indeed, using total compensation simply allows 
one element to take over all the effects of compensation. In the U.S. the 
problem of determination has been of tracking the long-term incentive deal in 
relation to the huge value of stock options granted. 
 
2.3 Theoretical explanation of executive compensation  
Even though executive compensation is considered a classic mechanism in 
organisation design, researchers are unable to reach agreement on the 
effects that the unique internal and external conditions have on each reward 
system (Leonard, 1990; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
O’Byrne and Young (2010) use Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database 
of 25,026 executives between 1992 and 2008. They show that the majority of 
all executive compensation levels can be explained by firm size. Evidence 
from the study of Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) confirms that industrial 
concentration affects the levels of compensation and firm performance. The 
authors cite Dunlop’s simple explanation - that firms in the same industry 
have similar constraints of technology, material, product development and 
pricing. Recently, however, a meta-analysis of the determinants of 
organisational incentive systems shows that industry concentration is an 
important factor on the design of the system (Merchant et al, 2003).  59  
 
Executive compensation has been introduced for at least three spectrums; 
the standard approach believes executive compensation can encourage the 
Agent’s motivation to serve the Principal’s need through the contract. This 
theme was steadily expanded to the second theme that criticises the rent 
extraction through inefficient design of executive compensation. The third 
spectrum of the debate the emerging concept of the collective power of a 
concentration of owners.  
2.3.1 Principal/Agency approach  
The basic economics approach of Agency theory relies on the belief that the 
firm is a nexus of explicit contract; thus executive pay can be used a solution 
to resolve agency problems by aligning the interest between the Principal and 
the Agent through compensation design (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Fama 
(1980) adds that the structure of the manager’s compensation contracts 
should unite the manager’s interests with those of the shareholders. Thus, the 
key idea is that the principal offers a compensation package which is aligned 
with firm performance in order to combine both sets of interests. Of course, 
each of them individually finds his own optimal way to design/follow the terms 
of the contract. Thus, if efficiency compensation has been designed, there is a 
relationship between firm performance and executive compensation and then 
the level of the Principal-Agent problem declines (Kim et al, 2010).  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) investigate the state of executive compensation 
as an answer to the conflict of interests between ownership and control. They 
find that the use of incentives is made part of executive compensation to 
raise the Agent’s motivation by observing the pay-performance sensitivity, 
which to them implies that higher beta indicates a better alignment of interest 
between the manager and the shareholder. However, this research finds little 
evidence of pay-performance sensitivity. They give three cautionary 
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mechanism unsuccessful, namely, a direct measure of CEO activity, the 
accounting measures of the firm performanceand relative performance, 
based on other executives in the same market. The idea is investigated in 
Garen (1994) who begins his estimation to determine salary as cash 
compensation; and as salary and bonus and later a stock option incentive. 
His research first introduces interactive specification in order to estimate how 
executive compensation is determined, and  he concludes that several 
features of his findings, such as size, industry and firm performance, are 
consistent with the basic Agency theory, with its complete contract approach.61  
 
Table 2.1 Empirical research on executive pay-performance sensitivity 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Jensen and Murphy  1990  US  Archival data 
1974-1986 
OLS 
regression 
Cash 
compensation 
Stock option 
Stock return  The estimation of pay-performance 
reveals the executive total pay is 
positively relates to firm performance 
at 0.0033 sensitivity. 
Kaplan  1994  US and 
Japan 
Archival data  
1980 
OLS 
regression 
Total 
compensation 
Earnings, stock 
return, sales 
There is cash pay-performance 
sensitivity existing. Turnover-
performance relations are also 
economically and statistically similar 
between US and Japan. 
Hall and Liebman  1998  US  Archival data 
1980-1994 
OLS 
regression 
Cash and Total 
compensation 
Stock return  Including stock option, the pay-
performance sensitivity is much 
greater at 0.0060. 
Conyon et al  2000  UK  Archival data 
1985-1995 
FE  Cash 
compensation 
Stock return, EPS  Level of executive pay is positively 
related to total shareholder return but 
not EPS. 
Gregg et al  2005  UK   Archival data 
1994-2002 
FE, RE, 
2SLS, 
GMM 
Total cash 
compensation 
Stock return, risk, 
industry, 
corporate 
governance 
Base pay compensation has 
increased over the period. It also finds 
a positive relation between executive 
pay and stock return.  62  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Bruce et al  2007  UK  Archival data 
2002-2003 
OLS 
regression 
Proportion of 
fixed to variable 
pay 
Industry, Sale, 
EPS, net income, 
ownership  
Single rewards to multitasking agents 
may lead them to overlook simple 
targets. As expected, positive pay-
performance sensitivity exists. 
Duffhues and Kabir  2008  Netherlands  Archival data 
1998-2001 
OLS 
regression 
Cash 
compensation 
Contemporaneous 
and lagged ROA, 
ROS, RET, Q 
Both contemporaneous and lagged 
ROA, ROS, Rand Q negatively 
influence cash compensation. 
However, a contemporaneous model 
provides stronger results.  
Bootsma  2010  Netherlands  Archival data 
2002-2007 
OLS 
regression 
Cash/total 
compensation 
ROA, ROE, stock 
return, net income 
The relative changes in firm 
performance (ROE & Stock return) 
positively influence the changes in 
CEO pay.  
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These researchers agree that there are three main factors which have found 
that the size, industry, and firm performance do affect executive pay in 
different settings around the world. Current research now treats size and 
industry as controlled variables; however the performance matrix that 
influences executive compensation is still under debate.  
Yit = ƒ (performanceit, controlled) +  ε i          …………(1) 
where Yit is defined as executive compensation. It is the function of firm 
performance and controlled variable of firm i at the time t. ε i represents the 
unobserved determinants of executive compensation. It is generally believed 
that the firm which performs better should be able to provide higher executive 
compensation in order to motivate the manager better to work as hard as he 
can in return for such compensation. Many researchers point out that many 
studies approach the issue in a narrow way, using the accounting numbers of 
performance measurement only. These find that the choice of performance 
indicator creates a new level of complexity between the Principal and the 
Agent.  
2.3.2 Managerial power approach 
Holmstrom et al (1989) broadly agree with Fama and Jensen (1983b) that 
executive compensation is an answer to the conflict of interests between 
ownership and control because it can raise the Agent’s motivation. However, 
they insist that the agency problem may become serious because of the 
separation between ownership and control in large firms owned by public 
investors, where management power is in the hands of an Agent who has 
little stake in the firm. This political explanation allows for an economics 
interpretation but requires further detail of the oligopoly competition on the 
separation between ownership and control. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) 
notably alert scholars to spread the awareness of the Agent’s self-interest. 64  
 
The authors condemn it as the source of inefficiencies in the design of 
executive compensation packages. These authors further states that it is 
useful to revise the reward system to make sure that the Agent puts his effort 
into maximising the wealth of the Principal since no shareholders can monitor 
or directly control the Agents’ action. This paper makes clearer the important 
role of executive compensation, particularly on pay-performance sensitivity, 
in a market coordination setting.   
Otten (2007) indicates that managerial power contradicts standard Agency 
theory, which approaches the display of power between the Principal and the 
Agent when the contract is being negotiated. Unlike the standard model, this 
approach assumes that the Agent is willing to use discretion in setting his 
own compensation in order to satisfy his own interests. Thus, executive 
compensation may shift away from optimal contracting outcomes to a 
direction which favours managerial rent-seeking, according to Bebchuk and 
Fried (2003) and Jensen et al (2004).  The authors believe that, to simplify 
the relationship, the players who take part in the firm are the principal (the 
shareholders), the Agent (the managers) and later the Board of Directors. 
The shareholder, as the owner, has to create a system to ensure that the 
manager works to maximise the shareholders’ interests. The managers have 
a responsibility to perform as the shareholders’ Agent; and they will be 
rewarded for positive results.  
In order to reduce the gap between the shareholders’ and managers’ 
interests, a competent system is needed in the first place to efficiently design 
the two mechanisms required to be in place   for monitoring and control 
(Lipman and Hall, 2008). The corporate governance literature suggests that 
an efficient system should be designed by starting with the Board of 
Directors, which is a combined team of managers and stakeholder 
representatives. Creating a board of directors benefits both shareholder and 
manager because it gives them a chance to listen to each other’s ideas. 
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compensation system design since the managers can use their influence on 
the amount and form of executive pay by extracting rent through dressing, 
packaging or hiding it, to serve their own interests – this is named 
‘camouflage’. However, outrage costs can pose constraints on compensation 
arrangements by the stakeholder.  
On the executive compensation issue, Zajac and Westphal (1995) come 
close to the role of ownership structure as an alternative explanation of the 
system design to shareholders. These authors are concerned about the 
control of the corporation when the manager has collective powers. The 
results indicate that the decline of shareholders’ powers may raise the agency 
cost; hence, corporate governance has to be efficient. Subsequently, 
corporate governance became one of the dominant compensation issues in 
the US, thanks to the consideration of dispersed ownership structure. 
Matsumula and Shin (2005) explain that corporate governance is the key to 
managing conflicts of interest. This suggests that an efficient system should 
be designed by first considering the Board of Directors, which is a joint team 
of representatives of the Principal and the stakeholder. CIMA (2001) supports 
the view that creating a board of directors benefits both the Principal and the 
Agent, because it gives them a chance to listen to each other’s ideas. A 
board of directors is a mechanism which aims to bring together the 
management team and the shareholders’ representatives. It is believed that 
the creation of a board of directors is a fair mechanism for all parties in the 
firm. The Principal has a chance to express what he is looking for and the 
management team has a chance to show how it serves this need or to 
explain why specific decisions were made. At first glance, the Principal seems 
to dominate the board, because the rules of corporate governance state that 
the chairman should not be part of the management team. However, this may 
be explained by the fact that the professional Agent has more information 
than the Principal and thus an independent chairman will redress the 
information imbalance. Moreover, the issue of transparency in the audit 
committee is relevant here; corporate governance states that the firm must 66  
 
report the findings of at least one audit committee as a financial expert and 
the external auditor has to be independent. The board is responsible for 
reducing self-interested behaviour either from the Principal or the Agent, so it 
is necessarily autonomous and unrelated to the firm’s interests. Note that 
best practice suggests that the board should be rewarded only on the basis of 
the number of its meetings. This is a way of avoiding another conflict of 
interest. The sum of money awarded is evaluated according to the complexity 
of the tasks, which generally uses the size of the firm as the proxy. 
Conyon and He (2011) use 1481 Chinese listed companies between 2001 
and 2005. Their study first compares the executive pay between China and 
the US by stating that China has differs starkly from the U.S. both politically 
(state-owned enterprise) and governance structure (highly concentrated 
family-owned business). Using GLS regression method this research reports 
positive correlation between executive cash compensation and size, ROA 
and market to book value. Further evidence proves the negative affect of 
ownership concentration on the use of executive equity incentive. 
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Table 2.2 Empirical research of managerial power on executive pay-performance sensitivity 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Conyon and Peck   1998  UK  1991-1994  OLS 
regression, 
fixed effect 
Cash of highest 
paid director 
RI, size, outsider 
ratio, CEO duality, 
nominating 
committee, block 
holder dummy, 
outside directors 
OLS shows that size and shareholder 
return is the influential factor on the 
executive pay-performance relation. 
However, FE reveals that shareholder 
return is the only factor effect the pay. 
Core, Holthausen, 
and Larcker  
1999  US  1982-1984  OLS 
regression 
Executive total 
pay 
ROA, RET, CEO 
duality, Board size, 
outsider ratio, 
interlocked, CEO 
ownership 
Board and ownership structure 
significantly influence the pay. When 
the managers have influence and 
power over the external directors and 
outside ownership, they are paid 
more. 
Talmor and Wallace  2002  258 US 
firms 
Archival data 
1992-1997 
OLS 
regression 
Cash 
compensation, 
stock option 
Industry, asset, 
ROA, stock return, 
tenure, 
Economic determinants, firm 
performance and corporate 
ownership all appear to support the 
design of executive pay.  
Davila and Penalva  2006  US  Archival data 
1993-2002 
OLS 
regression 
includes 
interaction 
variables 
Log total pay, 
proportion of 
cash/total pay 
Industry, sale, 
ROA, cash flow, 
stock return,  
corporate 
governance 
CEO uses power to take accounting 
performance into his pay when high 
takeover protection is active or/and 
CEO influences governance 
process. 68  
 
The existing research cited above sheds some light on the factors which 
tests have shown to influence executive compensation, including corporate 
governance. Now the state of empirical research adds one key concept by 
which to understand executive compensation structure; this is corporate 
governance structure.  
Yit = ƒ (corporate governanceit, controlledit,) +  ε i     …...……..….(2) 
where Yit is defined as executive compensation. It is the function of corporate 
governance and a controlled variable of firm i at the time t. ε i is the 
unobserved determinants of executive compensation. 
Since corporate governance has been introduced, the study of a 
remuneration committee and an analysis of the influential factors in designing 
the system have received most criticism as parts of the design of a 
compensation system (Merchant et al, 2003). Core et al (1999) indicate that 
when the executive managers have more influence and power over the 
external directors and outside ownership, they are paid more compensation. 
This in turn implies that executive managers under less effective corporate 
governance earn greater compensation, because firms with greater agency 
problems perform worse. However, this approach has been strongly criticised 
over its inconsistencies because the growth of executive pay in the 1990s is 
related to the increasingly independent boards. In addition, an outside 
selected manager has no power but the existing board provides generous 
compensation packages to attract its target managers. 69  
 
2.3.3 Concentration ownership approach 
Berle and Means (1932) raised awareness of the separation between 
ownership and control, using the US as the theory setting. The paper bases 
its discussion on the origin of social construction of American’s capital market. 
Later, Jensen and Meckling (1976) use this root to grow Agency theory in 
order to understand the relationships within an organisation. Regarding the 
market-based economy of the US, the literature grew rapidly on the 
assumption that the shareholders have lost power to the managers, due to 
the form of dispersed ownership. However, the Principal’s loss of control is 
not inevitable if shareholders do not let it happen. One rising concern is that the 
concentrated ownership exerts stronger control than does dispersed 
ownership; this might leads to different design of the mechanism within the 
organisation. This is the case made by Moerland (1995), who indicates that 
most European firms have network-oriented systems in their forms of 
concentrated ownership. Claessens et al (2000) also find that most firms in 
the Far East have concentrated ownership. Regarding the different roots of 
the economy, these findings suggest that the classic American Theory of the 
Firm may not apply worldwide, owing to its origins (La Porta et al, 2000). 
Recent US evidence also indicates that concentrated ownership often has a 
positive impact on profitability, thanks to the substantial power of the 
shareholder to reduce the dysfunction of managers (La Porta et al, 2000). 
Dyck and Zingales (2004) also indicate that large shareholders can be a 
mechanism to ensure the value maximisation of the firm. By definition, 
concentrated ownership structure is the classic identification of ownership 
structure which is based on the collective percentage of a specific group of 
shareholders. Using the definition provided by the International Financial 
Reporting Standards, the firm can justify its equity ownership as either by 
being a company which holds more than 20% of its voting stock directly,  or 
one which holds it via another company in a chain of ownership. Pallathitta 
(2005) states that in identifying ownership it may be perceived as inside or 70  
 
outside. Inside ownership represents managerial holdings and block holdings 
by controlling owners. Outside holdings represent family holdings, 
institutional holdings, foreign holdings and outside block holdings which 
influence the controlling owner. More recent evidence provided in the table 
below (table 2.3) indicates more factors which, in tests, have shown some 
influence on executive compensation other than firm performance; corporate 
governance is ownership structure. 
The studies on concentrated ownership and executive compensation aim to 
understand the link between ownership structure and the collective authority 
to make the decision within a large publicly-traded firm. The power includes 
the decision-making to select managers and ways to reward them. Jiang 
(2009) indicates that concentrated ownership can exercise its rights by 
promoting a well-designed executive compensation contract which rewards 
on the basis of firm performance. Empirical evidence indicates that in the US,  
executive compensation decreases in firms where ownership is concentrated 
(Core et al, 1999). The evidence goes side by side with Hartzell and Starks’ 
(2003) finding which indicates that concentrated ownership has a positive 
effect on monitoring and this reduces the agency cost. 
The original test to determine executive compensation before the year 2000 
has been criticised because it represents a single market structure, the 
market-based economy, which results in these firms having dispersed 
ownership of the Anglo-Saxon stock market structure. This may deal with the 
limited data available outside the US It was urged that it was time to revise 
the theory to take account of different settings where the equity structure is 
not the market-based economy. Soon afterwards, examples of this new 
determination were found. They were ‘Executive Compensation, Performance 
and Ownership’ by Brunello et al (2001), using the Italian stock market, 
‘Ownership Structure and Executive compensation: the case of Germany’ by 
Haid and Yutoglu (2006), ‘Executive Compensation, Firm Performance and 71  
 
Family Business in Korea’ by Kato et al (2007) and ‘Ownership Concentration 
and CEO Compensation Sensitivity in New Zealand’ by Jiang et al (2008).  
These studies provide the new knowledge that almost all of these settings 
have large shareholders dominating their ownership structure, which is not 
what Berle and Means (1932) were discussing. Filatotchev and Mickiewicz 
(2006) explain that block shareholdings in the US are considered to harm 
minority shareholders. This is why the regulator in the US makes it costly to 
retain block shareholders, which then leads to the dispersal of shares across 
the US stock markets. This research shares the key idea that ownership 
structure plays the key role in influencing the executive compensation. It 
becomes the fourth determinant, following the three original ones of size, 
performance and industry. Because the first three have proved their power to 
affect  pay, the strongest research trend in this area has become the 
empirical evidence on the ongoing debate, which asks how ownership 
structure (and its detail of how corporate governance affects the structure of 
dispersed ownership) affects the compensation system. In addition, Barkema 
and Gomez-Mejia (1998) suggest checking whether the institutional investor 
in an ownership structure pays a high proportion of the long-term incentive. In 
Western Europe, Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) confirm that ownership structure 
affects the pay executive compensation in Germany.  
Another three studies of executive compensation, performance and 
ownership structure which have been conducted in Asian countries reach 
diverse conclusions. Lin (2005) uses 485 Taiwanese listed companies with 
data from 1997-1999; he finds that boards of directors and large external 
shareholders influence executive compensation. Parthasarathy et al (2006) 
study ownership structure in India, where they find that the public sector pays 
executives less than multinational firms do. Kato et al (2007), using 246 
Korean listed firms, reveal that the cash compensation of Korean executives 
correlates with stock return in other ownership structures but not in family 
businesses. Kraft and Niederprum (1999) focus on the issue by studying how 72  
 
the distinction between ownership and control affects the executive 
compensation pay. The authors state that when the level of concentration 
ownership is low, the market-oriented system plays a role in the corporate 
control system by allowing the power of the capital market to take control 
over poorly performing firms. 
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2006) and Burkart and Panunzi (2006) explain 
that the firm can use equity financing as a mechanism to control the agency 
cost. They provide examples to show that ownership concentration allows 
shareholders to increase their ability to monitor and control the process of 
executive behaviour, which leads to an increase in shareholders’ wealth. 
However, they urge that although ownership concentration can be an 
effective monitor, it can also be a problem if it uses this concentrated power 
to extract private benefit in cases where legal protection is not strong enough 
to protect the minority shareholders. Villalonga and Amit (2006) provide an 
illustration to examine the agency problem between groups of shareholders; 
collective shareholders, dispersed shareholders and the manager. The 
authors point out that American market-based ownership is a type I Agency 
problem where type II is more important in a co-operative market economy. 
 
 
Type I Agency problem 
Conflict of interest between owners and 
managers 
             No          Yes 
Type II Agency problem 
Conflict of interest between 
Large and minority shareholders 
 
Yes 
 
 
Type A Firm 
 
Type B Firm 
No  Type C Firm  Type D Firm 
Source: Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
Figure 2.1 Identifying the type of a firm’s agency problem 73  
 
Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the way in which ownership structure 
influences the type of conflict of interest. Its originator states that firms with 
dual-class equity, pyramids, cross-holding and block holding are considered 
type A firms. Both problems may occur in the case where there is 
concentrated ownership but no owner-manager, a type B firm. In the case of 
a type C firm, there is no conflict of interest; it has an owner-manager but no 
minority shareholder. This is the classic problem between owners and 
managers in cases where there is no owner-manager and no dominant group 
of shareholders.  74  
 
Table 2.3 Empirical research on the moderating effect of ownership structure on the pay-performance sensitivity 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
collection  analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Newman  2000  UK  Archival data   OLS 
regression 
Log 
compensation 
Sales, stock 
return, ROE, 
ownership 
structure, 
corporate 
governance 
If CEO has at least one insider on 
board of compensation, they would 
prefer to get less compensation to 
retain their power on the committee. 
All firm size, performance, corporate 
governance indicates the level of 
executive compensation   
Brunello et al  2001  Italy  Survey data   OLS 
regression 
Executive total 
compensation 
Profits, Sales, 
listed/unlisted, 
multinational, 
individual 
characteristics 
The pay-performance sensitivity 
does exist. The increasing of 1 real 
profit causes an increase of 0.0003 
upper and middle managers’ total 
compensation. 
Elston and Goldberg  2003  Germany  Archival data 
1961-1986 
OLS/GMM 
regression 
Executive 
salary 
ROE, Sale, 
ownership 
structure 
Performance and size are generally 
positively related to compensation 
where block shareholder reduces 
the executive pay.  
Hartzell and Starks  2003  US  Archival data 
1992-1997 
Tobit, OLS 
regression 
Salary, Stock 
options, total 
compensation 
Stock return, Q, 
ownership 
structure 
Institutional ownership is positively 
related to the pay-performance 
sensitivity but negatively related to 
the level of compensation. 75  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
collection  analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Stathopoulos et al  2004  Retailing 
companies 
in the UK 
Archival data 
1999 
OLS 
regression 
Salary, annual 
bonus, stock 
option, long-
term incentive 
Size, growth, 
governance and 
ownership 
structure  
Firm size, growth, financial policy, 
ownership characteristics and 
governance arrangements influence 
compensation.  
Haid and Yurtoglu   2006  Germany  Archival data 
1987-2003 
OLS 
regression 
Total 
compensation 
ROA, Size  Size is the most important factor 
determining the executive and 
board compensation. A small 
proportion of performance-related 
pay is reported. 
Jiang et al  2008  New 
Zealand  
Archival data 
2001-2005 
OLS 
Regression 
Log total 
compensation 
Industry, Debt 
ratio, Asset, net 
profit, ROA, Q, 
ownership 
structure 
Concentrated ownership 
significantly regresses to poor pay-
for-performance. However, no 
evidence that large block holder 
leads to monitoring intensity. 76  
 
The evidence mentioned in Table 2.3 supports the view that size, performance and 
industry always affect pay; however, the way in which ownership structure affects the 
system is still under debate. Thus, the next issue in understanding the determination 
of executive compensation is tracking the structure of organisations, which is 
identified through the ownership structure. The general belief is that the firms which 
have dispersed ownership should require incentive contracts because they lack 
accumulated negotiating power. Many researchers point out that the underestimated 
power of ownership structure should been blamed for causing the contradictions of 
previous studies. Using the empirical research above, it may be summarised that the 
determinants of executive compensation are not only the functions of performance, 
size and industry, but also ownership structure.  
Yit = ƒ (ownershipit, firm performance*ownershipit, controlledit) +  ε i .……..(3) 
where Yit is defined as executive compensation. It is the function of firm 
performance, ownership structure, the interaction between firm performance and 
ownership structure, and the controlled variable of firmi at the time t . ε i is the 
unobserved determinants of executive compensation. However, most of the research 
addresses the issue from the narrow approach of corporate governance
2. The issue 
expands to include the better known ones of the ability of the Board of Directors, the 
transparency of the remuneration committee and the independence of the audit 
committee. Some research approaches the problem based on the contract theory, 
which indicates that a particular type of firm characteristics chooses to introduce 
different compensation structures into their executive compensation contracts. It 
finds that the compensation structure creates a new level of complexity between the 
                                                 
2 Hengartner (2006) provides an alternative executive explanation which takes the social 
comparison using tournament theory to explain how the pay difference between CEO and 
the next highest level serves to motivate the executives occupying that level by promoting 
competition among them. However, this direction provides inconsistent results (Conyon et al, 
2001; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). 77  
 
Principal and the Agent, which adds to the complexity of the contract design. Gibbon 
and Murphy (1990) add that executive compensation falls if the entire stock market 
does better than the firm. However, this result tends to indicate the loss of ownership 
concentration when the Principal has little power of control.  
2.3.4 Asian approach on executive compensation study 
Even though there is a rising trend in executive compensation research among Asian 
Scholar, most work on executive compensation issues in Asia are empirical work. 
Sun, Zhao, and Yang (2010) reveal that half of executive compensation in Asian’s 
works is Agency theory-based. However, another half of Asian executive 
compensation works query Berle and Means (1932), which highlighted on the 
separation between ownership and control. This is the result of the Agency theory 
footpath from the US setting; while concentration ownership of single family 
particularly dominates the Asian markets. Note that managerial power of corporate 
governance concern is also cited in the first approach.  
The Chinese setting is the most common one for Asian empirical work on executive 
compensation, as China is the world’s next upcoming economic super power. It also 
is unique in its characteristic of largely state-owned enterprise. Japan is the only 
other Asian-setting economy that has received attention on executive pay. However 
the figure of Japanese pay is far higher beyond Chinese and elsewhere in Asia. Only 
a couple of works can be found in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.  
Asian works on executive compensation can be summarised as follow.78  
 
Table 2.4 Empirical research on executive pay-performance relation in Asia   
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Kubo  2000  UK and 
Japan  
210 Japanese 
during 1995-
1996 and 
1,500 British 
listed firms in 
1994-1995 
RE  Director and CEO 
compensation 
 
 
Firm performance 
Performance, 
weight, size, age, 
tenure 
 
Director pay 
Japanese director pay has no 
relationship with shareholders’ return. 
British director pay is positively 
correlated with firm performance. 
Though, there is no performance 
consequence of the pay. 
Mengistae and Xu  2004  China  Survey data 
1980-1989 
OLS 
regression, 
FE 
CEO 
compensation 
ROC, size  Sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
firm performance in state-owned 
enterprises is found. 
Wang and 
Stammerjohan 
2004  China  1112 Chinese 
listed firms in 
2004 
OLS 
regression 
CEP 
compensation 
Size, industry  Both size and industry has 
significant affect on the executive 
compensation pay in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Kato and Long  2006  China   Archival data 
1998- 2002 
OLS 
regression 
Total cash 
compensation 
ROS, ROA,  
sales, profit, 
equity, ownership 
structure 
Independent directors who drive the 
significance of executive 
compensation and firm performance. 
However the stronger degree of 
state ownership reduces the link, on 
the other hand. 79  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Lin  2005  Taiwan  Survey data   LISREL 
estimation 
Log total cash 
compensation 
Sale, asset, 
ROA, ROE, 
stock return, 
EPS, corporate 
governance 
CEO acts as steward when he 
holds the position of chairman. 
Shareholders still have power of 
control over board of remuneration 
and executive compensation pay. 
Bai and Xu  2005  China  Survey of 
state-owned 
enterprises 
during 1985-
1989 
OLS 
regression, 
FE 
CEO 
compensation 
Profitability, 
ownership, size,  
industry 
High profitability and industry of 
state-owned enterprise affects the 
use of incentive for financial 
performance. 
Cheung, Stouraitis, 
and Wong 
2005  Hong Kong  412 listed 
companies 
during 1995-
1998 
OLS 
regression, 
FE  
CEO 
compensation 
 
ROA, governance, 
size, debt-to-asset, 
growth, market-to-
book 
Positive relationship between 
managerial ownership and executive 
compensation in both small and in 
family controlled firms. 
Firth, Fung, and Rui  2006  China  366 listed 
companies as 
Archival data 
1998 - 2000 
OLS 
regression 
Total 
compensation 
Stock return, 
income, assets, 
ownership 
structure 
Positive relation between CEO pay 
and accounting/stock based on 
performance in certain ownership 
conditions.  
Long & Kato  2006  China  188 listed 
companies 
during 1998-
2002 
OLS 
regression 
CEO 
compensation 
ROR, ROA, 
negative profit, 
sales, 
governance 
Executive compensation is sensitive 
to shareholder value. State-owned 
enterprises are weakening pay-
performance sensitivities. 80  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Basu, Hwang, 
Mitsudome and 
Weintrop 
2007  Japan  174 large firms 
during 1992-
1996 
OLS 
regression 
CEO 
compensation 
 
 
ROA, stock return  
ROA, RET, 
Ownership, 
governance, 
size, growth  
excess 
compensation, 
ownership, size 
Using corporate governance 
approach, this work reports that 
executive pay is higher in weaker 
corporate governance firms.  
Ownership and excess pay is 
negatively associated with 
performance consequences. 
Ferris, Kim and 
Kitsabunnarat 
2007  Japan  466 firms 
during 1997-
2001 
OLS 
regression 
CEO option grant  Governance  Smaller boards and a higher 
percentage of outside director are 
managerial power mechanism on 
option grant. 
Kato, Kim, and Lee  2007  Korea  Archival data 
1998-2001 
OLS 
regression 
Total cash 
compensation  
Sales, net 
income, ROA, 
stock return, 
ownership 
Cash compensation of Korean 
executive correlates with stock 
return in other ownership structures 
except for family business. 
Putthapiwat  2007  Thailand  377 listed 
companies in 
2005 
OLS 
regression 
Total cash 
compensation 
Revenue, EPS, 
ROE 
Executive compensation is 
positively related to firm 
performance in various industries. 81  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Buck, Liu and 
Skovoroda 
2008  China  601 listed 
companies 
during 2000-
2003 
OLS 
regression 
CEO 
compensation 
 
Firm performance 
Share value, RET, 
profit, ROA, size, 
governance 
 
CEO 
compensation, 
governance, size  
Strictly controlled simultaneous 
relation, firm size and firm 
performance affect executive 
compensation. 
Firm size and executive 
compensation positively affect firm 
performance. 
Cheng, Lui, Shum 
and Wong 
2008  Hong Kong  484 listed 
companies 
during 2006-
2007 
OLS 
regression  
director 
compensation 
 
ROE, stock 
return, size, 
growth, 
governance 
ROE, return, and size correlate with 
director pay where  an independent 
director attracts lower  pay in non-
family firms. 
Unite, Sullivan, 
Brookman, 
Majadillas, & 
Taningco 
2008  Philippines  2001-2003  OLS 
regression 
Change in CEO 
compensation  
ROA, RET, size, 
group 
Size is the key determine of 
executive pay where pay-
performance elasticity can be found 
in companies that are not affiliated 
to a corporate group 
Sakawa and 
Watanabel 
2009  Japan  Japanese 
manufacturing 
firms during 
1992-1995 
OLS 
regression 
Change in CEO 
compensation 
ROA, RET, Size, 
Ownership 
structure 
Pay-performance sensitivity does 
exist but under family control, the 
pay-performance sensitivity becomes 
weaker. 82  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Salim and Wan-
Hussin 
2009  Malaysia  158 listed 
companies 
during 2003-
2005 
OLS 
regression 
Change in 
executive 
compensation 
Change in 
shareholder 
wealth, 
governance 
Appropriate structure of 
remuneration committee and 
institutional shareholders enhance 
the pay-performance elasticity where 
managerial ownership causes 
weaker pay-performance relations. 
Kaewkumsorn  2009  Thailand  432 Thai listed 
companies in 
2007 
OLS 
regression 
CEO 
compensation 
ROA, ROE, EPS, 
RET  
Firm performance influences the 
executive pay in different manners 
depending on the industry. 
Tian  2009  Cross-
country 
(Asia) 
402 Asian 
companies in 
2000-2007 
OLS 
regression 
CEO 
compensation 
ROA, RET, risk, 
governance 
Pay-performance sensitivity does exist 
but in firms with powerful CEO the 
sensitivity becomes weaker. 
Conyon and He  2011  China  1,481 listed 
companies 
during 2001-
2005 
OLS 
regression, 
Random 
effects 
Cash 
compensation, 
stock option 
ROA, Market to 
book, RI, Sales, 
governance 
There is a positive influence of 
firm accounting/market 
performance and cash/equity 
incentive. Board determinants 
also play a role in the pay-
performance sensitivity setting. 
Chen, Liu and Li  2010  China  502 listed 
companies 
during 2001-
2006 
FE  CEO cash 
compensation 
ROE, stock 
return, 
governance, 
ownership, size 
Size, growth opportunity, and CEO 
shareholding have a positive affect on 
executive cash compensation where 
block shareholders reduce the 
executive compensation pay. 83  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Connelly, 
Limpapahayom and 
Sullivan 
2010  Thailand  218 listed 
companies in 
2005 
OLS 
regression 
Director pay, 
Manager pay 
size, risk, growth, 
leverage, ROA, 
governance, 
ownership 
Executive pay-performance sensitivity 
in family firms is lower than those 
non-family firms. The managerial pay 
sensitivity of family-owned firms can 
be found but not of a director. 
Chen,Ezzamel and 
Cai 
2011  China  Listed 
companies 
from 432 in 
1999 to 1,458 
in 2002 
OLS 
regression 
Executive 
compensation  
ROA, EPS, Q, 
Governance, 
ownership, lower 
level  of executive 
pay, CEO 
characteristics,  
Managerial ownership and education 
are significantly positively related to 
executive compensation where 
tournament prize does not relate to the 
pay. 
Kato and Long  2011  China  923 Listed 
companies 
during 1998 – 
2002 
OLS 
regression 
Executive 
compensation 
gap 
 
Firm performance 
pool size, state 
ownership, size 
 
 Executive 
compensation 
gap, state 
ownership, size 
Size and sate ownership are the key 
determinants of the executive pay 
gap between executive managers. 
The increase in the gap between top 
executives will result in greater firm 
performance due to enhanced 
managerial effort. 84  
 
Author(s)  Date  Setting 
Data  Variables 
Result 
collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Lee and Chen  2011  Taiwan  217 listed 
companies in 
1995-2004 
2SLS   Executive 
compensation 
 
Firm value 
ROA, Q, 
governance, size, 
risk  
executive 
compensation,  
Firm performance, size and 
governance have a positive relation 
with CEO compensation.  
CEO compensation has a positive 
relation to Tobin’s Q.  
Oviantari  2011  Indonesia  100 listed 
companies 
during 2008-
2009 
OLS 
regression 
Director and 
executive 
compensation 
ROA, EPS, size  Size positive influences the director 
and executive pay while ROA has a 
negative effect on the pay. 
Suherman, 
Rahmawati and 
Buchdadi 
2011  Indonesia  13 financial 
companies 
during 2007-
2009 
GLS 
regression 
Executive cash 
compensation 
ROA, RI, outside 
directors, 
institutional 
ownership 
ROA, size and institutional 
ownership have a positive relation to 
executive pay whereas stock return 
and proportion of independent 
director do not. 
Zhou, 
Geogakopoulous, 
Sotiropoulos, and 
Vasileiou 
2011  China  18 Chinese 
financial 
intuition during 
2001-2009 
OLS 
regression 
Director and 
Executive 
compensation 
ROE, Non-
Performing Loan 
ratio, Size 
There is a relationship between 
director compensation and firm 
performance, Non-Performing Loan 
ratio and size but not with the 
executive compensation case. 85 
 
Since most research approached executive compensation from (Standard) 
Agency Theory, executive compensation in Asia has received little attention 
regarding the narrow gap between ownership and control. The attraction and 
retention of desirable executives was not initially a problem since the majority 
of Asian firms are ruled by the (family’s members of) shareholder. However, 
there is intense conflict of interest between minority and majority shareholders 
in these types of firms. Kaplan (1994) explores the sensitivity of executive 
compensation and firm performance using comparison data between the US 
and Japan. He found a pretty similar proportion of sensitivity between 
executive compensation and firm performance in the US and Japan. 
However, he revealed that the famous stock option in the US was adopted in 
fewer than half of the cases surveyed in Japan. The research provided 
evidence on the American approach to executive compensation instead of 
exploring Japanese characteristics. Six years later, the first research in 
executive compensation using Asian Stock market characteristics was 
undertaken in the early twenty first century. Another comparison of executive 
pay between Japanese and UK setting was launched by Kubo, whose PhD 
thesis was submitted to the London School of Economics in 2000. The study 
verifies the sensitivity and consequences of executive compensation and firm 
performance in the UK but has failed to find any link in Japan. Seven years 
later, Basu et al (2007) once again tested the pay-performance sensitivity and 
the performance consequences of executive compensation; their study 
reported that executive compensation is higher in weaker corporate 
governance firms where ownership and excess pay is negatively associated 
with performance consequences.  
China received the most attention in number of studies on sensitivity between 
executive compensation and firm performance (Sun et al, 2010). In early work 
on Chinese executive compensation, Cheung et al (2005) explored 412 listed 
companies in the Hong Kong Stock Market and reported there is a weak but 
positive relationship between managerial ownership and executive 
compensation. Also, the work showed that Hong Kong pay-performance 86 
 
sensitivity varies across the industry where ownership structure does affect 
the executive pay level. This research was one of the early bodies of 
evidence that proved that the power of family ownership, the most common 
ownership structure in Hong Kong, is reflected in the executive compensation 
pay.  Cheng et al (2008) approached executive compensation pay by 
applying the managerial power approach. This research explores the 
influence of corporate governance structure such as number of independent 
non-executive directors, dual position between CEO and chairman, dual 
position between director and chairman, CEO or non-executive director, or 
whether the director is a member of the family that controls the company. 
Their study provided evidence that size and governance structure such as the 
independent non-executive director leads to low directors’ compensation in 
Hong Kong. This research is one of the Asian situations that found no 
sensitivity between director compensation and firm performance. However, 
where there is individual director compensation, further findings indicate that 
governance results are robust where sensitivity between individual director 
compensation and firm performance (ROE) does exist. 
A series of research studies report the Chinese mainland issue of state-owned 
enterprises in relation to executive pay. Almost all of them found that firm 
performance and state-owned enterprise affects the use of pay-performance 
sensitivity. Mengistae and Xu (2004) found supportive evidence to Agency 
theory by providing evidence that is a positive relationship between executive 
compensation and accounting performance in 769 state-owned emterprises 
(SOEs) in China from 1980 to 1989. Wang and Stammerjohan (2004) used 
1112 Chinese listed firms by carrying out OLS regression between CEO pay 
with firm size and industry. The results indicate that both size and industry 
have significant effects on the executive compensation pay in Chinese listed 
companies. Bai and Xu (2005) used 853 managerial incentives in 1990s to 
support Agency theory and Incomplete Contracts theory that Chinese State-
Owned enterprises were driven by incentive mechanisms in the 1980s; 
however, firm performance does not determine the CEO compensation. 87 
 
Kato and Long (2006) used 942 listed companies in Chinese Stock Markets 
from 1999 to 2002 and found that executive compensation has positive 
relationships with shareholder value and sales growth. Firth et al (2006) used 
the Institutional theory approach to 1998-2000 executive compensation pay 
by classifying Chinese firms into two groups. Firms with a state agency as the 
majority shareholder do not appear to have pay-performance sensitivity 
whereas state-owned enterprise and private block-shareholders relate their 
executive pay with firm performance. Buck, Liu and Skovaroda (2008) 
revealed the positive relationships between executive compensation and 
accounting performance in 601 Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2003. 
Their study further shows that executive pay also does affect firm 
performance. 
Recently, Chen et al (2010; 2011), Kato and Long (2011) and Lee and Chen 
(2011) provided recent evidence on the case in China. These studies report 
that firm performance, size, CEO ownership and board size have a positive 
relation to CEO; however, Zhou et al (2011) provided contradicting evidence 
by stating that is no relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance in China. Firm size is the only factor that determines the 
Chinese executive pay.  
Kato, Kim and Lee (2007) explored the Korean setting and found that cash 
compensation of Korean executives is positively influenced by firm 
performance (stock return) in all ownership structures except for family-owned 
business. This work revealed that accounting performance (ROA) has no 
power on the determination of executive compensation. Lee and Chen (2011) 
explored the Taiwanese stock market by using 2SLS for panel data. This 
work revealed that firm size, governance, firm performance and ownership 
are positively associated with CEO compensation where firm age, R&D 
expenditure, and firm risk are negatively associated with CEO compensation 
in Taiwan.  88 
 
Only limted work on executive compensation in Southeast Asia has 
contributed to the body of research in the field. Unite et al (2008) provided 
the first evidence on the relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance in the Philippines. This study reported that size is the only 
nationwide key determinant of executive pay where pay-performance 
elasticity can only be found in firms that are not affiliated to a corporate group 
in the Philippines. Salim and Wan-Hussin (2009) reported that appropriate 
structure of the remuneration committee enhances the pay-performance 
elasticity where managerial ownership causes weaker elasticity of pay-
performance relations in Malaysia. Oviantari (2011) explored Indonesia pay-
performance sensitivity by using director and executive compensation. The 
work indicated that firm performance has a negative influence on executive 
pay while firm size plays the key role in compensation pay. Suherman et al 
(2011) added that that Indonesian institutional ownership has a positive 
relation to executive pay whereas stock return and proportion of independent 
director does not. 
As is the case with other Asian countries, there are very limited  executive 
compensation studies posted from Thailand. Sitthiharn (2006) and Thakaew 
(2006) both found that EPS as firm performance has a statistically significant 
influence on executive compensation pay in the Thai stock market. However, 
Thakaew (2006) shows that RI has a negative influence on executive 
compensation. Putthapiwat (2007) and Kaewkumsorn (2009) provided Thai 
evidence that firm performance and executive compensation do correlate but 
vary across industries. Recently, Connelly et al (2010) added to the Thai 
evidence that the nature of the collective power of the ownership in family 
business allows them to influence the compensation settings. Thus the pay-
performance sensitivity for the executive managers in this context does exist.   
Sun et al (2010) undertook a critical review about executive compensation in 
Asia on the call for future research integrating Agency theory and the 
institution-based theory to examining executive pay variances across 89 
 
different settings. This research showed that China is in the lead followed by 
Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan which make some contribution. India, 
Singapore, and Korea make little, and almost all of Southeast Asia is missing 
from the league. Tian (2009) provided the first research on integrating Asian 
executive pay and performance sensitivity by using survey data from Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan from 
2000 to 2007. The research provided evidence that firm performance 
determines Asian executive pay but there is no performance consequence of 
executive pay.  
 
2.4 Performance consequences of executive compensation  
The last and least discussed compensation issue is the performance impact 
of executive compensation design. Few studies have investigated the 
fundamental question of whether executive compensation/incentive leads to 
better performance. Initially, the theme of the performance consequences of 
executive compensation may be traced back to assumptions about the 
executive managers who have the ultimate responsibility for the performance 
of the firm. Core et al (2003) indicates there is no statement to predict how 
compensation affects performance. However, it is clear that motivation theory 
expects compensation to increase enthusiasm, which should affect firm 
performance in a positive way. Fakhfakh and Perotin (2000) claim that to 
induce manager to exert greater effort drives not only the individual but also 
the organisation performance, because a substantial amount of profit will 
return to the managers when they put in a great deal of effort. However, Abell 
(2007) warns that the performance consequences of compensation may not 
exist as such, because the efficiency of the compensation pay may be 
reflected in various dimensions of performance. 90 
 
Finding how a firm measures performance consequences is not a new 
concept for business research, but the topic is still crucial because the result 
of the measurement indicates the manager’s ability and value to the firm. 
Finding a valid measurement system enables an executive manager to 
remedy the firm’s weaknesses as well as emphasising its strengths. A poor 
(invalid) measurement system, in contrast, may not identify the area of the 
problem; it may not motivate the manager. In addition, a poor measurement 
system may lead to unexpected behaviour on the part of the manager. 
Performance measurement can be discussed from three main standpoints: a) 
Process-based evaluation in the areas of operation and market research 
which provide non-financial information about such things as efficiency, 
productivity and marketing share; b) The result-based concept of financial 
reporting, known as the area of accounting number, providing a list of 
accounting incomes; and c) The reflection of the outsider’s point of view 
regarding the firm value. This is known as stock-based performance, from the 
area of the financial market.  
Ittner and Larcker (1998) suggest that the area of the performance 
measurement system has a role to play in strategic planning, evaluating in 
performance measurement the achievement of organisational objects and 
compensating managers for their innovation: this appears under Trends and 
Research Implications. Writers evaluate the current statement of six areas of 
concern in their performance evaluation: financial performance, customer 
satisfaction, operation efficiency, employee performance, 
community/environment and innovation/change. Among future trends, new 
financial measurements are being continuously developed, which reduces 
the limitations of the traditional financial performance measures.  
Performance measurement is generally accepted as the basic element in 
accounting measurement and the most central tool for evaluating firm 
performance. This can be said because accounting information has to be 
available free of charge under the requirements of commercial law. It is an 91 
 
indication of a firm’s financial capacity (Balance Sheet) and its operation 
performance (Profit and Loss account). The basic assumption of accounting 
procedure is the accrual basis, which holds that the adjusting of transactions 
can overlap from one accounting period to the next. The Balance Sheet 
provides details about the firm’s size; assets, liabilities and shareholders’ 
equity. The income statement gives information regarding the firm’s 
profitability; revenues, gross profit, profit before interest and tax and net 
profits. Due to the existence of various types of financial performance 
measure in the accounting literature, Biddle et al (1997) empirically compare 
key financial measurements which are provided by or related to the financial 
statement, such as net profits and operation cash flow. 
Income which is reported in the profit and loss accounting, on each line, 
indicates the different sorts of profit made by a firm. Gross profit provides 
income, which is affected by the firm’s cost structure; operation profit 
provides the firm’s ability to generate income from its own equity resources, 
whereas net profit is the profit after deducting all expenses (including interest 
and tax payments). These three figures are the best known; however, in 
terms of comparison between firms, it seem to be the case that EPS is the 
most readily understandable for the capital market’s investors because it 
provides net benefit per share invested. Net profit, alternatively, seems to be 
the best known amount, as far as the long-term investors are concerned. It 
should be clear that no single profit can provide more than one dimension of 
income, so each of them is unique in its own terms. 
Gross profits = Sales – Cost of good sales                     
Operation profits = Gross profit – operation expense     
Net profits = Operation profit – interests – taxes       
EPS = (Net profit – dividend on preferred stock)/common stock  92 
 
The net profit is the bottom line profit of the profit and loss account, although 
it has been criticised for not showing the cost of equity capital. On the basis 
of these two statements, the profit and loss account and the balance sheet, a 
firm’s capacity is standardised by size, which is called its financial ratios: net 
profit on revenues, return on assets, return of equity, debt to equity, earnings 
per share and dividends per share. These financial ratios are also provided 
by the annual report which all public companies are required to submit as 
accounting information for the public, via the Stock Exchange committee. 
The cash flow statement is the reverse of net profits to cash basis 
accounting. It provides financial information regarding the cash inflow and 
outflow. This statement is important because it provides unique data about 
the rising or falling of a firm’s liquidity in three areas of activity; operating, 
financing and investing. Thus the information is crucial in term of flexibility 
and the ability to convert assets to cash. Operation activity provides quite 
similar information to that in the profit and loss account; what difference lies 
in their underlying assumption, whether on a cash basis or an accrual basis. 
In the long run, both assumptions have the same total amount, but, 
unfortunately, when carefully analysing the situation, in particular when the 
firm lacks liquidity, the cash basis seems to be more important in the short 
run. To present liquidity information, it is necessary to re-arrange the 
information which is contained in the income statement and the balance 
sheet.  
Cash flows from operating activities = Net profits + depreciation + 
amortization + decrease in current assets – increase in current assets + 
increase in current liability – decrease in current liability         
Cash flows from investing activities = Acquisition of fixed assets – Cash 
paid for intangible assets - Cash received from sales of assets - 
Investments decrease   93 
 
Cash flows from financing activities = Cash received from short-term loans 
+ Cash received from long-term loans + Cash received from issuing 
ordinary shares + Cash received from premium on ordinary shares – Cash 
paid for repayment of short-term loans  - Cash paid for repayment of long-
term loans – Cash paid for repayment of promissory notes – Dividends paid  
Free cash flow = Increase (decrease) in cash flows from operation activities 
+ Increase (decrease) in cash flows from investing activities + Increase 
(decrease) in cash flows from financing activities – net cash flows from 
operating activities – net cash flows from investing activities       
Generally it is an accepted principle in accounting that the firm is required to 
keep an accounting record in accrual base accounting, but it sometimes 
cannot give some detailed information, about liquidity in particular. The main 
part of the financial statement reports the accrual basis in its balance sheet, a 
statement of profit and loss and a statement of change in shareholder equity. 
Using this information, the cash flow from operating activities can be 
calculated by performance measurement estimated by net profit minus 
transactions by those accruals. 
From the early compensation studies, researchers have been aware that it is 
important to understand whether or not compensation has the power to 
enhance firm performance (Heugens et al, 2009). There is no doubt that the 
prediction direction of executive compensation influences firm performance, 
but performance proxy-accounting-based versus market-based measures of 
performance- is still under debate (Leonard, 1990; Larcker and Sloan, 1995; 
Prendergast, 1999). Leonard (1990) finds that return on equity correlates with 
bonus pay. Abowd (1990) finds that managerial compensation has links to 
corporate performance in the next year. Gerhart and Mikovich (1990) aims to 
investigate the Agency theory which specifies that decisions about the 
compensation package cause differences in firm performance. The result 
indicates that contingent pay is associated with financial performance but 
base pay is not. 94 
 
Table 2.5 Empirical research on the way in which executive compensation influences the firm performance 
Author(s)  Date  Setting  Data  Variables  Result 
Collection  Analysis  Dependent  Independent 
Palia  2001  US listed 
companies 
3,260 data 
1981 - 1993 
Two-Stage 
least 
square- FE 
Q  Equity/total 
compensation, 
size, debt 
A system of simultaneous equations 
using instrumental variables indicates 
that equity compensation correlates 
with firm performance. 
Chalmers et al  2006  200 
Australian 
listed 
companies 
Archival 
1999 - 2002 
OLS 
regression 
ROA, RET  Excess 
compensation, 
sales, market to 
book value 
After controlling for corporate 
governance, predicted excess 
compensation is positively related to 
subsequent firm performance. 
Yayla and Hu 
 
 
 
2008  US listed 
companies  
S&P 500 
for the 
years 
1994-2005 
OLS 
regression 
ROA, Tobin’s 
Q, executive 
compensation 
Risk, size, 
alignment, 
competition, 
capital 
expenditure 
market share 
Executive compensation alignment 
with the firm performance when 
taking into account the 
competitiveness of the market, the 
capital expenditure and the market 
share of the firm. 
Cooper et al  2009  US listed 
companies 
CompStat 
1994 - 2006 
OLS 
regression 
ROA  Size, cash  
compensation 
CEO pay is negatively related to 
future shareholder return. 
Brick et al  2010  11,019 
American 
companies  
CompStat 
1992 - 2004 
OLS 
regression, 
FE 
Stock return  Pay-performance 
sensitivity, risk, 
industry 
High pay-performance sensitivity is 
associated with low future returns. 95 
 
The evidence summarised in Table 2.5 partly supports the view that 
executive compensation affects firm performance
3; however, the way in 
which firm performance has been measured is still under debate. Thus, the 
next issue in understanding the role of executive compensation is tracking 
the performance matrix. There is a general belief that a firm which gives 
higher executive compensation pay should have higher firm performance, 
because this high compensation should increase the motivation of the 
manager. Referring to the existing literature above, it may be summarised 
that firm performance is a consequence of executive compensation pay.  
Yit = ƒ ( compensationit, controlledit) +  ε i        ..…….. (4) 
where Yit is defined as firm performance. It is the function of executive 
compensation and a controlled variable of firm i at the time t . ε i is the 
unobserved determinants of firm performance. 
 
   
                                                 
3 Hengartner (2006) provides a comprehensive review on the effects of executive 
compensation 
1)  Stock options, dividend payment, and share repurchases. 
2)  Unvested stock options, restricted stock, and manager retention. 
3)  Incentive compensation and risk. 
4)  Compensation, Merger and acquisition, and divestitures. 
5)  Long-term compensation and capital investment. 
6)  Contingent pay and expectations management. 
7)  Incentive compensation and earning management. 96 
 
 
2.5 Chapter summary 
The division of labour rapidly developed the means of mass production. 
Modern economic theory begins by explaining how economic systems run 
through price mechanisms. When the market fails, the firm rises. The initial 
and perhaps the most influential person in the firm is the shareholder. He 
may need to organise the firm by himself but as a wealthy person he may not 
have enough time to operate all the firms that he creates. In time he must 
hire professional managers to run them. However, human rationality of self-
interest and opportunism which direct the way that parties make their decisions 
create the agency problem. Asymmetric information also limits economic 
ability in decision making. All these factors, together with the nature of the 
organisation structures, create the agency problem by compounding the 
complexity of the relationship between Principal and Agent. To control the 
agency problem, the Principal has a chance to create working contracts in 
order to express his interest and also to verify the Agent’s behaviour.  
Incentive theory has been developed; this evolved as a part of the efficiency 
branch of the standard agency problem. By mapping compensation designs 
while evaluating the alignment to firm performance, we may discover the 
hidden factors which influences the link between compensation and firm 
performance which previous research has basically overlooked. The 
components of the executive compensation package are salary, bonus, stock 
options and perks. The implementation of incentive compensation is one 
current issue. The explicit relation between pay and shareholder wealth has, 
so far, not been clearly demonstrated, where the performance consequences 
of compensation pay are still new. Another research arena investigates the 
implicit relation between pay and shareholder wealth, as well as corporate 
scandals and the agency cost.     97 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
The Development of Hypotheses  
 
Executive compensation research in Agency theory concentrating on the 
separation between ownership and control has a long history (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). However, the vast majority of executive compensation 
questions are constructed upon the Anglo-Saxon setting. Recently, new 
approaches, such as executive compensation in the collaboration economy 
have emerged. The main idea prompting the study of the role of ownership 
structure as a moderation factor on pay-performance sensitivity is the 
doubtful assumption of a separation between ownership and control. 
Fortunately, the current development of databases, as well as the rise of 
rigorously statistical analysis, provides a great platform on which to re-
evaluate executive compensation issues by providing a theoretical framework 98 
 
and adding new bodies of research, when applicable, on the pay-
performance sensitivity and its consequences. A set of testable hypotheses 
has also been established using the Agency theory approach to complete 
contract theory and accounts of concentrated ownership.  
Four groups of hypotheses are developed as the result of this chapter. The 
first is the issue of the executive pay-performance sensitivity. The second is 
how different characteristics of the separation between ownership and control 
affect the executive pay-performance sensitivity. The next section 
investigates the performance consequences of executive compensation, 
while the last section examines the role of ownership structure on the 
performance consequences of executive compensation. 
 
3.1 Pay-performance sensitivity 
Optimal contracting theory believes that executive compensation encourages 
excessive risk taking, resulting in an alignment of interest between the 
Principal and the Agent. Thus, it is the firm’s responsibility to design an 
executive compensation scheme which provides efficiency compensation to 
maximise shareholder value (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Holmstrom, 1979). 
Since the firms which fail to encourage their managers to serve their  interest 
do not experience competition in the market, a positive relationship between 
firm performance and compensation is expected (Murphy, 1999).  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) first provide empirical evidence on the influence 
of firm performance on executive compensation between 1974 and 1986. 
This original piece of work disclosed that that Agency theory is consistent but 
the small magnitude of pay-performance sensitivity raises some concern over 
the explanatory power of formal agency of optimal contracting. Hall and 99 
 
Liebman (1998) provide further US evidence on the pay-performance 
sensitivity, using 478 of large US companies’ data from the period 1980 to 
1994. The paper argues that the early weak evidence is the result of excluding 
the stock options. Adjusting the data, Hall and Liebman show that with every 
$1000 increase in company value comes a $25 increase in the executive 
manager’s wealth. Murphy (1999) revises the theoretical evidence and 
provides empirical evidence using 500 US companies during 1990 to 1996 
that cash pay-performance sensitivity does exist.  
Furthermore, Tevlin (1996) later found it to be the case that the 
compensation will be closely linked to firm performance if a higher 
econometric technique such as a dynamic model is involved.  Guy (2000), 
too, investigates the impact of firm performance on executive compensation 
in British companies from 1972 to 1989. Insisting not only on the 
econometrics estimation model which corrects the biases of heterogeneity, 
the author evaluates the issue of performance measures and the time 
dimension of firm performance. Both accounting-based and market-based 
performances are tested.  The results indicate that there is a strong positive 
influence of changes in shareholder returns at 6.6% by accounting on 
executive compensation. Gregg et al (2005) revisit the state of the pay-
performance sensitivity using rigorous estimation techniques such as fixed 
effects, random effects, instrumental variable and the generalised method of 
moment. The authors provide new evidence that a rise in firm performance 
causes substantial movement in executive compensation over time.  
Note that one issue which moves step by step with the pay-performance 
sensitivity is the determinants of executive compensation at firm level. One of 
the very first papers dealing with the determinants of executive compensation 
was introduced by Agarwal in 1981. This seminal work of compensation study 
begins the expanding search for the factors influencing executive compensation, 
for at the time it was believed that compensation should relate to the scale of 
complexity of the firm (the firm size). The evidence supports his assumption 100 
 
that the span of control, profit and company size influences the level of 
executive compensation pay. Even taking human capital into account, however, 
the firm’s size and ability to pay appears to be far more important than its 
other individual characteristics. The evidence supports the view that the power of 
the labour market influences the determination of executive compensation 
more than these individual characteristics do. Decktop (1988) confirms the 
finding that size, industry and firm performance are linked to executive pay.  
The consistency of the fundamentally empirical research led to phenomenal 
progress in 1990 when the Industrial and Labour Relations Review published 
a special issue named ‘Do Compensation Policies Matter?’. The Academy of 
Management Journal later launched a special issue, the ‘Special Research 
Forum on Managerial Compensation and Firm Performance’ (1998). The two 
special issues confirm that executive compensation was the most contentious 
issue in the 1990s. The search for the pay-performance sensitivity in Anglo-
Saxon cultures is still going on; the availability of executive compensation 
provides new evidence from different market settings. For example, SET 
established an executive compensation database in order to provide 
opportunities for Thai scholars to begin investigating pay-performance 
sensitivity. At least five studies of firm performance as a determination of 
executive compensation have been conducted on SET.  
Sitthiharn (2006) used 292 companies listed in 2004. She finds that firm 
performance, such as EPS, has a statistically significant influence on 
executive compensation pay in the financial sector. She also confirms that 
size and EPS have statistically significant influences on executive compensation 
pay in the non-financial sector. However, this research has interpretation 
limitations due to the use of cross-sectional data. Within the same year, 
Thakaew (2006) used Thai listed companies’ data from 2001-2004 to prove 
that the Thai listed companies reward their executives based on EPS, ROA 
and ROE. However she finds that stock return has a negative influence on 
executive compensation. This study, however, tends to suffer from 101 
 
multicollinearity, insufficiently controlled variables and sampling bias, due to 
the limited quality of the data. Soon afterwards, Puttaphiwat (2007) used 
simple regression on 377 listed companies in SET in 2006 to trace the influence 
of firm performance on executive total compensation. He finds that EPS has 
a positive relationship with executive compensation in consuming, industrial 
and property development where ROE has a positive relationship with 
executive compensation in the consuming, industrial, and real estate sectors.  
The SET (2007) used cross-sectional data sets between 2005 and2006 to 
investigate whether or not listed companies provide pay compensation to 
their CEOs on the basis of performance. This research confirms that size 
matters greatly to compensation pay; however, it fails to confirm that that any 
relationship between pay and performance exists. The research suffers from the 
statistical technique deployed: only the correlation for each year has been 
used to detect the relationship. It also suffers from the lack of a controlling 
factor to influence the link.  
Recently, using a regression analysis of 432 listed companies in SET in 2007, 
Kaewkumson (2009) examined the influence of firm performance on 
executive compensation. By analysing industries separately, he finds that 
accounting income - ROA, ROE and EPS - influence executive pay in the 
consumer products and resources industry. He also finds that in the 
agriculture industry, consumer products, industrial goods, real estate and the 
construction and resources sectors, stock return has influence power over 
executive compensation pay. It may be added that net revenue influences 
compensation in the agriculture industry, and in the consuming, finance, 
property development and service sectors. 
Most executive compensation research deployed OLS as the estimation 
technique; however the awareness on the possible estimation bias has since 
grown. Unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity is the most common 102 
 
concern; thus fixed effect should be adopted. Where the firms do not 
randomly decide to pay, executive compensation is an endogenous decision 
of the firm in nature. Estimation technique such as two-stage-least-square 
and generalised method of moments should be implemented. Since no 
systematic research has been done to verify the Agency theory which 
suggests a design with a clear link between the interest of the Principal and 
that of the Agent, the present study constructs the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive and significant relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance.  
Hengartner (2006) indicates that existing Anglo-Saxon evidence is sufficient 
to claim that shareholder wealth maximisation has the power to influence 
executive compensation design. However, one concern that challenges our 
understanding is the method of measuring firm performance. Market return, 
accounting income, or cash flow performance have long been discussed, but 
a final view on the use of performance evaluation has not yet been found. 
Bonner et al (2000) suggest that an appropriate choice of performance proxy 
may lead to a previously undiscovered assessment of the link between 
compensation system and firm performance. Frydman and Jenter (2010) 
emphasise that a comprehensive measure of compensation should include 
the effects of current performance on current compensation (in the case of 
bonus) and future compensation (in the case of a stock option). Kozan and 
Boulanger (2004), who provide synchronised key performance measures, 
state that the measures most often adopted are the accounting profitability 
measures included in EPS and OCF. The rationale for profitability is that 
calculated profit measurement considers both revenue and expenses and 
then standardises the size of the firms. Cash flow removes the estimation of 
accounting methods, which is believed to be more reliable than accrual basis 
numbers. Stock market measures are generally considered to be objective 
and independent measures which provide a forward- looking point of view but 
they have been criticised on the grounds of controllability.  103 
 
3.1.1 Accrual base accounting income 
EPS is one of the most common performance indicators on the executive 
compensation contract. This ratio is the best known financial ratio because it 
has been chosen by IRFs to represent profitability per one unit of equity; thus 
it guides investors to find how much they earn from their investment in the 
firm. Thai accounting standards also provide guidelines in calculating this, 
which make it the most comparable financial ratio across firms and over 
industries. This accrual base accounting income is a result of the 
combination using profit income, which is reported in the profit and loss 
account together with the balance sheet. Leone et al (2006) find that cash 
compensation is sensitive to accounting profit; they are still conscious of 
conservative accounting, with unrealised gains from uncertain profit but 
recognise unrealised losses, in a timely manner. The authors point out that 
the firm-value maximising of this accounting conservatism is different from the 
efficient contracts for compensation. Ittner and Larcker (1997) and Biddle et al 
(1999) also indicate certain limitations, such as the failure to account for the 
cost of capital. Next, yields-growth percentages can be misleading when the 
growth of a small firm is rapid. The determinant of net income number 
includes non-recurring and extraordinary items. Furthermore, these 
accounting numbers have been blamed for being self-evaluated, exclusive of 
the cost of capital, backward looking and short-term, leading to unexpected 
behaviour, such as creative accounting. Nevertheless, Sloan (1993) shows 
that the accounting numbers give a smooth profile of firm income as well as 
one which is suitable for earnings-based incentives, because it provides 
benefits in terms of risk-sharing between firms and managers. This research 
uses this opportunity to explore the role of EPS as a firm performance metric 
on the executive pay-performance sensitivity. Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H1a: EPS has a positive and significant relation to executive compensation  104 
 
3.1.2 Cash base accounting income 
This performance indicator is a result of the most straightforward recording 
method when cash is received and paid. The operation cash flow (OCF) is 
calculated by reversing the net profits to cash basis accounting by using the 
cash flow statement, which provides financial information regarding cash 
inflow and the outflow of cash. In the long run, both the accrual and cash 
bases have the same total amount, but, as noted above, the cash basis 
seems to more important in the short run even when the situation is carefully 
analysed, in particular when the firm lacks liquidity. To present liquidity 
information, it is necessary to re-arrange information which is contained in 
the income statement and the balance sheet, as well as noting the financial 
statement. Nwaeze , Yang, and Yin (2006) study the role of the OCF in the 
presence of earning. They believe that the OCF is contract-relevant in the 
presence of earning. They also show that the OCF in the compensation 
model is associated with the presence of earnings and stock returns, and 
they  discuss the quality of accounting earning in general. Skinner (1999) 
indicates that funds from the operations of a firm are better evidence than 
accounting income in terms of economic and behavioural evidence to support 
these researchers’ ideas. This research uses the available opportunity to 
explore the role of OCF as a firm performance metric on the pay-
performance sensitivity. Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H1b: OCF has a positive and significant relation to executive compensation  
   105 
 
3.1.3 Capital market base stock return 
Stock return is the capital market base, representing the investors’ decisions 
on stock prices reflecting the evaluation of the manager’s performance. This 
performance indicator is famous because of its availability, transparency and 
benchmarking ability, but it has been criticised over its sensitivity to timing, 
news and peer groups which are all beyond the control of the managers. 
However, this lacked the predictive ability to describe future performance and 
exemplified short-termism, which leads to such unexpected behaviour as 
creative accounting. Jenson  and Murphy (1990) explored the role of stock 
return on executive compensation .The idea is supported by Conyon and 
Simon (1998), who find that shareholder return regressed on executive 
compensation. However, Sloan (1993) criticises this view; he states that the 
stock price is not controlled by the manager. He explains that accounting 
earnings give a smoother profile of firm income than the stock price does. In 
addition, earning-based incentives provide benefits in terms of risk-sharing 
between the firm and the manager, while the stock price reflects external 
factors which are beyond managers’ control. However, using stock return is 
as common as using accounting profit. Core et al (1999) and Joh (1999) 
employ stock return as a proxy of firm performance in constructing a 
compensation equation. Talmor and Wallace (2002) find stock return 
associated with compensation pay. Supported by Lin (2005), who finds all 
three performance measurements are associated with executive pay, Leone 
et al (2006) propose that boards of director believe in a firm-value 
maximisation approach which is to minimise executive compensation costs, 
which ultimately leads to maximising firm value. Recently, Kato et al (2007) 
found that both accounting numbers and stock returns are playing a less 
important role in the determination of the compensation system in Korea. 
This research, as noted above, uses the opportunity to explore the role of 
stock return as a firm performance metric on the pay-performance sensitivity. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
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3.2 Ownership structure moderates pay-performance sensitivity 
Using the agency power approach, a limit number of studies have been 
undertaken on the role of ownership structure as a determinant of pay-
performance sensitivity. Original studies on ownership concentration and 
executive compensation aim to understand the collective authority to make 
the decision within a large publicly traded firm (Cheung et al, 2005). Typical 
Principal-Agent problems concern the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It is generally believed that a firm which has 
dispersed ownership should rely on intense incentive contracts because it 
lacks the cumulative negotiation power to reduce agency costs (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003). However, the American medel of separation between 
ownership and control may not be common outside the Anglo-Saxon 
cultures. Many researchers examples point out that corporate structure 
should be seen as the reason for this contradiction of previous studies. 
However, most of the research attacks the issue by using the narrow 
approach of corporate governance (e.g. Newman, 2000 and Lin, 2005). The 
issue became better known when questions were asked about such matters 
as the ability of the Board of Directors, the transparency of remuneration 
committee and the independence of audit committee. Some research 
approaches to the contract theory indicate that particular types of firm 
characteristically choose to introduce incentives into their executive 
compensation contract. However, it has been found that the incentive 
contract creates a new level of complexity between the Principal and the 
Agent, which leads to complexity in the contract design. 
Jiang (2009) indicates that there should be no more confusion about 
specifying the form of the separation between ownership and control; thus his 
research takes this opportunity to explore the role of ownership structure on 
the pay-performance sensitivity. Consequently, in a research proposition 107 
 
about the influence of ownership structure on the amount of basic salary pay, 
incentive pay and total executive pay, it is hypothesised that:  
H2: There is a moderation effect of ownership structure on the positive 
and significant relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance.  
Concentrated ownership flips the executive research direction when one 
raises the issue that dispersed ownership is not the most common ownership 
structure worldwide. In the US, corporate governance of the remuneration 
committee now dominates the research arena and this research trend has 
spread quickly to other settings. European research provides contradictory 
results compared with American and British evidence on the role of corporate 
governance as a determinant of executive pay-performance sensitivity. The 
evidence indicates that more highly concentrated ownership provides better 
monitoring through direct control; thus the executive compensation structure 
should be different from those in market-based economies. It marks a turning 
point in executive compensation studies, which requires the consideration of 
ownership structure. Khan (2003) summarises the Principal-Agent approach 
by comparing corporate governance mechanisms between market-oriented 
and network-oriented economies.  
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Table 3.1 Economy characteristics 
 
Type of Corporate Governance System 
Dispersed ownership 
leads to an equity 
market-based system 
Concentrated ownership 
in an equity market and 
bond system 
Investor orientation  Large  Concentrated 
Dominant agency conflict  Shareholder vs. manager  Majority vs. minority 
(stake)shareholders 
Role of board of directors  Important  Limited 
Role of hostile takeovers  Potentially important  Quite limited 
Role of insolvency  Potentially important  Possible systemic crisis 
may postpone 
bankruptcies 
Source: Khan (2003) 
Kraft and Niederprum (1999) remind us that the collective power of the Agents 
in the firm may affect the negotiation power over executive compensation 
design, which has a direct influence on the relationship between executive 
compensation and ownership structure. Claessens et al (2000) emphasise that 
the limited number of firms with dispersed ownership in East Asia, even when 
a 20% cut-off is employed, may suggest a different control mechanism from 
that generally used with dispersed ownership structure. The consideration of 
dispersed ownership causing higher compensation in the US leads Elston and 
Goldberg (2003) to explore the role of ownership structure on executive 
compensation (salary in particular) in Germany. The authors divide German-
concentrated ownership into corporate, foreign, bank and family ownership. 
Their results indicate that banks play a negative role in executive pay. 
Claessens et al (2000) indicate that family ownership is the most common 
ownership structure found in most Asian capital markets. Local institutional 
investors such as corporate holdings are found in most European countries. 
Foreign ownership is common in open economies and those which are friendly 
to foreign investment such as Canada, Australia and Singapore. 109 
 
3.2.1 Family businesses 
Unlike dispersed ownership firms, family businesses may provide a high-
intensity control mechanism in order to satisfy the family’s interests. DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1985) believe that family ownership explicitly and implicitly 
involves the heads of families in monitoring their firm’s wealth through the 
quasi-rents which relatives earn from employment in order to prevent poor 
management performance which might lead to a loss of the head’s control 
and wealth. McConaughy (2000) suggests that while the founding family can 
run the firms in their own interest, incentive pay is less required. Connelly et 
al (2010) indicate that family ownership shares some characteristics of high 
controlling power, as other forms of concentrated ownership also do. Shanker 
and Astrachan (1996) also suggest that family businesses incorporate some 
degree of control over strategic decisions by the family and always have the 
intention of keeping the business in the family. They suggest at least five 
criteria for defining something as a family business. These are the percentage 
of ownership, voting control, strategic decisions, the involvement of multiple 
generations, and the active management by family members. The 
consideration about the role of ownership has grown since the beginning of 
the twenty first century. Using east and south-east Asian countries, Claessens 
et al (2000) find the strong presence of family holdings. Wiwattanakantang 
(2000) confirms that family businesses are the most common form of 
ownership structure in Thailand. She also states that the management control 
of these firms lies in the hands of the founding family.  
Gomez-Mejia et al (2003) are aware that primary agency conflict in family 
business differs from that in widely-held businesses. The study empirically 
reports that family ownership wrap their executive pay with their performance. 
Also, the family-owned firm becomes more sensitive to systematic risk while 
the presence of institutional investors and R&D expenditure moderate the 
relationship. Corci, Gonenc, and Ozkan (2010) report the curb of executive 
compensation in family-run businesses in Europe. Both findings align with 110 
 
those of Core et al (1999); that stronger monitoring reduces the probability 
that managers will be awarded unnecessary compensation. Conelly et al 
(2010) add that the collective power of those with ownership in family 
business allows them to monitor the manager directly; thus the pay-
performance sensitivity for the executive managers should be stronger. The 
present study joins the long-standing and ongoing debate on the role of family 
businesses in the pay-performance sensitivity. Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H2a: Family ownership moderates the positive and significant relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance.  
3.2.2 Corporate holdings 
Listed companies benefit from the economies of scale which commonly 
cause other ownership structures to make initial public offerings to attract 
external capital in order to support their expansion. Unlike them, firms - and- 
institutions in particular - are created with a corporate ownership to deal with 
excessive funds for which the owner seeks investment opportunities. This 
type of business searches for a firm with a potential for high return. After 
substantial ownership blocks, this ownership tends to take an active part in 
the firm in order to ensure that the return will be worth their investment 
(Monks and Minow, 1995). Concentrated ownership is defined as ownership 
by local juristic investors, and local financial institutions comprising banks, 
trusts, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and state-owned 
corporations (Haid and Yurtoglu, 2006). The local concentration of ownership 
identifies the type of firm which has been controlled by native large/holding 
firms, such as are common in continental Europe.  
The role of corporate ownership on executive compensation pay is explored 
in German firms. Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) confirm that local institutional 
ownership reduces the level of executive compensation. Using data from the 111 
 
U.S., Hartzell and Starks (2003) confirm that the percentage of corporate 
holdings affect performance-related pay sensitivity. After controlling for firm 
size, industry, investment opportunities and recent performance, they find 
that the structure of local corporate holdings has a positive relation to the 
pay-performance sensitivity. Firth et al (2006) also provide empirical 
evidence on the moderate role of corporate concentrated ownership on the 
pay-performance sensitivity. Using three-year-panel data between 1998 and 
2000 from the Taiwan Stock Market, this research found the positive role of 
corporate ownership on the relationship between executive total 
compensation and stock return. The present study uses this opportunity to 
explore the role of corporate ownership as a concentrated form of ownership 
on the pay-performance sensitivity. It expects that corporate ownership has a 
greater but negative influence on the pay-performance sensitivity. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H2b: Corporate ownership moderates the positive and influence relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance. 
3.2.3 Foreign investors 
Foreign investors play an important role in the economic growth of almost 
every emerging economy. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is the primary 
channel for gathering capital from overseas. This is favoured not only for the 
movement of capital that it allows from the home to the host country, but also 
because it may introduce new technologies, processes, products, 
organisation technologies and other intangible assets to the other country 
(Rochananonda, 2006). The Stock Exchange is an alternative channel for 
gathering capital from overseas through trading transactions across borders.  
Lipsey (2002) mentions that compensation pays in foreign multinational firms 
are higher than that in similar domestic firms. The author introduces four 
different explanations for this. First, foreign firms have been forced to raise 112 
 
salaries by the regulations in the host country or pressure from the home 
country. Second, workers prefer to work for local firms. Third, because of 
some proprietary technology the foreigner investor wants to reduce employee 
turnover. The last assumption is that the foreigner investor lacks knowledge 
about how to attract better workers, so they have to pay their employees 
more than local firms do. Doeringer (2003) study the effects of Japanese 
multinational management practices and compensation pay in the United 
States. They find that Japanese firms pay attention to training, high problem-
solving skills and also team-working skills. In detail, they find that new 
workers in American- and Japanese-owned firms earn the same wage, but to 
further illustrate their idea they highlight the superior job security and greater 
opportunities available to employees of Japanese firms.  
Firth et al (2006), however, stated that in cross-border investment, foreign 
investors are likely to exert pressure on the firm to adopt a pay-performance 
sensitivity scheme. Using data during the period 1998 to 2000 from the 
Taiwan Stock Market, the study found the positive role of foreign ownership 
in the relationship between executive compensation and accounting 
performance. The authors state that foreign investors are in favour because 
they have a wider choice of investment and it is more likely that it will be a 
firm with good corporate governance, one characteristic of which is the close 
link between compensation and firm performance. Thus, it logically follows 
that performance sensitivity in foreign investments is likely to be higher than 
in domestic investments. The present study then expects positive role of 
foreign ownership in the pay-performance sensitivity. Consequently, it is 
hypothesised that: 
H2c: Foreign ownership moderates the positive and influence relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance. 
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3.3 Performance consequence of executive compensation 
Since executive managers have an important role on firm performance, the 
shareholder has certain expectations over the amount of compensation pay 
that will be returned to them; hence, they expect that greater compensation 
pay should bring superior performance (Mackey, 2006; Kim et al, 2010). 
Frydman and Jenter (2010) indicate that this fundamental question in 
compensation research is one of the most interesting, but little evidence is 
provided on the performance consequences of executive compensation. 
Abowd and Kaplan (1999) explain that one reason for this is that economic 
theory predicts a rise in motivation when the compensation rises but no 
theory indicates categorically that compensation will raise a firm performance. 
Using the Agency theory framework, the shareholder should not offer greater 
executive compensation if his investment is never paid back.  
The hope that executive compensation will lead to appropriate corporate 
performance drives the most important but less famous study to investigate 
the effectiveness of the system overall, rather than just the pay-performance 
sensitivity issue to date; that of Jensen and Murphy (1990). This paper began 
with the use of executive compensation to investigate the conflict of interests 
within the firm. Ever since, the investigation of efficiency in executive 
compensation designs has chosen this approach. Few papers have 
investigated the performance consequences of executive compensation; 
some believe that this approach is limited by the measurement issue, which 
results in an inability to interpret the relationship. Thus, the present study 
investigates the performance consequences in the hope that the executive 
compensation will show positive correlation with corporate performance. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H3: There is a positive and significant consequence of executive 
compensation on firm performance. 114 
 
The study of performance consequences of Thai listed companies has been 
investigated in Jiamsagul (2007) under the approach of transparency and 
disclosure, and board of directors affect three performance measures; ROA, 
Q, and stock return. Ittner et al (1997) observe the different types of 
performance used in executive incentive contracts: they are cash flow, net 
income, EPS, sales, economic value-added, return on invested capital, return 
on assets, return on equity, return on sales, stock price return and cost 
reduction. Langfield-Smith (1997) indicate that there is no generally accepted 
approach to measuring performance but the accounting-based approach is 
the most widely used where the capital market is doubtful about the role of 
the executive manager in accounting procedures. 
3.3.1 Accrual base accounting income 
Most of the performance consequences of executive compensation include 
accounting-based accrual basis in their analyses. However, the varied choice 
of methods of accounting performance makes it difficult to correlate the early 
findings. Gerhard and Milkovich (1990) explore the ROA consequences of 
executive compensation but find a momentum affect. The authors provide 
evidence that lagged ROA is the only factor which determines current ROA. 
Conyon et al (2000) suggest that EPS, as an accounting-based measure, is 
preferable because it is not subject to general economy, and shows less 
effect from noise induced by the capital market, is mostly under the firm’s 
control and also that it is not always  economically relevant but has the 
potential to signal managerial effort. Using British listed companies between 
1985 and 1995, the paper, however, fails to provide further empirical 
evidence on EPS as the performance consequence of executive stock 
options. Regarding to evidence above, it is hypothesised that: 
H3a: Executive compensation has a positive and significant influence effect on EPS 
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3.3.2 Cash base accounting income 
Net operation cash flow is a performance indicator and is the most straightforward 
recording method when cash is received and paid. In general, it is calculated 
by reversing net profits to cash basis accounting by using the cash flow 
statement, which provides financial information regarding the cash inflow and 
outflow. Nwaeze et al (2006) indicate that cash flow statements benefit the 
financial users by letting them understand the cash and cash-equivalent items 
which directly affect the liquidity of the firm. Thus, this information is legally 
available to the public. Sirisom (2003) indicates that funds from the operations 
of a firm provide investors with incremental information. The present study 
uses the opportunity to explore the role of executive compensation on OCF. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H3b: Executive compensation has a positive and significant influence effect on OCF. 
3.3.3 Capital market base return 
Stock return is the capital market base, which represents the investors’ decisions 
on stock prices reflecting their evaluation of the manager’s performance. This 
performance indicator is famous because of its availability, transparency and 
benchmarking ability. Conyon et al (2000) indicate that stock return is preferred 
since at least two supplementary reasons are given; it reflects the expectation 
of shareholders and the efficient market hypothesis is that share prices can 
intermediately reflect executive actions.  However, Hogan and Lewis (1999) 
use stock prices as a guide to firm performance and looked without success for 
a relationship between economic profit-plan adopters and non-adopting control 
firms. Davis (2001) indicates that nothing but higher market capitalisations 
creates a higher stock return. Abowd and Kaplan (1999) provide their own 
answer – that the nature of a share price is not directly correlated with 
executive motivation but tends to relate closely to overall market performance; 
but also that expectation over performance began to rise when executive 116 
 
incentives were granted, in the case of stock options. The present study aims 
to explore the stock returns on the subsequence of executive compensation. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H3c: Executive compensation has a positive and significant influence effect 
on stock returns. 
 
3.4 Ownership structure moderates the performance consequences 
of executive compensation 
The investigation of the role of ownership structure on the firm performance has 
a long history but only a few studies have explored the issue of the role of 
ownership structure in the pay-performance sensitivity. The uncertainty over the 
performance consequences of concentrated ownership has a confusing effect. 
On the one hand, concentrated ownership minimises the free rider problem and 
has substantial power to reduce agency cost, which tends to maximise firm 
value (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). On the other, concentrated ownership is 
believed to have an entrenchment effect because the controlling shareholder 
transfers wealth from other shareholders to his group (La Porta et al, 1998). 
 
Source: Kuntisook and Boonlert-U-Thai (adapted) (2009) 
Figure 3.1 Agency cost consequences of ownership structure 
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Figure 3.1 indicates the effect of ownership structure on agency cost. 
Dispersed ownership leads to the classic agency problem between manager 
and shareholder. Having concentrated ownership, Kuntisook and Boonlert-U-
Thai (2009) believe that the collection power in the Principal will align their 
effort to control the Agent, which leads to lower requirements in monitoring 
and bonding costs. However, having strong power, the concentrated 
ownership may divert firm value from the stakeholder into their own pocket. 
The inadequate balancing of control may lead to poor firm performance, 
which leads to the creation of a second type of Principal-Agent problem. 
Furthermore, the authors investigate the role of the controlling shareholder in 
the reporting of firm performance, for researchers believe that executive 
managers may play a part in moving funds from the minority interest into the 
hands of the manager and his family. The results provide evidence for the 
controlling shareholder, that in family firms, as well as others, corporate 
governance positively influences EPS. The finding aligns with those of 
Wiwattanakantang (2000), who explores the role of foreign investors and 
institutional investors in Thai listed companies. She finds that controlled size 
and corporate governance, foreign investment and institutional ownership all 
have positive influences on firm performance. Since most of the early and 
current research on the pay-performance sensitivity provides concrete 
evidence that those bigger firm hold superior resources, it is expected to 
leads them to achieve better output (Cichello, 2005). This study, then, 
controlled for the size effect. However, Edwards and Weichenrieder (2009) 
investigate the role of the control rights of German concentrated ownership in 
firm performance. The research found no evidence that concentrated 
ownership causes better firm performance. The present study uses the 
opportunity to explore the role of ownership structure in the performance 
consequences of executive compensation. Consequently, it is hypothesised 
that: 
H4: Ownership structure moderates the positive and significant 
consequences of executive compensation on firm performance. 118 
 
A numbers of studies have explored the ownership structures of family-
owned firms; Villalonga and Amit (2006) synthesise the literature and find 
that family ownership certainly influences firm performance but they are not 
sure in which direction. Classic Agency theory believes that the lower agency 
cost of conflict of interest between the Principal and the Agent has a positive 
effect on the value of the family firm, but the imbalance between the Principal 
and Agent can also raise the rent to deduct private benefits from those 
minority shareholders. Tontivanichanon (2004) also finds that during the 
period 1999 to 2003, family control in SET was positively significant for 
accounting based firm performance. However, Athiapinya (2005) uses the 
same period of data as Tontivanichanon but comes to a contradictory 
conclusion about the Thai listed companies; that there is a negative effect of 
family founding on firm performance. Maury (2006) confirms the role of 
family-controlled firms in the performance consequences in Western Europe: 
that family businesses better perform than any other type of ownership 
concentration, which the author believes is because family businesses have 
a lower level of conflicts between the family and the minority shareholder, 
except when the shareholder protection is low and control is high. In contrast, 
Barth et al (2005) discover that family-owned firms are likely to under-perform 
when managed by someone from the owning family. They believe that this is 
the result of the risk-shifting between shareholders and minority 
shareholders, the limited diversification of financial risk and the higher cost of 
capital. The present study uses the opportunity to explore the role of family 
ownership on the performance consequence of executive pay. Consequently, 
it is hypothesised that: 
H4a: Family ownership moderates the positive and significant consequences of 
executive compensation on firm performance. 
The studies of institutional investors as a form of concentrated ownership are 
rising in the US. because a huge amount of money is gathered in the form of 
mutual funds. Using data from the U.S., Hartzell and Starks (2003) confirm 119 
 
that the percentage of corporate holdings affects the sensitivity of 
performance-related pay. However, the form of the block shareholder in 
Europe is different. The common form in European listed companies is that of 
a cross-holding firm. The evidence can be seen in most European countries, 
except Britain. The inclusion of power is believed to have a positive influence 
on firm performance because of the increase in controlling power over the 
manager. Using Germany as an example, Haid and Yurtoglu (2006) find that 
the common form of block shareholder is local institutional ownership. Their 
result confirms the thinking that concentrated ownership is linked to the 
power of corporate control which raises firm performance. However, 
Chowdhury and Geringer (2001) provide contradictory evidence which 
suggest that even institutional ownership affects research and development 
intensity and leverage, but it has no direct relationship with firm performance. 
The present study uses this opportunity to explore the role of corporate 
ownership on the performance consequence of executive compensation. 
Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H4b: Corporate ownership moderates the positive and significant consequences 
of executive compensation on firm performance. 
Foreign business is believed to have different management practices from 
those of domestic firms. Lipsey (2002) indicates that it is not only because of 
its preferences but also due to the different regulations in the host-country 
and home-country pressures. Doeringer and Terkla (2003) study the effects 
of Japanese multinational management practices in the United States. They 
find that Japanese firms pay attention to training, high problem-solving skills 
and also team-working skills. The present study uses the available opportunity 
to explore the role of foreign ownership on the performance consequence of 
executive compensation. Consequently, it is hypothesised that: 
H4c: Foreign ownership moderates the positive and significant consequences of 
executive compensation on firm performance.  120 
 
 
3.5 Chapter summary 
By combining the above studies on the pay-performance sensitivity and the 
performance consequences of executive compensation into a single framework, 
the present study hopes to draw attention to the independence of the 
dimensions and to possible combinations of the design elements. By mapping 
how compensation designs along with evaluation are aligned to firm performance, 
we may discover the hidden factor which influences the link between 
compensation and firm performance which previous research has overlooked. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author 
Figure 3.2 Research framework 
The research framework provides four main research hypotheses: that 
H1: There is a positive and significant relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance. 
H2: There is a moderation effect of ownership structure on the positive and 
significant relation between executive compensation and firm performance. 
H3: There is a positive and significant consequence of executive compensation 
on firm performance. 
H4: Ownership structure moderates the positive and significant consequences of 
executive compensation on firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Research methodology 
 
There are six sections in the research methodology of this empirical study of 
the pay-performance sensitivity and its consequences. The first section 
presents the research approach, research design and research process of 
the study, which sets out to provide substantial evidence of a research 
philosophy leading to the method selected for this study. The second section 
concerns the empirical evidence on the pay-performance sensitivity and also 
the performance consequences of executive compensation. Section three 
gives an account of the measurement of the variables. The next section 
discusses the data collection process. The data analysis, for testing the 
hypotheses presented in Chapter Three, is discussed in section five. The last 
section provides a summary of this methodology chapter. 
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4.1 Research approach 
Unlike the natural sciences, social science research, according to Bryman 
(2008), must clearly identify the way in which the study views the world. 
Saunders et al (2007) identify the need to choose a research philosophy, 
which answers three important questions on epistemology, ontology and 
axiology, in turn as follows: 
‘What constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study? What is the 
nature of the social phenomena as entities? and how to generate fresh 
insights into real-life issues and problems’  
First, epistemology is the awareness of the way in which knowledge is 
created and what we accept as being valid knowledge (Abdel-Khalik and 
Ajinkya, 1979; Collis and Hussey, 2009). The nature of knowledge in this 
study has a similar philosophical outlook to that of the natural sciences, 
which is called the positivist position. It begins with the collection and then 
the analysis of facts through objects which are considered to be real and it 
benefits from avoiding the effects of personal judgement (Saunders et al, 
2007). Eisenhardt (1989) and Franco-Santos (2007) indicate that most 
executive compensation studies taking the agency approach are positivist in 
character. This is because the existing theories are constructive enough to 
develop hypotheses. For this reason, the present study is conducted under 
positivist conditions. The greatest advantage of this approach is that the 
available data can be treated in such a way as to avoid bias from the feelings 
and attitudes of the researcher. Heavily reliant on economic, financial and 
accounting theories, this study is written in the belief that the best way to 
create new knowledge is to let the facts speak for themselves.  123 
 
Second, the research ontology indicates the nature of what the study takes to 
be reality. This study belongs to objectivism. It starts with the assumption that 
social entities exist in a reality external to the social actors concerned with 
their existence (Saunders et al, 2007). The firms which require management 
skills exist in reality. The evidence of objectivism is a job description of 
qualifications, which can be publicly identified. The formal structure of an 
organisation can also be verified. Financial statements confirm this belief. 
Thus, knowledge can be gained through observation, and hence the scientific 
method is appropriate (Bryman, 2008).  
Third, the axiology pertains to judgements about value (Collis and Hussey, 
2009). This study admits no possibility of allowing the feelings and 
judgements of the researcher to enter the work, thus aiming to ensure it is 
remains value-free. The data rely on financial statements and other objective 
documents, which indicate that secondary data are the source of information. 
The data analyses are statistical methods which are justifiably believed to be 
free from emotion and feeling. 
Subjective   
Research philosophy 
Objective 
  Epistemology   
Personally experienced; relative  1  2  3  4  5  Acquired by observation 
  Ontology   
Product of individual consciousness  1  2  3  4  5  External concrete independent 
  Axiology   
Autonomy (free will choice)  1  2  3  4  5  Behaviour determined by 
environment    Methodology   
Naturalistic participant observation  1  2  3  4  5  Scientific statistics  
             
Source: Burrell and Morgan (Adapted) (1978)  
Figure 4.1 Research philosophy choices 
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Figure 4.1 provides an illustration of the three dimensions of this research 
philosophy, which demonstrates that (1) all the data are acquired through 
observation; (2) the researcher’s personal judgement is minimal; and (3) the 
environment directly influences the choice of the behaviour. This 
philosophical platform leads to a scientific and statistical methodology. 
Saunders et al (2007) indicate that the three philosophical positions derived 
from objectivity, the view of reality and the regulatory dimensions will lead to 
a particular research paradigm. This study’s choice of philosophical platform 
leads to a scientific and statistical methodology which is classed under 
functionalism. Nevertheless, it is believed in this research that organisations 
and the human beings within them are rational entities (to some degree, 
more or less); thus this study relies on a rational explanation of the chosen 
organisational problems in the current structure of the organisation’s current 
management in order to offer rational solutions. Burrell and Morgan (1978) 
provide a more functional definition as follows: 
‘The functionalist approach to social science tends to assume that the social 
world is composed of relatively concrete empirical artefacts and relationships 
which can be identified, studied and measured through approaches derived 
from the natural sciences.’ 
Within this paradigm, the study of human behaviour is also conducted in the 
same way as the study of natural phenomena is (Collis and Hussey, 2009). 
Collis and Hussey (2009) also claim that functionalism is the dominant 
paradigm in accounting, finance and organisation theory because it allows 
the features of the natural world to be identified using social facts. Because 
the philosophy underlying this study is classed as functionalist, the 
foundation of the study is deductive logic. Bryman (2008) provides the 
substantive definition of deductive research as the common view when a 
theory is approached as the basis for research. Deductive research provides 
the basic information to construct a set of hypotheses which are later found 125 
 
valid or otherwise in the analysis stage. Thus, the beginning of deductive 
research is approached via a theory. Saunders et al (2007) illustration this:  
 
Source: Saunders et al (Adapted) (2007) 
Figure 4.2 The positivist approach 
Figure 4.2 shows graphically the steps taken in a positivist approach as a 
research method, which, Collis and Hussey (2009) assert, has at least three 
advantages. First, this approach provides a rigorous structure for study 
because the hypotheses are firmly constructed. Second, key variables are 
suggested and ways of measuring them are available. Third, the criteria for 
accepting and rejecting hypotheses are widely agreed, while the existence of 
theory gives strong support to the generalisations. The researcher provides 
more information on the steps in the research process. It begins with the 
formulation of a testable hypothesis. The next step is the identification of 
relevant variables, which also focuses on data collection. This study, in 
particular, aims - by using rigorous statistical tests - to validate the Agency 
theory, which suggests that compensation could form an alliance with agency 
interest. It is believed that using statistical tests is important because it 
makes what is being researched independent of the researcher. Also, this 
research logic contributes to the literature on executive compensation by 
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moving the existing theories to meet the ready availability of data, thus 
creating empirical evidence. Saunders et al (2007) suggest that  
‘the deductive approach provides far less potential for misleading theories of 
no real practical value. It also provides a basis of explanation, allows the 
anticipation of phenomena, predicts their occurrence and therefore permits 
them to be controlled.’ 
This logical approach to the research requires hypotheses to be identified, 
constructed and tested. The result is that either falsification leads to the 
modification or discarding of theory or confirmation leads to support for the 
theory. It controls by allowing the testing of hypotheses. This type of research 
seeks to explain causal relationships between variables. However, Vernon 
(2000) reminds the researcher that theory can never be proved absolutely, 
but rather provides guidelines on which variables shape the issue. Saunders 
et al (2007) also provide three characteristics of deductive research. First, it 
is operationalised; the concept enables facts to be measured quantitatively. 
Second, dealing as it does with complicated data sets and statistical 
methods, it is important to the study to be as simple as possible to 
understand. This brings in the principle of reductionism. Last, generalisation 
is the aim of deductive research. Thus, sufficient numerical size is crucial. 
For this reason, most of the data in this research are quantitative data; 
however, some qualitative data have had to be added. This research seeks 
to use the least technical terms possible, even when complicated statistical 
issues are being discussed. With this constraint, the research has 
investigated the structure of the pay-performance sensitivity using Thai listed 
companies as its sample. 
In order to understand the research design, it should be borne in mind that 
the purpose of this research is explanatory. It aims to discern causal 
relationships between executive compensation and firm performance. It 
should also be remembered that this research benefits from the abundance 127 
 
of executive compensation literature available, the increasing amounts of 
secondary data, the econometric already designed and also the increasingly 
powerful computers and rich archival material which have been absorbed into 
the research strategy. The method used in this research seeks to validate 
Incentive theory and other related theories by gathering data and later testing 
hypotheses. Saunders et al (2007) urge that the availability of secondary data 
does not guarantee the precise information needed to answer any particular 
question. For this reason, the researcher understood that it was important to 
design the research so as to make the most of the available data. 
Using a unique panel of data, this study combines a short time series and 
various cross-sectional data. Baum (2006) indicates that panel data 
significantly improve in the statistical performance of firm performance since 
it allows us to understand the behaviour of the firm across time. Gujarati 
(1999) adds that panel data have a good potential for letting researchers 
understand the research phenomena at both the firm and time dimensions of 
the data. Therefore, it enhances the quantity and quality of the data, which 
using only one of these dimensions might not be able to offer. However, he 
admits that researchers using cross-section/short panel data have to deal 
with missing values for some items. He goes so far as to say that this type of 
data set may suffer the inconsistent classification of some financial items 
across firms. The three common approaches to analyse panel data are 
pooled-OLS, fixed effects (FE), and random effects. The selection of these 
methods depends on the data structure and the research question. 
The quantitative method is used because this study aims to generalise in 
investigating the relationship between firm characteristics, executive 
compensation and firm performance, mostly using Agency theory. The 
greatest advantage of this research method is that it allows the findings to 
favour generalisation. This research method is that of a well structured 
scientific experiment using statistical analysis, which is preferred if 
generalisations are to be made. 128 
 
After describing the direction and premise of the research, this section 
discusses the research process. First, the literature on executive 
compensation and firm performance was reviewed. Next, the research 
question, research framework and hypotheses were formally laid out. Then 
the research methodology, which is positivism using the archival method, 
was identified. Fourth, the population and sample were selected. Fifth, the 
data were collected through DataStream, SETSMART and annual 
registration statements. Sixth, the data were analysed using multivariate data 
analysis. Multiple regression analysis began with the OLS, using both main 
and interaction effects. Next, the analysis used FE estimation to ascertain the 
structure of the panel data. The third analysis was the manipulation of 
simultaneous equations using Instrumental Variables. The next analysis was 
the Generalised Method of Moment, used to construct a dynamic model of 
the lagged dependent variable. The supplementary analysis was made by 
logistic regression. 
One of the greatest advantages of this study is the reliability of the issues 
related to validity. This term is commonly used in relation to the question of 
whether the measures devised for the concepts of the study are reliable 
(Bryman, 2008). Using rigorous sources of data, namely DataStream, 
SETSMART and publicly available annual registration statements and annual 
corporate reports, there was no doubt about reliability. The data providers 
aim to give only the facts about and from the stock market; thus the data 
were minimally biased. Their aim was to provide ‘facts’. The issue related to 
the validity of the archival research is recalled by Saunders et al (2007), who 
point out that, even though empirical data are essential, it is crucial to avoid 
those which have been selected with bias. This idea is echoed by Wallace 
(1991), who mentions that internal validity is a potential problem when 
research is associated with financial statements. The first concern is internal 
validity. This is the level of control over the relative influence of any one of 
the elements, the independent variables, on the selected matter, the 
dependent variable (Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya, 1979; Wallace, 1991). Ryan et 129 
 
al (2003) explain that high internal validity means that it is change in the 
independent variables, not in anything else, which makes the dependent 
variable move. The background theory and measurement of variables have 
been suggested as having possibilities for reducing the internal validity of the 
research. After constructing the firm validity of the conceptual framework, 
Wallace (1991) suggests that there is a continuing issue over external 
validity. He states that external validity gives the impression that archival 
research has a greater degree of external validity than other research 
approaches, because it deals with actual empirical data on companies. For 
this reason, the motivation of the subjects is real. Saunders et al (2007) 
propose three kinds of external validity to take into account. First, population 
validity is concerned with the bias in the sampling selection. Improper 
selecting may challenge the ability to generalise the research to the 
population. Second, time validity concerns the appropriateness of the time at 
which the data were collected. Last, environmental validity is concerned with 
the interpretation of data collected in a different setting. Wallace (1991) also 
explains that statistical validity is the threat that the assumptions and 
relationships defined in such analyses may be at odds with reality. Without 
this validity, the ability to predict disappears. 
 
4.2 Empirical models 
In common use in empirical work relating to executive compensation are the 
results of assessing the foundation of the Agency theory which controls and 
co-ordinates the mechanism shaped by the organisation design. Using the 
existing knowledge, this leads to the formation of four research models.  
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Model 1 The pay-performance sensitivity 
Following standard Agency theory, the first model aims to provide empirical 
evidence on the pay-performance sensitivity. It shows the variables which are 
expected to explain the variation in executive compensation pay from firm to 
firm. Not only is firm performance expected to have a positive influence on 
executive compensation pay, but also the roles of size and industry are 
controlled for. Thus, the empirical model is as follows:  
∆(Executive compensation) it = β0 + β1 ∆(EPS) it + β2 ∆(OCF) it + β3 ∆(R) it + β4 
(Lequity) it + β5 (dummy industrial) it + β6 (dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Executive compensation = either executive salary, bonus, or total compensation  
EPS = Earnings per share  
OCF = Operation cash flow per share  
R = Stock return 
Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
Dummy industrial = one of eight groups to which the listed company 
belongs: Industry, Mining and quarrying, Real estate, 
Financial institutions, Service, Technology, 
Construction, Agricultural products and the Market for 
Alternative Investment: shown as 1 if a specific 
industrial interest is required, zero otherwise. 
Year dummies   = one of seven years in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
β0 = intercept term 
β1 – β6 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, I = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = either 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008.   131 
 
Model 2: The moderating role of ownership structure on the pay-performance 
sensitivity 
Regarding ownership structure, the next stage is to obtain empirical evidence 
on the way in which ownership structure influences the pay-performance 
sensitivity. It shows the variables which are expected to be important in 
explaining the variation in executive compensation from firm to firm. The roles 
of size and industry are controlled for. The empirical model is as follows: 
∆(Executive compensation) it = β0 + β1(FAM) it + β2 (COR)it + β3 (FOR) it + β4 ∆ 
(FAMEPS)it  + β5 ∆(COREPS) it + β6 ∆(FOREPS) it + β7 
∆(DISEPS) it+ β8 ∆(FAMOCF) it + β9 ∆(COROCF) it + β10 
∆(FOROCF) it  + β11∆(DISOCF)it + β12 ∆ (FAMR) it + β13 
∆(CORR) it + β14 ∆(FORR) it + β15 ∆(DISR) it  + β16 (Lequity) it 
+ β17 (dummy industrial) it + β18 (dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Executive compensation = executive salary, bonus, or total compensation  
EPS = Earning per share 
OCF = Operation cash flow per share 
  R     = Stock return 
  Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
  FAM = ownership structure where the first 20% of biggest shareholders 
are held by one family name 
  COR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as corporate shareholders 
  FOR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as foreigner shareholders 
  FAMEPS = joint effect between earnings per share and family 
shareholder type of ownership structure 132 
 
  COREPS = joint effect between earnings per share and a corporate 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FOREPS = joint effect between earnings per share and a foreign 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  DISEPS = joint effect between earnings per share and no concentration 
in the shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FAMOCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a 
family shareholder type of ownership structure 
  COROCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a 
corporate shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FOROCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a 
foreign shareholder type of ownership structure 
  DISOCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and no 
concentration in the type of ownership structure 
  FAMR = joint effect between stock return and a family shareholder type of 
ownership structure 
  CORR = joint effect between stock return and a corporate shareholder 
type of ownership structure 
  FORR = joint effect between stock return and a foreign shareholder type 
of ownership structure 
  DISR = joint effect between stock return and no concentration in the 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  Dummy industrial = one of eight groups which a listed company may 
belong to: Industry, Mining and quarrying, Real estate, 
Financial institutions, Service, Technology, 
Construction, Agricultural products and the Market for 
Alternative Investment: shown as 1 if a specific 
industrial interest is required, zero otherwise. 
  Dummy year = one of seven years for which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
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β0 = intercept term 
β1 - β18 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
 
Model 3: Performance consequence of executive compensation 
Following the test of efficiency compensation design, this study goes further 
to explore the level of success in the existing system. The next stage is to 
obtain empirical evidence on the way in which executive compensation 
influences firm performance. The following performance consequences 
model shows the variables which are expected to be important in explaining 
the variation in performance consequences of executive compensation from 
firm to firm. The roles of size, industry and year are all controlled for. Thus, 
the performance consequences model is as follows: 
 ∆ (Firm performance) it = β0 + β1∆(Executive compensation) it + β2 (Lequity) it 
+ β3 (Dummy industrial) it + β4 (Dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Firm performance = EPS (Earning per share), OCF (Operating cash flow 
per share), or R (Stock return) 
Executive compensation = either bonus or total compensation 
  Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
Dummy industrial = one of eight groups to which the listed company may 
belong: Industry, Mining and quarrying, Real estate, 
Financial institutions, Service, Technology, 
Construction, Agricultural products and the Market for 
Alternative Investment: shown as 1 if a specific 
industrial interest is required, zero otherwise. 134 
 
Dummy year      = one of seven years in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise 
β0 = intercept term 
β1 – β4 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
t = either 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
 
Model 4: The moderating role of ownership structure on the performance 
consequences of executive compensation 
Following the test of effectiveness of the executive compensation system, 
this study explores the role of ownership structure on the level of success of 
the executive compensation system. The next stage is to obtain empirical 
evidence on the way in which ownership structure influences the performance 
consequences of executive compensation. It shows the variables which are 
expected to be important in explaining the variation in performance 
consequences of executive compensation from firm to firm. The roles of size, 
industry and year are all controlled for. Thus, the empirical model is as 
follows: 
 ∆(Firm performance) it = β0 + β1(FAM) it + β2 (COR) it + β3 (FOR) it +                 
β4 ∆(Executive compensation *Family ownership) it +          
β5 ∆(Executive compensation *Corporate ownership) it + 
β6 ∆(Executive compensation *Foreign ownership) it +        
β7 ∆(Executive compensation *Dispersed ownership) it + 
β8 (Lequity) it + β9 (dummy industrial) it + β10 (dummy year) it 
+ ε it 
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where: 
Firm performance = EPS (Earning per share), OCF (Operating cash flow 
per share), or R (Stock return) 
  FAM = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as family shareholders 
  COR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as corporate shareholders 
  FOR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as foreign shareholders 
  Executive compensation*family ownership = joint effect between 
executive compensation and the family shareholder 
type of ownership  
  Executive compensation*corporate ownership = joint effect between 
executive compensation and the corporate 
shareholder type of ownership  
  Executive compensation*foreign ownership = joint effect between executive 
compensation and the foreign shareholder type of ownership  
  Executive compensation*dispersed ownership = joint effect between 
executive compensation and no concentration in the 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
  Dummy industrial = one of eight groups which list which sector the 
company belongs to: Industry, Mining and quarrying, 
Real estate, Financial institutions, Service, 
Technology, Construction, Agricultural products and 
Market for Alternative Investment: shown as 1 if a 
specific industrial interest group is required, zero 
otherwise. 
Dummy year = one of seven years in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
β0 = intercept term 136 
 
β1 - β10 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the ith firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
 
4.3 Measurement of variables  
In order to provide empirical evidence, this study has carefully measured the 
variables used to test the theory. Even though there is no consensus on the 
definition of executive manager, it is generally agreed that the term refers to 
those leading officers who are permanently in charge of superior 
organisational issues. So far, the definition of executive manager in the 
literature has covered the executives and directors, chief executive officers 
and the next four positions immediately below the chief executive officer (as 
well as people who are in the same position or above), who are in charge of 
management duties (SEC, 2007a). This can be illustrated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SEC (2007a) (Adapted) 
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Figure 4.3 provides an illustration of the definition base of ‘Executive 
Manager’ in the listed companies handbook provided by SET. Gathering 
executive compensation data in order to provide empirical evidence, the 
present study measures the variables used in a later chapter to test the 
theory. The four groups of main variables refer to executive compensation, 
firm performance, ownership structure and controlled variables.  
The first group contains executive compensation variables. This research 
notes Farmer’s concern (2008) over the difficulties in understanding the 
determinants of executive compensation, i.e. the components of the total 
compensation package. This variable is measured by the sum of executive 
compensation paid to the top five executive managers divided by the number 
of top five executive managers. In Thailand, compensation has three 
components: salary, bonus and perquisites. These three elements are 
sometimes wrapped up as a package of so-called cash incentives. A pension 
is also in common use, paid for by 2% of base pay; however, because the 
amount is small, the total is not significant when compared to base pay or 
bonus. For this reason, this study considers the pension and perquisites as 
one. More precisely, the three segments of executive compensation are the 
basic pay, incentives and other amounts. In the second component of 
compensation are the incentive payments encouraging managers to pursue 
better performance. The variable payments related to performance are 
grouped under this heading. Note that almost the entire value of these 
elements comes from bonuses (only one firm was recorded as paying 
commission to its executives). The last group is other benefits. This includes 
retirement benefits, honoraria and perquisites such as housing, insurance 
and the funding of education and other executive fixed benefits. The figure 
represents the average salary per head that all five executives received per 
year. Average executive compensation is the preferred term, because the 
first five executive managers play the most important role in decision- 
making, which determines the firm performance. The three elements (salary, 
bonus, and total compensation) are the concern of the original executive 138 
 
compensation research. It is the total of objective payments, which requires 
no estimation on its value. Recent American executive compensation 
research favours stock options, because of the rising numbers of shares 
awarded; however, due to limitations of data, we could access no information 
on either the number or value of the fourth section of the compensation 
component, the stocks and options granted during the period. 
The second variable group is the firm performance variable. As all 
performance measures are imperfect, this research focused on the 
accounting and finance literature. Brown and Caylor (2006) and Franco-
Santos (2007) indicate that several performance measures should be able to 
provide better conclusions than one alone. Based on this suggestion, the 
present study employs data on firm performance from the accounting 
information in financial statements, which is provided by DataStream. Ittner et 
al (1997) observe the performance measurements used in the annual bonus 
contracts such as return on assets, return on equity, return on sales, and 
stock return on the hope that these various types of measurement may affect 
the closeness of the link with compensation pay. Alangar (1993) suggests 
that self-assessment alone may not be sufficient to explain firm performance: 
including the capital market performance, as this study does, should provide 
a better performance matrix. Thus, this research measures the firm performance 
cash basis, accrual basis and capital market base, which all provide different 
types of information. 
The classic element of performance that has been measured is accounting 
income. However, this performance is subjected to the size of the firm. 
Instead of income, it has been suggested that EPS should become a standard 
firm performance measure which is compulsory in reports, as part of the profit 
and loss account of all corporate financial statements, by the International 
Financial Reporting Standard, the American-Financial Accounting Standard 
Board and also the Thai Accounting Standard. This profitability ratio indicates 
the proportion of profit allocated to the common share.  139 
 
  EPS it   =   (Net income it – Dividend on preferred stock it) 
                  Average outstanding common share it 
Where:  
  EPS = Earnings per share 
  Net Income = the firm incomes minus expense for accounting period 
  Dividend on preferred stock = the payment made to preferred stock holders 
  Average outstanding common share = Outstanding common share at the 
beginning of accounting period plus outstanding common 
share at the end of accounting period, then divide by two 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
Using EPS has the advantage of a well-known financial ratio that gives 
comprehensive information on to what extent a shareholder deserve the 
return, but this performance measure depends heavily on a financial report 
system which is subject to management even if it has been evaluated for 
quality by an external auditor. Thus, it is possible that the number has been 
manipulated, due to the accrual accounting system.  
Nwaeze et al (2006) study the role of operation cash flow (OCF) when a firm 
is earning. They believe that the OCF is contract-relevant in the presence of 
earning. They support their idea by showing that the OCF
4 in the 
compensation model is associated with the presence of earning and stock 
returns. They also discuss the quality of accounting earning in general. 
However, Skinner (1999) criticises this research, claiming that funds from the 
operation of a firm are better evidence than accounting income in terms of 
adequate economic and behavioural evidence to support these researchers’ 
ideas.  
                                                 
4 This study controls for scale-effect heteroskedasticity by scaling OCF with the 
average outstanding common share.  140 
 
  OCF it =   EBIT it   +  Depreciation it – taxes it 
         Average outstanding common share it 
where: 
  OCF = Operating Cash Flow per share 
  EBIT = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 
   i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 
   t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008 
The use of cash flow performance has the advantage of removing estimation 
items which provide better quality earning than the accrual incomes. 
Moreover, this research benefits from the work of Jiamsagul (2007), who 
believes that the stock return is an indicator of the investor return. The use of 
stock returns is widely accepted in financial market research for explaining the 
return of stock. This study identifies stock return as a return rate of common 
stocks which presents the perception of the investors toward the future of the 
firm. The idea is also supported by Bushman and Indjejikian (1993), who use 
stock returns to predict the rising or falling of incentives. Recently, Kato et al 
(2007) have found that both accounting numbers and stock returns are playing 
a less important role today in determining the compensation system in Korea.  
This study uses extracted return index (RI) from DataStream in computing 
stock return, which is adjusted return index to show continuously 
compounded returns, as follows; 
  Rit =  RI it – RI it-1 
       RI it-1 
where: 
  R    = stock return 
  RI   = yearly return indexed on 31 December  
   i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 
   t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008 141 
 
 
This calculation is the result of Acaranupong (2003), who suggests that stock 
return can be calculated by diverting the return index as follows. 
                              RI it = RI it-1 * (Pit + DYit  ) / Pit-1               
                   RIIt / RI it-1   = (Pit + DYit  ) / Pit-1          
            ( RIIt / RI it-1 ) -1  =  [(Pit + DYit  ) / Pit-1 ] -1          
     ( RIIt - RI it-1 ) / RI it-1  =  (Pit + DYit  - Pit-1 ) / Pit-1 
     ( RIIt - RI it-1 ) / RI it-1  =  stock returnit 
where: 
  R     = Return on stock 
  RI     = Return Index 
  P      = Share price  
  DY   = dividend yield of the price index 
   i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 
   t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008 
Using stock return has the advantage of being less subject to management 
manipulation. It embodies a forward-looking measure of the firm value, 
reflecting investors’ decisions and selecting of an investment (Jaimsagul, 
2007) However, using stock return has some limitations in assessing the real 
ability of the firm because large numbers of quantitative and qualitative factors 
also influence the stock return.  
The third variable group is ownership structure. This research uses equity 
ownership structure as the mediating variable. The mediating in the variable 
has been created to modify the level of the variable being manipulated to see 
its effect on the variable under review. This is the base variable to pull out 
‘behind the scenes’ details of the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables by creating an interaction variable in regression analysis 
(Mitchell and Jolley, 2007). This study shows how the effect of executive pay 
on firm performance brings in ownership structure as the moderating variable. 142 
 
There are three types of ownership concentration; family ownership, 
corporate ownership and foreign ownership. Any firm whose type of 
ownership concentration is not recognised will be grouped with the local 
individual investors. The data were obtained from the major shareholders’ 
section in SETSMART at the end of each year.   
The classification of each ownership group is identified using the first 20% of 
majority shareholders. Taylor and Taylor (1996) indicate that, below a 20% 
share, the holding tends to be a ‘passive holding’ which has no influence on 
decision making. SET also indicates that holding 20% or more of outstanding 
shares is believed to be enough to wield direct influence, but not yet 
controlling power, over four important areas: a) influencing operation and 
financial decisions, b) demanding to inspect the business operations and the 
financial situation, c) calling an extraordinary general meeting at any time and 
d) submitting a notion to the court demanding the dissolution of a company if 
it is thought that further operation will bring only losses and that there is no 
chance of recovery. Edwards and Weichenrieder (2009) also agree with this 
idea and believe that 20% of voting rights is enough to identify the largest 
ultimate owner in firms. Thus, the shareholder of 20% or the largest 
shareholder is mainly used in the present thesis as the criterion for identifying 
ownership structure. The four types of ownership structure in this study are 
family, corporate, foreign and dispersed ownership. The first ownership group 
is family businesses, defined as a structure of ownership concentration under 
which a single family, distinguished by surname, owns the majority of shares 
and the family holds at least 20% of the outstanding shares. The second is 
local corporate investor structures, defined as those in which a Thai juristic 
person, such as an institutional investor, partnership or limited company, 
state enterprise, or administrative department holds a majority of shares, 
which is also over 20% of the outstanding shares and also not directly 
controlled by a person or family The third type is a foreign investor structure, 
defined as one in which a person, such as an institutional investor, 
partnership, limited company, state enterprise or administrative department, 143 
 
whose company  is not registered in Thailand as a Thai organisation, holds a 
majority of shares which is also over 20% of the outstanding shares; and the 
fourth type is a dispersed investor structure, defined as one in which no one, 
neither a family, an institutional investor, partnership, limited company, state 
enterprise nor administrative department, who is or is not registered in 
Thailand as a Thai organisation, holds a majority of shares which is also over 
20% of the outstanding shares. Thus, the last ownership structure, the 
reference group where the firm is not qualified for any of the three previous 
types of ownership, will be located here. 
The final variable section concerns the control variables. These are the firm 
characteristic variables which manipulate the effect of the variable being 
studied, although these are not the main concern of the study. The control 
variables of this study are the firm’s size and its industrial group. Many 
previous studies show that firm size affects the executive compensation 
system and firm performance. The basic reason is the ability of bigger firms 
to select better qualified staff, who they have to pay more, in view of these 
qualifications. Also, the Marginal Productivity theory provides an indicator 
that executive managers in bigger firms are better able to improve 
productivity, due to economies of scale. The budget argument also confirms 
that it is economically possible for bigger firms to pay higher executive 
compensation whether or not the employees are considered worth it. Baker 
and Hall (2004) examined the effect of firm size on executive pay. They give 
as a reason for their findings that bigger firms are more complex, thus calling 
for more responsibility from their executives than from those who work for 
smaller firms. Thus it is reasonable that they should get higher 
compensation, to keep pace with their responsibilities. Almost all research 
finds that firm size affects firm compensation but the criteria for judging firm 
size varies with different researchers. The most common ones used are 
sales, total assets, equity and number of employees. However, most of these 
previous studies used logarithms of the size indicator to make the data 
homoskedastic. In addition, the industry denotes the economic environment, 144 
 
which is believed to influence executive compensation pay and also firm 
performance. Early evidence indicates that, over time, different industries 
create an executive compensation practice using comparative techniques 
and benchmarking within the industry. Gerhart and Milkovich (1990) and 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) provide supportive evidence that firms in the 
same industrial group have similar constraints of technology, materials, 
products development and pricing. A meta-analysis of determinants of 
financial performance by Capon et al (1990) shows that over 100 studied 
firms found a positive relationship between industrial concentration and firm 
performance. The last control variable, year, is due to the structure of the 
panel data. The year effect is controlled because the macro economy factor 
may influence executive compensation pay across firms. In a better 
economic environment, all firms tend to raise their executive pay with or 
without any change in their individual firm. In contrast, in an economic 
recession, firms tend to reduce their executives’ pay to compensate for the 
situation, even though the executive managers are not responsible.  
 
4.4 Data collection 
In line with the research design, this archival research identifies the research 
population base in the reports of SET for all 541 listed companies from 2002 
to 2008. As listed companies on the Stock Exchange, these companies are 
likely to automatically exhibit relatively high standards not only because they 
are able to design sufficient control systems but also because the market 
mechanism allows competition in the close monitoring of its management 
practice. Having to play the key role in the financial system, these firms 
should play the role of incentive mechanisms for all the others.  145 
 
These individually collected data on executive compensation in an un-
balanced panel were taken from the annual registration on the SETSMART 
database. Financial statement, ownership data and other relevant data were 
mostly taken from four sources: DataStream, SETSMART, the annual 
registration statements (Form 56-1) and annual corporate reports. This short 
form of panel data has a cross-sectional time-series observation covering 
541 firms, each of which includes eight observations measured at one 
through to eight years. The population spans eight industries, which provided 
504 complete sets of data to be gathered on the dependent variable and total 
compensation. This research excludes suspended or delisted shares and 
shares which might be delisted in the near future. The shares included must 
also satisfy at least three years of continuous data. The main limitation 
comes from the breakdown of the data supplied on compensation pay into 
base pay and incentive pay, which are provided in the annual registration 
statements of some firms only; this finally limits the number of samples to 
about 122 firms per year.  
Table 4.1 Data collection 
  
Number of 
observations 
Number 
of firms 
Population of this study    428 
No executive compensation data from Form 56-1     -27 
No firm performance reported from DataStream     -15 
No majority shareholder report from SETSMART     0 
Number of observed firms     386 
Number of firm reporting only total compensation     -230 
Number of firms which have more than three years of  missing data 
              missing data  
-34 
Number of firms which reported break-down   
               compensation detail 
854  122 
Number of observation missing some data for a firm    -104    
Number of firms with complete un-balanced data  750   
Source: Author 146 
 
To be precise, these secondary data were gathered from various sources of 
data because no single database for executive compensation has so far 
been formed. However, the highest-quality data sources are the SET 
database, the annual registration statements and the annual corporate 
reports, because they deal with the Stock Exchange rules and regulations 
which oblige all listed companies to provide accurate information in order for 
stakeholders to understand the activities within the firm. Any company which 
does not do so will be targeted to receive an official warning and the 
possibility of later delisting. The executive compensation details, as well as 
the missing data from other sources, were obtained from the executive 
compensation section of the annual registration statements, which is 
available on the SET library database (accessible only at the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand’s library). The last two years of data on executive compensation are 
also available on the website of SET. These two sources of data provide 
details of information about compensation packages, forms and figures of 
pay. In addition, the details on the industrial sectors can be obtained from the 
SET website. However, the classification of industry by sector is different 
from that of the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). Other 
relevant data, such as the information related to firm characteristics, 
ownership structure and other capital market information relating to the listed 
company can be generated from SETSMART. The last data on financial 
statements and stock market information were gathered from DataStream.  
Secondary data provide several advantages, one of which is that the data are 
higher in quality than primary data because they have been prepared to a 
standard pattern rather than for a particular objective. They thus allow the 
researcher to draw comparisons between settings as well as comparisons of 
populations of interest with the larger population. Secondary data also have 
fewer resource requirements than primary data. However, the present 
research could weigh these advantages against the limitations of this type of 
data, such as their internal validity. Thus, the research measurement of 
variables in the present work has been carefully evaluated.  147  
 
Table 4.2 Classification of Industries 
Industrial  Sector  ISI 
1. Agricultural and food   
  Food and beverages  C10, C11, C12 Food, beverage and tobacco 
product 
  Agribusiness  A. Agriculture 
2. Consumer products   
  Fashion  C13, C14, C15 Textiles, wearing and leather 
product 
  Home and office products  C16, C31 Wood, furniture 
  Personal products and 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
C21 Pharmaceuticals 
3. Financial and insurance  K. Financial and insurance 
  Banking   
  Finance and securities   
  Insurance   
4. Manufacturing   
  Petrochemicals and chemicals  C19, C20 Petroleum and Chemicals 
  Industrial materials and machinery  C22, C23, C24, C25, C28 rubber, plastics, 
metals, non-metallic mineral products and 
machinery and equipment. 
  Automotive  C29 Manufacturing of motor vehicles 
  Packaging   
  Paper and printing materials  C17 Paper and paper product 
5. Real estate and construction   
  Construction   F. Construction 
  Property development  L. Real estate activities 
  Property fund 
6. Mining and quarrying   
  Energy and utilities  D. Electricity, gas, steam 
E. Water supply 
  Mining  B. Mining and quarrying 
7. Services   
  Transportation and logistics  H. Transportation and storage 
  Commerce  G Wholesale and retail trade 
  Tourism and leisure  I. Accommodation and food service 
N. Support service activities 
  Media and publishing  R. Art, Entertainment and recreation 
C18. Printing and reproduction of recorded 
media 
  Health Care Services  Q. Human health 
  Professional Services  M. Professional, scientific activities 
8. Technology   
  Information and communication  J. Information and communication 
  Electronic components  C26, C27 Computer and Electrical equipment 
9. Non-Performing Group    
10. Non-compliance Group    
11. Medium-Sized Enterprises   
Source: Author 148  
 
 
4.5 Data analysis 
This study’s research philosophy indicates that the quantitative approach is 
best for its research analysis. This approach benefits the probable concomitants 
and consequences of certain situations. Cook et al (1990) state that the role 
of statistical research is to function as a gatekeeper in designing and 
analysing data, and drawing conclusions. The present study follows previous 
studies in the executive compensation arena, of which almost all employed 
multivariate data analysis and multiple regression analysis in particular. Thus, 
multiple regression analysis is used to analyse the correlation between 
executive compensation and the firm performance. This analysis is the 
modelling and analysis of the numerical data of explanatory variables, also 
called independent variables, and consists of the values of a response 
variable, which is also called the dependent variable. The result of this 
process is a prediction, inferences, hypothesis testing and the modelling of 
causal relationships.  
The standard multiple regression form is ‘Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3 + ε’. In 
the equation, Y represents the predicted variable in the regression equation. 
β represent the coefficient of the independent variable, which is derived using 
the method of least squares; this minimises the sum of the squared 
deviations of the residuals. X1 represents the predictor variable. X2 
represents the moderate variable. X3 represents the control variables. ε 
represents the disturbance term and a stochastic component of the model 
(error term). The OLS method is the best known method of estimation.  
A variety of alternative regression, however, such as the Curve estimation, 
Generalised linear models, Nonlinear regression, Logistic regression, 
Discriminant function analysis, Logit regression and Poisson regression, are 149  
 
also available (Agresti and Finlay, 2009). In order to perform any type of 
multiple regressions, correlation analysis will initially be checked. This basic 
analysis provides a degree of association between two observed data of 
partial correlation. Furthermore, basic information such as descriptive 
statistics is still needed to explain the location of data. Gobel and Zwick 
(2009) compare three estimation techniques - pooled-OLS, fixed effects, and 
GMM - in order to track the contradictory findings caused by the endogeneity 
between labour and productivity. Using the appropriate statistical method, the 
research hopes to get a better understanding of the establishment and the 
consequences of management decisions on human resources. Hausman 
(1978) suggests comparing different estimates and determining whether the 
differences are significant. If they differ significantly, the new estimation might 
improve the estimation quality.     
4.5.1 Ordinary least squares method 
The ordinary least squares method (OLS), as the main statistical method 
performs multiple regressions by minimising the values of the independent 
variables in the data set to estimate the values of the dependent variable. It 
has been called the most famous estimation of those called ‘Least Squares’ 
(Kennedy, 1999). A good estimator evaluates, by minimising a weighted sum 
of all the residuals, the distance between the real data and the estimated 
values. The estimated equation will be evaluated using the proportion of 
dependent variables in explaining the dependent variable. Kennedy further 
indicates that, because the OLS estimator minimises the sum of squared 
residuals, it automatically maximises R
2, the coefficient of determination. 
Greene (2008) indicates that the two dimensional (panel) data give an 
opportunity to capture the omitted variables which denote heterogeneity 
across firms. Baltagi (2005) confirms that panel data provide control for 
individual heterogeneity, while Saunders et al (2007) add that panel data 
provide more variability and less collinearity among the variables, besides 
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are used in this study, it is assumed that these are not subject to either firm 
or time effect. Pooled-OLS, thus, is deployed to analyse all of the data.   
4.5.1.1 Main effect  
The OLS regression model is constructed to first identify the relationship 
between executive compensation, an independent variable and firm 
performance, a dependent variable. The estimation model is ‘Y = β0 + β1X1 + 
β2X2+ β3X3 + ε’. The second test, for the dependent variable, is the 
performance consequences of executive compensation, an independent 
variable. The estimation model is ‘Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3 + ε’. In the 
equation, Y represents the dependent variable. β represent the coefficient of 
the independent variable, which is derived using the method of least squares; 
this minimises the sum of the squared deviations of the residuals. X1 
represents the independent variable, X2 represents a moderating variable, X3 
represents the control variables and ε represents the disturbance term and a 
stochastic component of the model (error term). In this study, the data were 
tested using a multi-year cross-sectional multiple regression structure for the 
level of compensation expressed as a function of the firm performance.   
4.5.1.2 Interaction effects 
Still using the OLS regression model, we identify the relationship between the 
variables: executive compensation, ownership structure and firm performance. 
The interaction effect creates a third variable based on one independent 
variable (either executive compensation or firm performance) and one 
moderator variable (in this study, ownership structure). This variable provides 
more detail on the way in which the independent variable together with a 
particular moderator variable influences the dependent variable. The 
estimation model is ‘Y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ β3X3 + β4X1*X2+ ε’. In the equation, 
Y represents the dependent variable, β represents the coefficient of the 151  
 
independent variable, X1 represents the independent variable, X2 represents 
the moderating variable, X3 represents the control variables, X1*X2 represents 
the interaction variable and ε represents the error term. Using the interaction 
effect may create a multicollinearity issue. Thus, the robust and cluster (firm) 
option in Stata is adopted since it provides specify standard errors that are 
asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
Gujarati (1999) inserts the dummy variable, which can be used in interaction 
effects. For the present study, the data were also tested using the interaction 
effect in two directions: one, the level of executive compensation expressed 
as a function of performance and the ownership structure characteristics of 
the firm; and two, firm performance expressed as a function of the executive 
compensation and ownership structure.  
4.5.2 Within-groups method 
To perform regression analysis using panel data, then, it is important to take 
into consideration the influences over time and over the same individuals of 
observation. If there is no unique attribute of either firm observation or time 
period, the pooled OLS estimator is required. However, if there is any difference 
between the firms under observation but constancy over time for the same 
observation unit (firms), then a fixed effects (FE) estimator is required. This 
kind of estimator, also known as the within-estimator/least squares dummy 
variable, is an econometrics technique to deal with the unique attributes of 
individuals which are not the results of random variations and do not allow 
error variances across time. This model helps to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. It allows for differences in the constant term which are 
included in the error term (Gobel and Zwick, 2009). The removed constant 
can be isolated at any time in the invariant components of the models. To get 
rid of the individual effect, within the transformation deployed in the data, the 
co-efficient is estimated via OLS regression. However, the in this study 152  
 
indicate that the pay-performance sensitivity are more likely to be unable to 
meet the OLS assumption of the zero-conditional-mean. This causal performance 
measurement issue of the relationships leads to a simultaneous equation, 
which requires an advanced statistical technique to capture the link.  
4.5.3 Two-Stage Least-Squares method  
The empirical literature on pay-performance sensitivity is continuously 
expanding, and consequently it is important that any ignorance of the reverse 
causality between executive compensation and firm performance in the 
empirical works  is addressed. Since firms do not randomly decide to pay 
executive compensation, performance is one of the key determinants. Even 
so, the better performing firms are supposed to pay higher compensation and 
in this sense higher compensation does lead to better firm performance. It 
raises the possibility of inconsistency in the OLS estimator, which requires a 
zero-conditional-mean assumption of linear regression (Zwick, 2006). Failure 
to respond to the requirement might lead to bias or inconsistent estimates for 
the parameters of interest (Ebbes, 2004). Providentially, the structure of the 
panel data provides a chance to explore the causality between independent 
and dependent variables. Using OLS and FE regression allows the 
endogenous variables to perform regression by regressing each equation. 
However, these estimations are biased and not consistent, particularly when 
lagged endogenous variables are included in the equation. This leads to the 
use of alternative (otherwise known as instrumental) variables.  
To replace endogenous variables using a proxy variable requires the variable 
to be truly exogenous, and the expected proxy variable has to correlate very 
closely with the endogenous variables but not with the independent variable. 
With the new variable, the instrument variable (IV) estimator is able to not 
only detect the effect of X on Y but also the effect of the endogeneity. Thus, 
the method provides a consistent estimator and is unbiased. However, finding 153  
 
the appropriate IV is a major problem. Recently, lagged variables have been 
introduced as instrumental variables. Shepherd (2008) suggests this 
approach has the potential benefit in that it is intuitively appealing to look for a 
proxy in past values of tariffs that does not suffer from the same problem. It 
also provides advantages that are simple to implement, no additional data are 
required, and as stated, it is intuitively appealing. This study, thus, deploys 
lagged level as IV for contemporary differences.  
Statistical inference proceeds in the way of instrumental variable are so called 
statistical inference using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). The process 
begins by replacing Xit with Xit-1 in the first estimation (regressing Y to X) and 
then using contemporaneous data to regress Xit to Yit. However, running the 
two stages separately will provide incorrect standard error and might 
mistakenly exclude exogenous variables from the main model (Shepherd, 
2008). After this, a 2SLS is introduced in order to create an IV base in the 
statistical estimation. This sophisticated IV needs an extension of the OLS 
regression to cover the violation of the zero-conditional-mean assumption. This 
simultaneous equation model is the well-known case in econometrics using 
2SLS estimator (Ebbes, 2006). Baum (2006) explains that the first stage is to 
calculate new X (X-hat) in order to remove the resulting influence of Y on X. 
Then X-hat is regressed on Y during the second stage. Baum (2006) believes 
that 2SLS is a special case used because the simple IV estimator could not 
deal with the multiple instruments of one optimal instrument. He further 
explains that 2SLS employs an instrumental variable in the first-stage 
regressions of endogenous repressors, then obtains the predicted values to 
run the second-stage OLS regression (Baum, 2006; Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). Like the IV estimator, 2SLS exhibits consistent and unbiased 
properties. To perform IV, this study uses also the estimation Model One and 
Model Two, as described above. Ebbes (2006) mentions that the availability 
in computing packages has made 2SLS the most common to fix a 
simultaneous equation.  154  
 
Baum (2006) further provides specific information about Instrumental Variables, 
estimators which not only deal with a simultaneous determination between 
dependent and independent variables (endogenous) but also correct the 
problem of omitted-variable bias, measurement errors in variables, and self-
selection bias. The ordinary regression is Y = X α + є. When є suffers from 
the endogenous problem (not only that X relates to Y but that Y also relates to 
X), the problem is solved by replacing X with another variable, given the 
name Z, which is closely related to X but not related to Y. Thus, selecting 
appropriate instrumental variables ensures a consistent estimator and 
unbiased properties. The major issue with this technique is finding the 
exogenous variable; that is, the independent variable which is independent of 
the disturbances in the system. Nevertheless, lagged variables are also 
commonly used as instrumental variables.  
4.5.4 Generalised method of moments 
Since the direction of causality between executive compensation and firm 
performance is believed to be endogenous, 2SLS is preferred,  while taking 
the benefit of panel data means that they allow the impact of lagged 
dependence on the contemporaneous dependent variables to be seen, and 
the dynamic panel-data model using a lagged dependent variable causes 
findings which are not strictly exogenous (Baum, 2006). The time-invariant 
explanatory variables may cause bias upwards in OLS and downwards 
biased in FE. In this case, using IV will not fix the problem. If the data consist 
of a large number of observations, using a set of orthogonal restrictions 
related to an econometric model allows the estimator to get closer to the true 
value of the parameter (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). This idea leads to the 
introduction of a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). It benefits from not 
requiring any assumptions about the formation of residuals. The probability of 
a large sample leads to the law of large numbers: that is, the bigger number 
of observations leads to a similarity with the population value if they can be 
observed (Greene, 2008). Three natural options for the initial consistent 155  
 
estimator are Anderson and Hsiao (1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Mileva (2007) indicates that several econometric 
issues often arise such as that the endogeneity of the causality may run in 
both directions; and also that time-invariant firm characteristics and the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable cause autocorrelation, and the 
panel has a short time dimension and a larger firm dimension. This 
complicated model with short-fat panel data prefers system-GMM because it 
combines the first-difference with a set of equations level with a suitable 
lagged first-difference as instruments (Rodman, 2006). 
 
4.6 Chapter summary 
This research methodology chapter provides an explanation for the three main 
divisions of information in the thesis: (1) the research philosophy, (2) data 
collection and (3) data analysis. This first section represents the research 
approach and research design and is followed by a look at the research process 
adopted by this study.  
Table 4.3 Summary of the research philosophy, approach and design 
Implications  Description 
Epistemology  This research implication is one of positivism. 
Ontology  The view of reality in this research is that it is objective. 
Axiology  This research starts with the belief that the choice of what to study and 
how to study it should be determined by objective (value-free) criteria 
rather than human experiences, beliefs or interests.  
Paradigm  This research belongs to the functionalist paradigm. It is the oldest and 
most dominant form of research because it employs a scientific 
approach which makes the result tangible. 
Approach  The hypotheses of this research are proposed on the basis of a logical 
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Implications  Description 
Methodological  As with all research using a positivist approach, this research uses a 
quantitative method because this alone can be the basis for valid 
generalisations and scientific laws. 
Design  As positivist, this research aims to identify causal relationships and 
fundamental laws which explain the behaviour of executives and firms. 
Measurement  Concepts or variables in this study are operationalised in a way that 
enables facts to be measured quantitatively. 
The positive epistemology with objective ontology and objective criteria 
axiology lead to a functionalist paradigm. Functionalism indicates that logical 
deduction is the proper approach, which leads to a positivist outlook and a 
quantitative method. The positivist design indicates that this study needs to 
be operationalised to quantitatively measure variables. Table 4.4 provides not 
only an illustrative platform showing the way that this study views the world, 
but also includes the type of data needed. The second section provides the 
data collection information. The four sources of data are DataStream, the 
annual registration statements (Form 56-1), SETSMART and the SET website. 
The annual registration statements (on Form 56-1) provide data about 
executive pay in its totals and form. DataStream provides financial 
information and firms’ characteristics. Ownership structure is obtained from 
SETSMART. Other information is gathered from the SET website. 
Table 4.4 Summary of the variables and data sources 
Variable name  Type  Source 
Executive compensation:     
   Base pay  Metric  The annual registration statements 
   Bonus  Metric  The annual registration statements 
   Total compensation  Metric  The annual registration statements 
Firm performance:     
   EPS  Metric  DataStream 
   Operation cash flow  Metric  DataStream 
   Stock return  Metric  DataStream 
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Variable name  Type  Source 
Ownership structure:     
   Family ownership  Dummy  SETSMART 
   Corporate ownership  Dummy  SETSMART 
   Foreign ownership  Dummy  SETSMART 
   Dispersed ownership  Dummy  SETSMART 
Control variables:     
   Industrial  Dummy  Website of The Stock Exchange 
   Size  Metric  DataStream 
   Year  Dummy  DataStream 
The final section provides information about the way in which the data are 
analysed. It begins with the classic multivariate analysis, using the OLS 
method. The estimation is the main regression to investigate the relationship 
between variance using both main effects and interaction effects. This study 
approaches three characteristics of complex panel data modelling, namely, 
unbalanced panel data, dynamic panel data and simultaneous equations. 
Thus, an instrumental variable using 2SLS estimation as well as GMM is 
employed to get rid of the complexities.  
Table 4.5 Summary of estimation techniques 
Estimation technique  Nature of the data/variable 
OLS  Cross-sectional data 
FE  Panel data 
2SLS-IV  Panel data with endogenous variable 
GMM  Dynamic panel data with endogenous variable 
Table 4.5 provides four estimation techniques by which to understand the 
pay-performance sensitivity. In each section, the first estimation is dedicated 
to contemporaneous independent variables, using OLS regression. The 
second estimation adds lagged performance using OLS regression. The third 
estimation controls for firm unobserved variables, using FE. The fourth 
estimation deals with the endogeneity issue, using the instrumental variable 
in order to control for the effect of the lagged dependence variable.  158  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Research finding:  
Overview of executive pay in Thailand  
 
This chapter provides essential information about executive compensation 
payment in Thai listed companies. Regarding The research carried out 
annually by the stock market authority, the Thai capital market has its own 
form of executive pay. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon setting, salary and bonus are 
the only two predominant executive elements paid to Thai executives. Also, 
the stock option is far from common in this capital market. This chapter 
begins by describing the background to process of executive pay setting in 
Thailand. Section two provides the descriptive information about compensation, 
performance and ownership. The three measures of executive compensation 
are salary, bonus and total pay. The three performance measures are EPS, 
OCF and stock returns. The four ownership structures comprise family-
owned, corporate-owned, foreign-owned, and dispersed ownership firms. 
Then, the next  section aims to identify the executive compensation trend. 160  
 
Section three provides a partial account of the correlations between these 
variables. The last section summarises  this chapter. 
5.1 Executive compensation pays in Thailand 
In order to clarify the executive compensation in Thai listed companies, this 
section provides basic information about the executive compensation payments, 
firm performance, firm size, the industry, and ownership structure of the listed 
companies which have been selected from the Thai capital market. Thus, this 
section provides descriptive statistics of variables of 750 sets of unbalanced 
panel data from Thai listed companies between 2002 and 2008. The unbalanced 
state is the result of some firms leaving the market before the end and some 
not being established at the beginning. The firms were selected on the basis 
of completing the key variables, which contain three sets of information. The 
first section indicates executive compensation: salary, bonus, other additions 
and total compensation. The second covers firm performance, in terms of 
EPS, OCF and stock returns. The third provides the ownership structure. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of executive compensation, firm performance and size 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the compensation components, firm performance 
and firm size of the sample of Thai listed companies. The sample consists of unbalanced 
panel data of executive compensation observations from the annual report (Form 56-1) for 
the period 2002 to 2008. Firm performance and size data are from DataStream. A median 
is provided because of the unique character of the data. EPS represents earnings per 
share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow. R is stock returns. 
Variable  Median  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Observation 
Executive compensation 
Salary  1,716,328  2,096,791  1,383,143  125,353  8,676,000  750 
Bonus  186,165  501,662  1,123,252  0  19,800,000  750 
Total  2,254,086  2,733,023  2,174,946  180,000  22,800,000  750 
 
Firm performance 
EPS  0.58  2.29  4.95  -3.91  36.71  737 
OCF  13.13  7.78  29.86  -179.43  87.05  742 
R  0.02  0.14  0.52  -0.90  3.18  674 
Firm size 
Equity*  1,246,058  6,935,834  27,500,000  24,797  384,000,000  750 
*Thousand Thai baht 161  
 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of executive compensation, firm performance 
and size of 750 Thai listed companies during 2002-2008. Since previous 
researchers suggest that almost all the executive compensation data have a 
unique shape, both median and mean are provided. 
Panel A of Table 5.1 provides an overview of executive compensation of 
listed companies in Thailand, the median value of salaries was 1,716,328 
Thai baht (about 34,350 GBP); it was 186,165 Thai baht (about 3,700 GBP) 
in the case of bonuses; and the total compensation package was 2,254,086 
Thai baht (about 45,000 GBP). Despite some research on the topic of 
executive compensation in Thai listed companies, such as Sitthharn (2006), 
Puttaphiwat (2007), Keawkumsorn (2009) and Connelly et al (2011), there is 
no information on the median value of Thai executive compensation. 
 On average, Thai companies paid a salary of 1.72 million Thai baht (about 
34,400 GBP) to their executives. The highest salary was 8.7 million Thai baht 
(about 17,400 GBP), while the lowest was 0.12 million Thai baht (about 2,400 
GBP). The means of the executive bonuses stood at 501,662 Thai baht 
(about 10,000 GBP). The highest bonus paid was 19.8 million Thai baht 
(about 396,000 GBP), while the lowest was zero. On average, the fringe 
benefits of those executive managers amounted to 0.35 million Thai baht 
(about 7,000 GBP). The highest level of fringe benefits was 5.68 million Thai 
baht (about 113,600 GBP), while the lowest value was 0.05 million Thai baht 
(about 1,000 GBP). To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the 
first empirical evidence on the elements of executive compensation in Thai 
listed companies.   Furthermore, on average, the figure of executive total 
compensation was 2.73 million Thai baht (about 54,600 GBP); the highest 
value was 22.8 million Thai baht (about 456,000 GBP) where the lowest 
figure was 0.18 million Thai baht (about 3,600 GBP). This evidence cannot 
directly compare to early Thai finding because table 5.1 is the result of the 
first Thai panel data on executive compensation pay. However, it  is 
comparable to early Thai findings such as Kaewkumsorn (2009) who used 162  
 
2007 Thai listed companies data to reveal that on average Thai executive 
earn about 3 million Thai baht; the highest figure was 32 million (10 million 
baht higher than this current study)and the lowest was 0.02 million. The 
slightly lower figure of this study might be the result of taking early data as far 
back as 2002 in generating the overall figure of executive pay in Thai listed 
companies. This assumption appears to hold since Connelly et al (2011) use 
2005 Thai listed companies’ executive compensation. This study shows that 
on average a manager receives about 3 million baht where the median value 
was 2.3 million baht, the minimum figure of executive pay was 1.2 million, 
while 14.335 was the maximum executive total pay. The difference between 
the minimum and maximum executive pay of the three studies reflects the 
problematic of data quality in Thai listed companies, which also is a problem 
for every others’ research on the emerging market.  Full comparative 
information on the executive compensation pay in Asia is shown in figure 5.1. 
Panel B of the table provides an overview of firm performance from the 750 
observations of listed companies in Thailand between 2002 and 2008. The 
median value of EPS was 0.58 times. However, on average, firms generated 
EPS of 2.29 times, with a slightly high standard deviation at 4.95 times. The 
highest earning return from one share reached 36.71 times, while the lowest 
made a loss at 3.91 times. The median value of operation cash flow per 
share was 13.13 times, while on average the listed companies gained 7.78 
times operation cash flow from one share with an extremely wide standard 
deviation of 29.86 times. The highest value of operation cash flow was 87.05 
times, while the lowest operation cash flow was -179.43 times. Compared 
with the starting share price of the period, the median value of stock returns 
was only 2.00% by the end of the period, while listed companies gained on 
average 14 times the stock returns, with a wide standard deviation at 0.52. 
The highest stock return was 3.18%, while the lowest stock returns was 
negative at 0.90.  163  
 
Panel C of the table provides an overview of firm size from the 750 observations 
of listed companies in Thailand during the period in question. The median 
value of equity was approximately 1.25 million Thai baht (25,000 GBP). On 
average, listed companies had about 7 million Thai baht (140,000 GBP) in 
equity with a standard deviation, which is 4 times greater than the mean. The 
biggest size of Thai listed firms had equity of 384 million Thai baht (7,680,000 
GBP).  
Furthermore, this section further provides comparative information of 
executive pay in Asia. In Asia, however a search of the literature found no 
unified information about the Asian executive compensation. Mercer, 
however, annually published salary information, and the 2010 data are 
showing below. 
 
 
 
Source: Mercer (2010) 
Figure 5.1 Mercer’s international salary differentials in Asia 
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This figure reports the comparative means of executive compensation 
components between Thailand and elsewhere. Japanese executives received 
the highest salary at 5.85 million Thai baht. Singapore and Hong Kong 
executives earned about 4.40 million and 4.2 million Thai baht respectively. 
Chinese and Korean executives receive about 3 million Thai baht while Thai 
executives earn 2.6 million Thai baht. Vietnam executive total pay is on the 
rise, at only 0.2 million Thai baht below the Thai pay threshold. The 
Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia earn the lowest pay rates with figures at 
2.1 million, 2.2 million and 2.3 million Thai baht respectively. 
Documentary reviewing of executive compensation pay in Asia provides 
slightly different result. This study found that, in 2003, Thai executives earned 
2.4 million Thai baht while executives in Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore 
earned much higher rates at 4.7 million, 5.7 million, and 9.8 million Thai baht 
(Kato and Kim, 2007; Sun et al, 2010). Japanese executives earned far higher 
rates,  equating to the highest Asian executive pay at 17.3 million Thai baht 
(Nakazato, Ramseyer, and Ramusen, 2011), while Chinese executives 
received the highest increases to their executive pay figure at 4.2 million Thai 
baht (Bai and Xu, 2005; Chen et al, 2001; Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and 
Long, 2006). This study provides evidence that Thai executives earned 3.1 
million, accounting for a 17% growth comparing 2003 to 2007. Philippine 
executives’ pay information first reveals that 5.7 million Thai baht is the figure 
of executive earning (Unite et al, 2008). Korea, Hong Kong, and Japan figures 
all increased from 2003 at about 20% (Sun, Zhao and Yan, 2010). 
Moreover, regarding econometric concerns, this section provides supplementary 
information about a partial correlation between executive compensation, firm 
performance and firm size of Thai listed companies, which is shown below.    165  
 
Table 5.2 Correlation analysis 
This table reports correlation coefficient of the executive compensation, firm performance 
and firm size of the sample of Thai listed companies. The sample consists of unbalanced 
panel data of executive compensation observations from the annual report for the period 
2002 to 2008. Firm performance and size data are from DataStream. EPS represents 
earnings per share. OCF stands for the operation cash flow. R is stock returns. Lequity is 
natural logarithm of equity as the proxy of firm size.  
   salary  Bonus  Total  EPS  OCF  R 
bonus  0.0875**                
total  0.7104***  0.6909***             
EPS  -0.0038  -0.0472  -0.0430          
OCF  0.0280  -0.0252  0.0080  0.0211       
R  0.0009  0.0467  0.0224  0.0394  0.0323    
Lequity   -0.0891**  -0.0223   -0.0847**  0.1278***  0.0104  -0.0383 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Table 5.2 explores the correlation between executive compensation, firm 
performance and firm size. It reveals that correlation coefficient among 
executive compensation variables indicates that the forms of executive 
compensation elements are positively correlated with each other, especially 
in the case of salary, and bonus to total compensation at 0.7104 and 0.6909, 
respectively. The analysis also indicates the correlation between executive 
compensation (salary, total compensation) and firm size (log equity) while 
size and earnings per share correlate with each other. However, there is no 
evidence on the correlation between any executive compensation and any 
firm performance.  
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of variable used in the equations 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the compensation components, firm performance 
and firm size of the sample of Thai listed companies. The sample consists of unbalanced 
panel data of executive compensation observations from the annual report (Form 56-1) for 
the period 2002 to 2008. Firm performance and size data are from DataStream. EPS 
represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow. R stands for stock 
returns.  FAM stands for family-owned firm. COR is corporate-owned firm. FOR represents 
foreign-owned firm. BON is executive bonus. TOT is executive total compensation. ∆ is the 
different level between contemporaneous and lagged value of the variable. 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Observation 
Executive compensation 
∆salary  138951.7  579140.6  -3843707  3150140  626 
∆bonus  21850.3  935399.8  -10700000  16100000  626 
∆total  180724.3  1185471  -10000000  17100000  626 
Firm performance 
∆EPS  0.00182  2.79197  -33.31  19.94  606 
∆OCF  0.74893  30.27437  -106.78  201.65  618 
∆R  -1.39110  18.06660  -298.02  112.97  543 
Firm size 
lequity  14.26912  1.45163  10.6  19.77  626 
Interaction role of ownership and firm performance 
FAMEPS  -0.09592  1.61886  -33.31  4.4  620 
COREPS  0.05412  1.75544  -18.44  19.94  621 
FOREPS  0.00641  0.60882  -7.76  9.76  623 
DISEPS  0.03705  1.23511  -10.40  13.33  620 
FAMOCF  0.48707  21.72533  -106.78  201.65  624 
COROCF  0.21938  13.92953  -96.39  127.83  625 
FOROCF  -0.02404  10.04665  -67.53  98.33  622 
DISOCF  0.05880  11.86621  -88.00  102.15  625 
FAMR  -0.08339  3.12857  -19.23  33.42  579 
CORR  -0.10134  8.01976  -122.49  112.97  612 
FORR  -0.20841  2.39356  -50.40  14.78  618 
DISR  -0.84356  14.5302  -298.02  75.72  612 
Interaction role of ownership and executive compensation 
BONFAM  4290  183883  -1963925  1034000  626 
BONCOR  1696  323276  -3134167  3328030  626 
BONFOR  12853  197374  -596363  3568360  626 
BONDIS  3011  835451  -10700000  16100000  626 
TOTFAM  67621  368363  -2324866  2269689  626 
TOTCOR  47916  568286  -5226787  4583604  626 
TOTFOR  27775  416502  -2404470  5848309  626 
TOTDIS  37413  892685  -10000000  17100000  626 167  
 
Table 5.3 provides an overview of variables used in regression models. The 
table is made up of five elements. The first panel provides executive 
compensation changes. It reveals that every executive element of pay was 
rising. On average, executives of Thai listed companies’ received better pay 
at 0.14 million Thai baht (about 2,800 GBP). This figure accounts for 77% of 
executive salary change throughout the period. Bonus payments are on the 
rise in the Thai capital market. On average, executive managers in Thailand 
received an increase of 12% in bonuses throughout the period. However, the 
size of the changes in bonuses paid varies; it ranges from negative 11 million 
Thai baht (about -220,000 GBP) to positive 17 million Thai baht (about 
300,000 GBP). 
 Panel two provides information on the changes in firm performance. It 
indicates that EPS and OCF are on the rise but stock returns were slightly 
descending. EPS change is positive but little in magnitude at 0.0018. The 
changes span widely from -33.31 to 19.94. Unlike EPS, OCF change in 
magnitude is 0.7489. The fluctuation is common in cash flow performance, 
since this information is unadjusted with accrual information. Stock 
performance is on the downward trend; however, the magnitude of change is 
small. The range of change is wide with the minimum at -3.62 and the 
maximum at 2.81. 
Panel three gives natural logarithm of equity. The information shows the 
increase of firm size during the observation period. The next panel describes the 
interaction variable between ownership structure and firm performance. Most 
of the variables were positive. However, stock returns variables show a 
negative trend by their downward character. The final panel indicates that all 
interaction variables between ownership structure and executive 
compensation were on the rise.    168  
 
Table 5.4 Correlation analysis of variables used in regression analysis 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the compensation components, firm performance 
and firm size of the sample of Thai listed companies. The sample consists of unbalanced 
panel data of executive compensation observations from the annual report (Form 56-1) for 
the period 2002 to 2008. Firm performance and size data are from DataStream. EPS 
represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow. R stands for stock 
returns.  FAM stands for family-owned firm. COR is corporate-owned firm. FOR represents 
foreign-owned firm. BON is executive bonus. TOT is executive total compensation. 
   EQUITY  SALARY  BONUS  TOTAL  EPS  OCF  R 
SALARY  0.0885*  1 
          BONUS  0.0213  0.0885*  1 
        TOTAL  0.0608  0.5493*  0.8402*  1 
      EPS  0.1362*  -0.0012  0.0348  0.0271  1 
    OCF  -0.0039  -0.0372  0.0222  0.0090  -0.0145  1 
  R  0.0429  -0.1304*  -0.0261  -0.0865*  -0.0147  -0.0501  1 
FAM  -0.2288*  0.0359  -0.0075  0.0078  -0.0742  0.0158  0.0419 
COR  0.2957*  -0.0023  -0.0111  -0.0096  0.0432  0.0000  0.0384 
FOR  0.1079*  -0.0311  0.0353  0.0203  0.0073  -0.0112  -0.0137 
DIS  -0.1386*  -0.0147  -0.0058  -0.0133  0.0313  -0.0096  -0.0755 
FAMEPS  0.0592  -0.0163  -0.0293  -0.0295  0.5886*  -0.0454  0.0015 
COREPS  0.1199*  0.0323  0.0252  0.037  0.6371*  0.0050  0.014 
FOREPS  -0.0021  -0.0575  -0.0014  -0.0251  0.2211*  0.0254  0.0025 
DISEPS  0.0537  0.0009  0.0810*  0.0589  0.4479*  0.0048  -0.0503 
FAMOCF  -0.0169  -0.0371  -0.0032  -0.0216  -0.0370  0.7209*  -0.0151 
 
COROCF  0.0083  -0.0264  -0.0147  -0.0242  0.0081  0.4624*  0.0139 
FOROCF  0.0155  -0.039  0.0163  0.0263  0.0167  0.3330*  -0.0056 
DISOCF  -0.0021  0.0372  0.0656  0.0683  0.0065  0.3941*  -0.1152* 
FAMR  -0.0149  -0.0478  -0.0119  -0.0406  0.0016  -0.0611  0.1768* 
CORR  0.0571  -0.0493  -0.0031  -0.034  0.0155  0.0122  0.4704* 
FORR  -0.0034  -0.0057  -0.0196  -0.0191  0.0025  -0.014  0.1353* 
DISR  0.0155  -0.1047*  -0.0217  -0.0664  -0.0271  -0.047  0.8522* 
BONFAM  0.0184  0.0687  0.1961*  0.1837*  -0.0992*  -0.0105  -0.0135 
BONCOR  0.0130  0.1809*  0.3455*  0.3633*  0.0478  -0.0192  -0.0063 
BONFOR  0.0614  0.0286  0.2104*  0.2120*  -0.0012  0.0241  -0.0091 
BONDIS  0.0003  0.0073  0.8931*  0.7097*  0.0409  0.0289  -0.0218 
TOTFAM  0.0102  0.4152*  0.1141*  0.2932*  -0.0745  -0.047  -0.0188 
TOTCOR  0.0721  0.5197*  0.2605*  0.4699*  0.0554  -0.0232  -0.0317 
TOTFOR  0.0463  0.1623*  0.1317*  0.3427*  -0.0150  0.0230  -0.0091 
TOTDIS  0.0090  0.1516*  0.8414*  0.7479*  0.0377  0.0351  -0.0821 
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Table 5.4 cont 
   FAM  COR  FOR  DIS  FAMEPS  COREPS  FOREP
S  COR  -0.4733*  1 
          FOR  -0.2603*  -0.2289*  1 
        DIS  -0.4172*  -0.3670*  -0.2018*  1 
      FAMEPS  -0.0820*  0.0385  0.0212  0.0339  1 
    COREPS  -0.0228  0.0485  -0.011  -0.0176  0.0018  1 
  FOREPS  -0.0078  -0.0068  0.0303  -0.0060  0.0006  -0.0003  1 
DISEPS  -0.0222  -0.0195  -0.0107  0.0539  0.0018  -0.0009  -0.0003 
FAMOCF  0.0307  -0.0145  -0.008  -0.0128  -0.0643  -0.0007  -0.0002 
COROCF  -0.0116  0.0245  -0.0056  -0.0090  0.0009  0.0122  -0.0002 
FOROCF  0.0018  0.0016  -0.0069  0.0014  -0.0001  0.0001  0.0772 
DISOCF  -0.0036  -0.0032  -0.0018  0.0087  0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0001 
FAMR  -0.0410  0.0182  0.0099  0.0160  0.0032  0.0009  0.0003 
CORR  0.0094  -0.0204  0.0045  0.0073  -0.0008  0.0247  0.0001 
FORR  0.0646  0.0567  -0.2610*  0.0500  -0.0052  0.0027  0.0118 
DISR  0.0434  0.0381  0.0209  -0.1072*  -0.0035  0.0018  0.0006 
BONFAM  0.0318  -0.0151  -0.0083  -0.0133  -0.1666*  -0.0007  -0.0002 
BONCOR  -0.0039  0.0081  -0.0019  -0.0030  0.0003  0.0750  -0.0001 
BONFOR  -0.0478  -0.0420  0.1837*  -0.0371  0.0039  -0.0020  -0.0061 
BONDIS  -0.0026  -0.0023  -0.0013  0.0063  0.0002  -0.0001  0.0000 
TOTFAM  0.2505*  -0.1185*  -0.0652  -0.1045*  -0.1155*  -0.0057  -0.0019 
TOTCOR  -0.0619  0.1308*  -0.0299  -0.0480  0.0050  0.0846*  -0.0009 
TOTFOR  -0.0490  -0.0431  0.1881*  -0.0380  0.0040  -0.0021  -0.0683 
TOTDIS  -0.0308  -0.0271  -0.0149  0.0737  0.0025  -0.0013  -0.0004 
 
Table 5.4 cont 
   DISEPS  FAMOCF  COROCF  FOROCF  DISOCF  FAMR  CORR 
FAMOCF  -0.0007  1 
          COROCF  -0.0005  -0.0004  1 
        FOROCF  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  1 
      DISOCF  0.0144  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  1 
    FAMR  0.0008  -0.0909*  0.0004  -0.0001  0.0001  1 
  CORR  0.0004  0.0003  0.0263  0.000  0.0001  -0.0004  1 
FORR  0.0026  0.0020  0.0014  -0.0511  0.0004  -0.0024  -0.0011 
DISR  -0.0606  0.0013  0.0009  -0.0001  -0.1345*  -0.0016  -0.0008 
BONFAM  -0.0007  -0.0143  -0.0004  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0723  0.0003 
BONCOR  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0414  0.0000  0.0000  0.0001  -0.0107 
BONFOR  -0.0020  -0.0015  -0.0010  0.0772  -0.0003  0.0018  0.0008 
BONDIS  0.0913*  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0736  0.0001  0.0000 
TOTFAM  -0.0055  -0.0630  -0.0029  0.0004  -0.0009  -0.1571*  0.0024 
TOTCOR  -0.0025  -0.0019  -0.0470  0.0002  -0.0004  0.0023  -0.0782 
TOTFOR  -0.0020  -0.0015  -0.0011  0.0740  -0.0003  0.0019  0.0009 
TOTDIS  0.0831*  -0.0009  -0.0007  0.0001  0.0915*  0.0012  0.0005 170  
 
Table 5.4 cont 
   FORR  DISR  BONFAM  BONCOR  BONFOR  BONDIS   TOTFAM 
DISR  -0.0052  1 
          BONFAM  0.0020  0.0014  1 
        BONCOR  0.0005  0.0003  -0.0001  1 
      BONFOR  -0.0971*  0.0038  -0.0015  -0.0003  1 
    BONDIS  0.0003  -0.0257  -0.0001  0.0000  -0.0002  1 
  TOTFAM  0.0161  0.0108  0.5982*  -0.0010  -0.0120  -0.0007  1 
TOTCOR  0.0074  0.0050  -0.0020  0.7590*  -0.0055  -0.0003  -0.0155 
TOTFOR  -0.0887*  0.0039  -0.0016  -0.0004  0.6273*  -0.0002  -0.0123 
TOTDIS  0.0037  -0.0977*  -0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0027  0.9430*  -0.0077 
 
Table 5.4 cont 
   TOTCOR  TOTFOR  TOTDIS 
TOTFOR  -0.0056  1 
  TOTDIS  -0.0035  -0.0028  1 
This full investigation aims to detect potential multicollinearity, where two or 
more independent variables have a high correlation with each other, before 
multiple regression analysis takes place in the next chapter. Since there is a 
high positive correlation between executive compensation components - 
salary, bonus and total compensation - potential multicollinearity is found, as 
no equation will deploy these three variables as independent variables at one 
time. As a result, multicollinearity is no longer an issue of concern.  
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Table 5.5 Descriptive statistics on industrial categories 
The sample consists of 750 unbalanced panel data, the industries which the 750 
observations belong to and remarks from SET website for the period 2002-2008.  
 Industry  Observation  Percent 
Agricultural and food   60  8.00 
Consumer products  68  9.07 
Financial and insurance   98  13.07 
Manufacturing  90  12.00 
Real estate and construction  166  22.13 
Mining and quarrying  49  6.53 
Services  120  16.00 
Technology  49  6.53 
Medium-sized enterprises  50  6.67 
Total  750  100.00 
Table 5.5 represents the distribution among Thai listed companies of the nine 
dummy variables for industries. The biggest industrial sector according to the 
number of firms in SET was the Real estate and construction sector which 
yielded 166 observations (22%). The second biggest industry was Services, 
giving 120 observations (16%). Financial and insurance is the industry which 
comes third, with 98 observations (13%). The three smallest industries were 
Mining and quarrying, Technology, and Medium-sized enterprises, all of 
which generated about 50 sets of observations (7%) each. 
In order to add new knowledge, this study deploys ownership structure as a 
moderating variable by using the first 20% of largest shareholders as a proxy. 
The identification using the first 20% of majority shareholders is defined by 
Taylor and Taylor (1996), Edwards and Weichenrieder (2009) and SET 
(2010), all indicating that a higher than 20% share tends to be an ‘active 
holding’ which can influence decision making. There are four kinds of 
ownership structure; family ownership, corporate ownership, foreign 
ownership, and dispersed ownership. Only 0.79% of outstanding shares are 
held by the Ministry of Finance and other government agencies 
(Wiwattanakantong, 2000). 172  
 
Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics of the type of largest shareholder 
Thai listed companies are classified into two main groups; concentrated ownership and 
dispersed ownership. Using the first largest 20% of ownership as a proxy of ownership 
identity, the sample consists of 750 unbalanced panel data of ownership structure 
observations from SETSMART for the period 2002 to 2008.  
Ownership structure  Number of 
observation 
Setting 
Thailand* Thailand**  Japan**  U.S**  U.K.** 
1. Dispersed ownership  180  24.00  29.00  23.40  53.50  21.30 
2. Concentrated 
ownership 
           
     2.1 Family ownership  265  35.33  25.00  -  -  - 
     2.2 Corporate 
ownership 
222  29.60  25.76  25.50  0.00  3.60 
     2.3 Financial 
Institutions 
-  -  8.30  46.10  39.80  60.80 
     2.4 Foreign 
ownership 
  83  11.07 
 
12.30  5.00  6.70  12.30 
Total  750  100.00  100.00    100.00   100.00   100.00 
* This current study 
** Wiwattanakantang (2000) 
This table indicates the distribution of the largest shareholders of the listed 
firms. Using the first largest 20% of ownership as a proxy of ownership identity, 
two main groups are constructed. Dispersed ownership has been taken as 
the reference group, because it is not only the sole non-concentrated form of 
ownership, but also because this makes it easier to compare with the 
standard literature on executive compensation, most of which uses data from 
the US. As a consequence, the value of the ownership structure would not be 
presented in any standard regression analysis. The last three categories, 
family-owned, corporate-owned, and foreign-owned firm, are also called firms 
with concentrated ownership.  
Using 20% as the criterion by which to identify ownership structure, this study 
finds that the highest percentage of most of the listed companies identified as 
family businesses was 35.33%. This finding is comparable to Connelly et al 
(2010) which reported that 36.5% of Thai listed companies might classed as 
family-owned firm. Corporate ownership was the second most popular form 
of ownership, about 30%. Unlike the data from the US, these data show only 173  
 
a small number of firms with dispersed ownership (about 24%). Thus, 
dispersed ownership does not seem to be the predominant type of ownership 
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The smallest group turns out to be foreign 
ownership, which represents only about 11% of the listed companies.  High 
corporate ownership of Thai listed companies is similar to those Japanese, 
which one fourth of listed companies are corporate ownership. Even though 
the figures of individual shareholders are  similar to some extent, American 
individuals each hold a small proportion while Thai individuals tend to present 
a form of family ownership (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). 
 
5.2 Elements of executive pay in Thai listed companies 
A general view of the executive compensation is presented. The data are 
gathered from 2002 to 2008 in Thai listed companies. Unlike others, this 
setting only provides three common forms of compensation pay which were 
salary, bonus, and others.  
 
Figure 5.2 Elements of executive compensation pay in Thai listed companies 174  
 
Figure 5.2 indicates that executive compensation rose constantly throughout 
the period of observation. The figure began at 2 million Thai baht in 2002. 
The number rose sharply to about 2.5 million Thai baht in 2003-2005, with 
another sharp rise to 2,847,030 Thai baht in 2006. The executive total 
compensation first reached 3 million Thai baht (3,099,681) in 2007. The 
figure reached its peak at 3,129,091 Thai baht in 2008. Salary was the main 
executive compensation to executive managers of the Thai listed companies. 
Salaries increased consistently from 1,614,390 Thai baht in 2002. The figure 
slightly rose to 1,728,318 Thai baht in 2003. The figure showed continual 
growth to 1,877,867 Thai baht in 2004 where it first exceeded 2 million Thai 
baht in 2005. The figure continued to grow to reach 2,196,603 Thai baht in 
2006. The number rose dramatically to 2,418,378 Thai baht in 2007, and 
peaked at 2,448,893 Thai baht in 2008. In addition to salary, another element 
in the fixed executive compensation was other compensation (perks and the 
pension fund). The number of firms paying other kinds of compensation to 
executive managers remained the same throughout the period. However, this 
compensation pay was the lowest value of executive compensation offered in 
Thai listed companies. Given that it was not the main component of executive 
compensation; the result indicated that about 5% of executive pay was this 
kind of compensation. The numbers of firms paying other kinds of 
compensation to executive manager grow throughout the period, which 
began at 89,437 Thai baht in 2002. The number increased sharply to 
148,781 Thai baht in 2003 and then reached 145,779 Thai baht in 2004. The 
number of firms which paid other compensation to executive managers 
remained the same at 1.2 million Thai baht between 2005 and 2006. The 
figure dropped sharply to 110,863 Thai baht in 2007 where it reached its 
peak at 188,694 Thai baht in 2008. 
The second most valued form of executive compensation was the bonus. On 
average the executive managers of Thai listed companies received a bonus 
worth almost 0.5 million Thai baht which accounted for about 20% of 
executive compensation package, compared to that typically worth 1-2% in 175  
 
the US. The US information is aligned with OECD (2005) which states that 
overall the size of performance-related pay is a fairly modest percentage of 
the base salary. The figure of bonus was 305,478 Thai baht in 2002 and this 
rose sharply to 524,962 Thai baht in 2003. The figure remains the same at 
511,866 Thai baht in 2004. The figure slightly dropped to 501,109 Thai baht 
in 2005. The figure rose to 528,628 Thai baht in 2006 where it dramatically 
rose to 570,440 Thai baht in 2007. However, the figure dropped to 491,504 
Thai baht in 2008. In addition to bonuses, another type of incentive 
compensation provided was to give executive stock options. Unlike the US 
and UK stock markets, the Thai Stock Market shows that stock options were 
the least favoured type of executive compensation. Only four Thai listed 
companies gave stock options to their executive managers in 2002. The 
number of firms providing stock options for their executive managers grew 
slowly to reach about 10 firms; a figure which remained constant from 2003 
to 2008. The number indicates that less than 10% of listed companies 
included a stock option in their executive compensation pay package.  
 
5.3 Executive compensation trend in Thai listed companies 
Section 3 provides comparative information about the value of executive 
compensation pay in Thai listed companies from 2002 to 2008 across year, 
size and industry as shown below. 
5.3.1 Average compensation for each year 
This section provides information about the value of executive compensation 
pay in Thai listed companies from 2002 to 2008. The number of observations 
was 69, 86, 108, 123, 123, 122 and 119, in each successive year.  176  
 
 
Figure 5.3 Value of executive salary pay 
Figure 5.3 shows the value of both mean and median for executive salary 
pay between 2002 and 2008. On the whole, the amounts rose slightly 
throughout the observation period. On average, the middle value of executive 
salary grew by 4% over the period. The median value, which was 1.35 million 
Thai baht in 2002, increased to 1.49 million Thai baht in 2003 and then and 
then increased again to 1.66 million Thai baht in 2004. The number dropped 
slightly to 1.56 million Thai baht in 2005. The median value of executive 
salaries, once again, rose slightly to 1.81 million Thai baht and then 1.96 
million Thai baht before it reached its peak at 2.05 million Thai baht in 2008. 
Overview information about mean values indicates that, on average, the 
salaries of executive managers grew steadily by 7% over the period. 
Regarding yearly data, the value of salaries grew continually throughout the 
period. It touched 1.65 million, 1.76 million, 1.82 million, 1.98 million, 2.04 
million and 2.16 million Thai baht in each successive year in the years from 
2002-2007 and finally reached 2.14 million Thai baht in 2008. 
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Figure 5.4 Value of executive bonus pay 
This figure provides overview information about the value of executive 
bonuses from 2002 to 2008. In general, the median value of executive bonus 
grew by 5% over the period. However, there is a sharp rise in the bonus 
trend from 2002 to 2003 before it fell again in 2006. The value of the bonus 
once again rose from about 0.30 million to 0.51 million before it finally fell to 
0.50 million. The trend once again rose but reach its peak in 2007, and fell to 
about 0.50 million Thai baht in 2008. To get a clearer picture, this study also 
provides information about the mean value of executive bonus pay. On 
average, executive managers received bonuses of 0.08 million, 0.15 million, 
0.18 million, 0.19 million and 0.17 million, reaching a peak of 0.23 million 
before dropping slightly to 0.18 million Thai baht in 2008. On average, the mean 
value of executive bonus pay grew by 18% over the period of observation. 
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Figure 5.5 Value of executive total compensation 
Figure 5.5 provides general information about the total value of executive 
pay. The figure shows that the median value of executive total compensation 
grew by 5% over the period. This median value was 1.96 million, 2.12 million, 
2.29 million, 2.56 million, 2.58 million and 2.70 million in each successive 
year, before dropping slightly to 2.63 million Thai baht. Using mean values, 
the table indicates that, on average, executive managers received total 
compensation packages in the years under review of 1.63 million, 1.72 
million, 2.07 million, 2.28 million and 2.44 million in each successive year, 
before they reached a peak at 2.54 million. The mean value of executive total 
compensation dropped slightly from a peak of 2.41 million Thai baht in 2008. 
A trend of 7% growth can be seen in the mean value of executive total 
compensation over the period. 
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5.3.2 Average compensation for each size of the firm 
This section provides information about the value of executive compensation 
pay in Thai listed companies based on size, using equity as the proxy for 
magnitude. The first group is of small firms, which had less than 560 million 
Thai baht in equity. The second is above 560 million in outstanding equity but 
below 1,250 million Thai baht. The next group had above 1,250 million but 
below 3,200 million Thai baht of outstanding equity. The last group includes 
the biggest firms which have outstanding equity of above 3,200 million Thai 
baht. The numbers observed were 187, 188, 188 and 187 sets of data, 
respectively. The three important elements of executive compensation – 
salary, bonus and total compensation – are shown. 
 
Figure 5.6 Average executive compensation by size of firm 
The group of smallest listed companies paid , on average, a salary of 1.2 
million Thai baht to their executive managers, while the median value was 1.1 
million Thai baht. On average the executive managers of the third biggest 
groups of listed company earned salaries of 1.7 million Thai baht, while the 
median value of executive salaries was 1.6 million Thai baht. Regarding the 180  
 
second biggest company group listed, on average, their executive managers 
earned salaries of 2.1 million Thai baht, while the median value of the 
executive salaries was 1.8 million Thai baht. Regarding the group of listed 
companies with the largest equity, on average their executive managers earned 
a salary of 3.4 million Thai baht, while the median value of executive salaries 
was 3.2 million Thai baht. 
Regarding the bonus from the group of smallest listed companies, on average, 
their executive managers received a bonus of 0.11 million Thai baht each, 
where the median value of executive bonus was zero Thai baht. On average, 
the executive managers of the third biggest group of listed companies 
received a bonus of 0.27 million Thai baht each where the median value of 
executive bonus was 0.16 million Thai baht. The second biggest group of 
listed companies paid, on average, a bonus to their executive managers of 
0.57 million Thai baht each, where the median value of executive bonus was 
0.26 million Thai baht. Regarding the group of largest listed companies, on 
average, their executive managers earned a bonus of 1.05 million Thai baht 
each, where the median value of executive bonus was 0.88 million Thai baht. 
The last element is executive total compensation. On average the executive 
managers in the groups of smallest size received a bonus of 1.4 million Thai 
baht. The executive managers of group of lower and upper median in size 
received 2.1 million and 2.8 million Thai baht, respectively. The executive 
managers in the group of biggest size received 4.7 million Thai baht.  
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5.3.3 Average compensation for each industrial group 
This section provides information about the value of executive compensation 
pay in the chosen Thai listed companies according to industry. The nine 
industrial groups represented are Mining and quarrying, Real estate, 
Financial institutions, Services, Technology, Construction, Agricultural 
products, MAI and Industry. The number of observations for each group was 
60, 68, 98, 90, 49, 120, 49, 50 and 166 listed firms, respectively.  
Agro is Agricultural and food products industrial. Con stands for Consumer product 
group. Fin is Finance and insurance industrial. Manu is manufacturing industrial. 
Real is Real estate and construction. Min is Mining and quarrying. Serv stands for 
Services industrial. Tech is technology group. MAI is Medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Figure 5.7 Average executive compensation of the firms according to industrial group 
Figure 5.7 indicates that the industrial group which paid the biggest salary, 
about 4 million Thai baht, was Mining and quarrying. The next biggest 
salaries paid were in Financial and insurance, Technology, Agricultural and 
food and MAI which paid salaries of about 2.57 million, 2.54 million, 2.35 
million and 2.11 million Thai baht, respectively. The smallest salary paid, 1.55 
million Thai baht, was in the Service industries. In addition, the median value 
of the salaries paid in Mining and quarrying, Financial and insurance, 
Technology, Agricultural and food industries and MAI was 3.50 million, 2.50, 
0
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2.69 million, 2.15 million and  1.70 million Thai baht, respectively. The 
smallest salary paid using median value was in the Service industries, and 
was 1.27 million Thai baht.  
The biggest bonuses paid were in Mining and quarrying and Finance and 
insurance. The average value of bonuses paid in these two industries was 
1.42 million and 1.05 million Thai baht.  The next three biggest bonuses paid 
were consequently in the MAI, Agricultural and food and Manufacturing 
industrial groups. The average value of bonuses paid was 0.52 million, 0.45 
million and 0.44 million Thai baht, respectively. The smallest bonuses paid 
were in the Service industries, which paid bonuses of 0.15 million Thai baht. 
In addition, the median value provides the middle value of bonus paid in each 
industrial group. Mining, Finance, MAI, Agricultural and food and Manufacturing 
industry paid 1.26 million, 0.18 million, 0.19 million, 0.24 million and 0.25 
million Thai baht, respectively. The smallest bonus paid using median value 
was by the Service industry and was 0.05 million Thai baht.  
The figures indicate that Mining and quarrying, Financial and insurance, 
Technology, Agricultural and food and MAI were the five industrial groups 
which paid the highest total compensation. On average, the amounts of 
executive total compensation were 5.44 million, 4.01 million, 2.97 million, 
2.84 million and 2.78 million Thai baht, respectively. The median values of 
total compensation were 5.22 million, 3.02 million, 3.13 million, 2.38 million 
and 2.24 million Thai baht, respectively. The smallest executive total 
compensation paid was in the Service industries, which paid total compensation 
of 1.82 million Thai baht of which the median value was 0.55 million Thai 
baht. The figure above is comparable to the findings of Puttaphiwat (2004). 
However, this current study is the only work to date on executive pay that 
provides a mean of executive total pay. None of the literature on Thai 
executive compensation has shown the detail of the median. 183  
 
 
5.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter provides descriptive statistics of executive compensation in The 
Stock Exchange of Thailand. In addition, firm performance, ownership 
structure, size and industry are also discussed. On average, Thai executive 
managers receive salaries of 2 million Thai baht with 0.5 million Thai baht in 
bonuses while other supplementary pay such as perks account for 0.01 
million Thai baht. The information reveals that salary was the main element of 
Thai executive pay which accounts for 77% of total pay. Bonus is the most 
common incentive pay which accounts for 18% of the executive total pay. 
Unlike American and British settings, Thai executives receive 5% of their pay 
as other pay. A small number of managers receive stock option. On average, 
the earnings of Thai listed companies was 2.29 per share. Operation cash 
flow was 7.78 per share while stock returns came at 0.02 time. The size of 
firms varied significantly, ranging from 384,000 million to 25 million Thai baht 
in equity. This results in the calculating of the natural logarithm of equity used 
as proxy of size, instead of equity itself. Real estate and construction was the 
biggest industry by number of firms, where the minority of firm are classified 
as Mining and quarrying. Family ownership is the most common ownership 
structure, and only about 10% of Thai listed companies are classified as 
foreign-owned firms.  Annual information reveals that salary growth has been 
consistent at around 0.14 million Thai baht every year. Bonus, however, 
fluctuates annually. The figure for bonuses rose sharply at 219,484 Thai baht 
in 2003, shortly after the Asian financial crisis. However, 2004-2005 was not 
a good year for executive managers. Even the annual bonus was paid, the 
figures dropped continually. The subsequent period of economic stability in 
2006-2007 had a momentum effect on the incentive pay, the figure rose 
sharply. However, 2008 was not a good year for executives, who saw their 
bonuses pay dropped back to the same level as it had been in the worst 
year, 2005.  184  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Research finding:  
Pay-performance sensitivities 
 
Optimal contracting of Agency theory believes that executive compensation 
can be a mechanism to encourage the Agent to behave in the Principal’s 
interest, resulting in an alignment of interest between the Principal and the 
Agent. Since the firms that fail to encourage their managers to serve their (the 
firms) best interests will be unable to compete in the market, pay-performance 
sensitivity is expected (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Hartzell and Starks (2003) provide further evidence that ownership structure 
has an effect on executive pay. Thus, this chapter is structured in three sections. 
The first section presents regression results of executive pay-performance 
sensitivity. Section two provides regression results of ownership structure as 
moderator of pay-performance sensitivity. The last section provides a 
summary of this chapter. 186  
 
 
6.1 Pay-performance sensitivity 
The hypothesis developed in Chapter 3 indicates that pay-performance 
sensitivity may exist. The three measures of executive compensation are salary, 
bonus and total compensation. The three performance measures are EPS, OCF 
and R. This chapter aims to find the pay-performance sensitivity, using the 
methodology stated in Chapter 4. This section is structured in three units. The 
first unit presents regression results of executive salary pay-performance 
sensitivity. Unit two provides regression results of executive bonus pay-
performance sensitivity. The third unit provides regression results of executive 
total pay-performance sensitivity. The equation below is called model 1. 
∆(Executive compensation) it = β0 + β1∆(EPS) it + β2∆(OCF) it + β3 ∆(R) it + 
β4(Lequity) it + β5(Dummy industrial) it + 
β6(Dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Executive compensation = Executive salary, bonus, or total compensation  
     β0 = intercept term 
     β1 – β6 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
           i = the i
th firm 
t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008 
EPS = Earning per Share 
OCF = Operation cash flow per share  
R = Stock returns 
Lequity = natural logarithm of equity  
Dummy industrial = one of eight groups to which the listed company 
belongs: Manufacturing, Mining and quarrying, Real estate 
and construction, Finance and insurance, Services, 
Technology, Consumer product, Agricultural and food 187  
 
products and Medium-sized enterprises: shown as 1 if a 
specific interest industrial is required, zero otherwise. 
Dummy year = one of seven groups in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown as 
1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
Tables 6.1-6.3 provide empirical evidence to indicate whether or not firm 
performance has any sensitivity with executive compensation. This hypothesis 
is tested using the OLS in the first two columns of each executive 
compensation element. Column 3 of each panel provides the FE to treat the 
structure of the panel data which all the other variables are the same as in 
the OLS estimation but include ε i  that is the unobserved individual effect. 
This study approaches the three executive compensation matrices – salary, 
bonus and total compensation. Thus, this section begins the investigation with 
the salary, bonus, and total pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for 
size, industry and year effect. 
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Table 6.1 Regression results of the salary pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the pay-performance sensitivity using 
both OLS and FE estimation using model 1. The first column is dedicated to contemporaneous 
data of firm performance. The second column adds lagged performance. The third column 
controls for firm effects. EPS stands for earning per share; OCF stands for operation cash 
flow, where R is the stock returns. L. indicates the lagged value of these variables. The 
coefficient is reported in the first line of each variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. 
The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance. T-value is 
presented in brackets   ( ).  *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: Salary 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -410387.37  -793678.26*  2537621.52 
   (-1.25)  (-1.91)  (1.20) 
EPS  1756.18  9824.38  19677.05 
   (0.20)  (1.12)  (1.51) 
OCF  -1063.16  -1476.25*  -1514.01 
   (-1.65)  (-1.80)  (-1.20)    
R  -4356.85***  -4942.57***  -4877.74*** 
   (-3.81)  (-3.62)  (-3.65)    
L.EPS 
 
18467.32  26570.06 
  
 
(1.34)  (1.34) 
L.OCF 
 
822.52  401.8 
  
 
(0.92)  (0.38) 
L.R 
 
6923.92***  7371.80*** 
  
 
(4.05)  (3.95) 
Lequity  39946.28*  65509.51**  -160154.19 
   (1.67)  (2.12)  (-1.09)    
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.06  0.12  0.15 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 
Table 6.1 investigates the pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for size, 
industry and year effect. The number of observations is up to 521 in the case of 
contemporaneous performance and 396 in the case of contemporaneous and 
lagged performance. The correlation between the observations and their 
prediction value is low, at around 6%-15%. Column 1 reveals that 
contemporaneous stock return is negatively correlated with the executive 
salary highly statistical significance. Column 2 and 3 confirms early finding 
and adds that the lagged R coefficient is positively and statistically highly 
significant with executive salary.  This finding confirms most research in the 
area such as Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Gregg et al (2005). It also 189  
 
confirms the Chinese early findings such as those of Mengistae and Xu 
(2004), Long and Kato (2006), and Buck et al (2008). Connelly et al (2010) 
add to the Thai evidence that pay-performance sensitivity for Thai executive 
managers exists. Also Malaysian evidence, Salim and Wan-Hussin (2009) 
use 476 Bursa Malay listed companies for years 2003 to 2005. It reveals that 
contemporaneous stock returns had no influence while lag stock returns had 
a positively influence on Malaysian executive total compensation. Based on 
the existing evidence, Hypothesis 1.1, which predicts that firm performance 
has a positive relationship with executive salary, has not been rejected.  
Table 6.2 Regression results of the bonus pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the pay-performance sensitivity using 
model 1. The first column is dedicated to contemporaneous data of firm performance. The 
second column adds lagged performance. The third column controls for firm effects. EPS 
stands for earning per share; OCF stands for operation cash flow, where R is stock returns. 
L. indicates the lagged value of these variables. The coefficient is reported in the first line of 
each variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance. T-value is presented in brackets ( ).  * denotes 
the statistical significance at 10%. 
Independent variable 
 
Dependent variable: Bonus   
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -24785.40  254740.40  2534470 
   (-0.13)  (0.69)  (0.70) 
EPS  27076.29*  27466.21*  38219.81* 
   (1.73)  (1.70)  (1.71) 
OCF  909.38  75.62  2.40 
   (0.57)  (0.08)  (0.00) 
R  -2195.68  -2602.81  -2052.26 
   (-1.19)  (-1.27)  (-1.22) 
L.EPS 
 
10546.49  18854.67 
  
 
(0.81)  (1.07) 
L.OCF 
 
1258.10  467.75 
  
 
(1.59)  (0.57) 
L.R 
 
-2221.52  -1749.75 
  
 
(-0.95)  (-0.87) 
Lequity  3246.81  -19118.90  -183832 
   -0.23  (-0.65)  (-0.71) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.02  0.06  0.04 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 190  
 
Table 6.2 investigates the pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for size, 
industry and year effect. The number of observations is up to 521 in the case of 
contemporaneous performance and 396 in the case of contemporaneous and 
lagged performance. Column 1 shows EPS coefficient is positively and 
statistically significant but significant at 10% with the executive bonus. The 
result is confirmed in column 2 and column 3. However, the correlation 
between the observations and their prediction value is low, at around 2%-6%.  
the sensitivity between executive pay and EPS as a firm performance 
sensitivity finding confirms Sitthiharn (2006), Puttaphiwat (2007) and 
Kaewkumson (2009) all found that EPS influences executive total pay. It also 
confirms the Chinese early findings such as Mengistae and Xu (2004) show a 
positive relation between executive compensation and accounting 
performance in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Long and Kato (2006) 
found that executive compensation has positive relationships with 
shareholder value. Buck et al (2008) confirm the positive relationships 
between executive compensation and accounting performance in Chinese 
listed companies from 2000 to 2003. As far as market structure is concerned, 
EPS evidence provides supportive evidence to the view of pay-performance 
sensitivity from the standpoint of Anglo-Saxon culture. However, the 
significance level is low at 10%. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.2, which predicts 
that firm performance has a positive relationship with executive bonus, has 
been rejected. Further pay-performance sensitivity has been explored against 
the rule of executive total compensation and firm performance. 
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Table 6.3 Regression results of the total pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the pay-performance sensitivity 
using model1. The first column is dedicated to contemporaneous data of firm performance. 
The second column adds lagged performance. The third column controls for firm effects. 
EPS stands for earning per share; OCF stands for operation cash flow, where R is stock 
returns. L. indicates the lagged value of these variables. The coefficient is reported in the 
first line of each variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance. T-value is presented in brackets ( 
).  *, ** and *** denote the statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable 
  Dependent variable: Total compensation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -710913*  -623711  4917812 
   (-1.83)  (-0.99)  (1.05) 
EPS  26918.95  32932.15  54862.73* 
   (1.31)  (1.64)  (1.71) 
OCF  395.22  -1240.49  -1360.83 
   (0.21)  (-0.98)  (-0.78)    
R  -6902.42***  -8104.93***  -7489.44***  
   (-3.01)  (-3.25)  (-3.27)    
L.EPS  51616.92*  44836.35  -340996 
   (1.70)  (0.98)  (-1.07)    
L.OCF 
 
29109.46  46073.38 
  
 
(1.17)  (1.28) 
L.R 
 
2374.82*  1227.37 
  
 
(1.92)  (0.89) 
Lequity 
 
4332.73  5292.32* 
  
 
(1.39)  (1.68) 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.04  0.08  0.07 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 
Table 6.3 investigates the pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for size, 
industry and year effect. The number of observations is up to 521 in the case of 
contemporaneous performance and 396 in the case of lagged performance. 
Column 1 shows that firm performance is negative but highly significant 
correlated with the executive total compensation. Column 2 provides further 
evidence that R coefficient is still negative and statistically significant at 1% 
with executive total compensation. Column 3 of the table above confirms the 
early finding that R is negatively significant at 1% correlated with the 192  
 
executive total compensation. The correlation between the observations and 
their prediction value is low, at around 4%-8%.  
The result verifies the existing evidence such as Gregg et al (1993), Thakaew 
(2006) and Duffhues and Kabir (2008), which found that firm performance 
has a negative influence on executive compensation. However, the result 
goes against the basic idea that the remuneration committee set a reward 
system using firm performance as a simple target setting because every 
falling of stock return brings better executive compensation pay to executive 
managers. It also aligns with Kubo (2000) who found that Japanese director 
(total) pay has no relationship with shareholder’s return while British director 
compensation is positively correlated with firm performance. Also, the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (2007) uses two cross-sectional data sets between 
2005 and 2006 which provides that Thai listed companies do not pay 
compensation to their executives based on accrual accounting and stock 
performance. Wang and Stammerjohan (2004) also report that size and 
industry are the only factors that determine executive compensation pay in 
Chinese listed companies. It also supports Unite et al (2008), which reports 
that size is the key factor determining executive pay in the Philippines. 
Recently, Zhou et al (2011) provided evidence that firm size is the only factor 
determining the Chinese executive pay. Also, Indonesia evidence by 
Oviantari (2011) suggests that firm size is the only factor that plays a key role 
on director compensation pay. Therefore, Hypothesis 1.3, which predicts that 
firm performance has a positive relationship with executive total 
compensation, has been rejected. This result leads to further suspicion that 
the alignment between firm performance and executive compensation is 
influenced by the different structures of ownership. 
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6.2 The role of ownership structure on the pay-performance 
sensitivity 
Since the form of separation between ownership and control is different from 
the standard Agency model, this section provides empirical evidence for 
Hypothesis 2 that ownership structure moderates the pay-performance 
sensitivity. The three measures of executive compensation are salary, bonus 
and total compensation. The three performance measures are EPS, OCF and 
R. This chapter aims to find the pay-performance sensitivity, using the 
methodology stated in Chapter 4. This section is structured in three sections. 
The first section presents regression results of ownership structure as the 
moderator of salary pay-performance sensitivity. Section two provides 
regression results of ownership structure as the moderator of bonus pay-
performance sensitivity. The third section provides Regression results of 
ownership structure as moderator of total pay-performance sensitivity. 
Regarding ownership structure, the next stage is to obtain empirical evidence 
on the way in which ownership structure influences the pay-performance 
sensitivity. It shows the variables which are expected to be important in 
explaining the variation in executive compensation from firm to firm. The role 
of size and industry are controlled for. The empirical model is called model 2: 
∆(Executive compensation) it = β0 + β1(family ownership) it + β2 (corporate 
ownership)it + β3 (foreign ownership) it + β4 ∆ 
(FAMEPS)It  + β5 ∆(COREPS) It + β6 ∆(FOREPS) It + 
β7 ∆(DISEPS) It+ β8 ∆(FAMOCF) It + β9 ∆(COROCF) 
It + β10 ∆(FOROCF) It  + β11∆(DISOCF)It + β12 ∆ 
(FAMR) It + β13 ∆(CORR) It  + β14 ∆(FORR) It   + β15 
∆(DISR) it  + β16 (Lequity) it + β17 (dummy industrial) it 
+ β18 (dummy year) it + ε it 
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where: 
Executive compensation = executive salary, bonus, or total compensation  
EPS = Earnings per share 
OCF = Operation cash flow per share 
  R     = Stock returns 
  Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
  Family ownership = ownership structure where the first 20% of biggest 
shareholders are held by one family name 
  Corporate ownership = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as corporate shareholders 
  Foreign ownership = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as foreigner shareholders 
  FAMEPS = joint effect between earnings per share and family shareholder 
type of ownership structure 
  COREPS = joint effect between earnings per share and a corporate 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FOREPS = joint effect between earnings per share and a foreign 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  DISEPS = joint effect between earnings per share and no concentration in 
the shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FAMOCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a family 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  COROCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a 
corporate shareholder type of ownership structure 
  FOROCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and a foreign 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  DISOCF = joint effect between operation cash flow per share and no 
concentration in the type of ownership structure 
  FAMR = joint effect between stock returns and a family shareholder type of 
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  CORR = joint effect between stock returns and a corporate shareholder type 
of ownership structure 
  FORR = joint effect between stock returns and a foreign shareholder type of 
ownership structure 
  DISR = joint effect between stock returns and no concentration in the 
shareholder type of ownership structure 
  Dummy industrial = one of eight groups which a listed company may belong 
to: Industry, Mining and quarrying, Real estate, Financial 
institutions, Service, Technology, Construction, 
Agricultural products and the Market for Alternative 
Investment: shown as 1 if a specific industrial interest is 
required, zero otherwise. 
  Dummy year  = one of seven years for which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise 
β0 = intercept term 
β1 - β18 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
Tables 6.4 – and6.5 investigate the effects of ownership structure on the 
relationship between executive salary and firm performance. It is expected 
that this regression analysis on the link between executive salary and firm 
performance will be moderated by ownership structure. The next two tables 
examine the influence of ownership structure on the relationship between 
executive bonus and firm performance. Then, Tables 6.8 and 6.9 test the 
influence of ownership structure on the relationship between firm performance 
and executive total compensation. Thus, this section begins the investigation 
of the role of ownership structure with the executive salary, bonus, and then 
total pay-performance by controlling for size, industry and year effect.   196  
 
Table 6.4 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of 
executive salary pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive salary by using model 2. The first two columns 
deploy OLS estimation. The third column controls for firm effects. EPS represents earnings 
per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock returns. L. indicates the 
lagged value of these variables. FAM is family-owned firm, COR is corporate-owned firm, 
and FOR is foreign-owned firm. The coefficient is shown in the first line of each variable. 
Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
consistent covariance. The T-value is presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Salary 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -359158.72  -625990.56  3130431.24 
 
(-1.12)  (-1.52)  (1.35) 
FAM  13939.52  -1825.01  390449.29* 
 
(0.31)  (-0.04)  (1.72) 
COR  -31250.05  -15721.95  -115973.36 
 
(-0.58)  (-0.22)  (-0.33)    
FOR  -197154.85*  -151039.86  130629.8 
 
(-1.79)  (-1.55)  (0.59) 
FAMEPS  -21440.62  -12208.18  -12047.28 
 
(-0.64)  (-0.34)  (-0.31)    
COREPS  12486.01  11400.28  25812.33 
 
(1.01)  (1.04)  (1.39) 
FOREPS  -47604.54  69323.36  66427.96**   
 
(-1.37)  (1.56)  (2.18) 
DISEPS  -6438.09  -2929.02  -848.26 
 
(-0.55)  (-0.19)  (-0.04)    
FAMOCF  -1703.06**  -2334.75**  -2084.44 
 
(-2.44)  (-2.12)  (-1.27)    
COROCF  -1617.85  -1852.99  -4521.07 
 
(-1.07)  (-0.97)  (-1.30)    
FOROCF  -1040.96  -2803.53  -2111.94 
 
(-0.50)  (-1.05)  (-0.89)    
DISOCF  2169.49  543.49  1694.63 
 
(1.23)  (0.38)  (1.06) 
FAMR  -9945.42  -8202.34  -3372.72 
 
(-1.42)  (-0.99)  (-0.31)    
CORR  -4213.1  -6076.2  -6021.37 
 
(-0.87)  (-0.66)  (-0.65)    
FORR  -9516.08  -8276.33  -18474.87 
 
(-0.78)  (-0.88)  (-1.12)    
DISR  -3885.97***  -4358.58***  -5286.02*** 
 
(-4.53)  (-4.01)  (-12.61)    
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Independent variable  Dependent variable: Salary 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
L.FAMEPS 
 
62429.19*  74472.01**   
   
(1.68)  (2.01) 
L.COREPS 
 
12805.86  20962.5 
   
(0.64)  (0.70) 
L.FOREPS 
 
75262.55***  78395.40*** 
   
  (3.44)  (3.66) 
L.DISEPS 
 
  5708.29  8744.71 
   
  (0.45)  (0.67) 
L.FAMOCF      269.29  48.34 
   
  (0.19)  (0.04) 
L.COROCF 
 
  1300.61  -1179.81 
   
  (1.05)  (-0.56)    
L.FOROCF 
 
  -2608.99  -2649.45 
   
  (-0.88)  (-0.87) 
L.DISOCF 
 
3083.35  4030.09 
   
(1.19)  (1.35) 
L.FAMR 
 
2216.01  14192.16 
   
(0.16)  (0.71) 
L.CORR 
 
9726.99  11231.02 
   
(1.07)  (0.94) 
L.FORR 
 
-4168.96  -8131.54 
   
(-0.24)  (-0.42)    
L.DISR 
 
6877.39***  6676.26*** 
   
(5.82)  (4.82) 
Lequity  41865.36*  58676.95*  -206776.09 
 
(1.82)  (1.96)  (-1.29)    
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.08  0.15  0.17 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 
In Table 6.4 the moderating effects of ownership structure on the influence of 
firm performance on executive salary are analysed. The number of observations 
ranges from 396 to 521 data firms (depending on the amount of data which 
are required in each equation). Since the results of the regression analyses 
indicate that the OLS and FE regression are not represent the raw data very 
well, further investigation into the detail of estimations provides a better 
opportunity to understand the issue.  198  
 
Column 1 indicates that executive salary is influenced by a particular type of 
ownership structure on a specific type of firm performance, size, industry and 
year. The interaction effect indicates that the contemporary R coefficient is 
negatively and statistically significant at 5% on executive salary in the case of 
dispersed-owned firms. Also, the contemporary OCF coefficient is negatively 
and statistically significant at 5% on executive salary in the case of family-
owned firms. Further investigation using lagged firm performance in Column 
2 confirms early findings. It adds that lagged EPS coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant at 5% on executive salary in the case of foreign 
ownership; lagged R coefficient is positively and statistically significant at 5% 
on executive salary in the case of dispersed-owned firms. Column 3 deploys 
FE estimation, which confirms most of early findings in Column 2. This 
finding aligns with early Thai findings such as Sitthiharn (2006), for instance, 
who examined 292 Thai listed companies in 2004, indicate that EPS is a 
statistically significant link with compensation pay in both the financial and 
non-financial sectors. Puttaphiwat (2007) used 337 listed companies in SET 
in 2006, and also found that EPS has a positive relationship with executive 
compensation in the consuming, industrial and real estate sectors. 
Kaewkumson (2009) used 432 Thai listed companies and reported pay-
performance sensitivity in the capital market. 
The foreign ownership results align with early studies such as Firth et al 
(2006), who stated that foreign investors are likely to exert pressure on the 
firm to adopt a pay-performance sensitivity scheme. Using year 1998 to 2000 
data from the Taiwan Stock Market, the study found the positive role of 
foreign ownership in the relationship between executive compensation and 
firm performance. The authors state that foreign investors are in favoured 
because they have a wider choice of investment and it is more likely that it 
will be a firm with good corporate governance, one characteristic of which is 
the close link between compensation and firm performance. Thus, it logically 
follows that performance sensitivity in foreign investments is likely to be 
higher than in domestic investments. 199  
 
Table 6.5 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of 
executive salary pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive salary using model 2. Each column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in 2SLS estimation. EPS represents 
earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock returns. L. 
indicates the lagged value of these variables. FAM is family-owned firm, COR is corporate-
owned firm, and FOR is foreign-owned firm. The coefficient is shown in the first line of each 
variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and consistent covariance. The T-value is presented in brackets ( ). *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent Variable 
Dependent variable: Salary 
(1)  (2)    (3)    (4) 
Intercept  16667928.62  -548183.91*  -464198.35  66216949.34 
 
(0.08)  (-1.75)  (-1.35)  (0.07) 
EPS 
   
2025.26  -853938.43 
     
(0.23)  (-0.08) 
OCF 
 
-1685.57* 
 
-94912.84 
   
(-1.93) 
 
(-0.08) 
R 
 
-5489.65***  -5325.56*** 
 
   
(-3.79)  (-4.25) 
  FAM  1122062.56  11300.4  15306.28  -679216.12 
 
(0.27)  (0.19)  (0.30)  (-0.02) 
COR  3153907.18  -32973.09  -16582.27  26622961.63 
 
(0.05)  (-0.49)  (-0.25)  (0.08) 
FOR  18985261.96  -185560.01*  -219145.2*  13967252.15 
 
(0.10)  (-1.70)  (-1.84)  (0.07) 
FAMEPS  -5767743.23  -442775.38 
   
 
(-0.16)  (-1.07) 
    COREPS  -1093435.12  -28803.1 
   
 
(-0.04)  (-0.37) 
    FOREPS  1508177.88  -98469.32* 
   
 
(0.10)  (-1.93) 
    DISEPS  -752321.85  -46696.83 
   
 
(-0.34)  (-0.41) 
    FAMOCF  -9549.12 
 
-1831.23 
 
 
(-0.02) 
 
(-0.63) 
  COROCF  -71820.67 
 
-4649.20** 
 
 
(-0.05) 
 
(-2.04) 
  FOROCF  -485439.3 
 
-332.71 
 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-0.07) 
  DISOCF  84229.74 
 
-2998.26 
 
 
(0.10) 
 
(-0.57) 
  FAMR  1227760.44 
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Independent Variable 
Dependent variable: Salary 
(1)  (2)    (3)    (4) 
 
(0.18) 
   
(-0.07) 
CORR  1272242.62 
   
12511019.02 
 
(0.04) 
   
(0.07) 
FORR  5402556.31 
   
-782441.25 
 
(0.11) 
   
(-0.08) 
DISR  -128522.42 
   
-856015.66 
 
(-0.17) 
   
(-0.09) 
Lequity  -1153999.82  56802.74***  52255.72**  -6889228.64 
 
(-0.07)  (2.39)  (2.05)  (-0.07) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  .  .  0.08  . 
Observation  396  449  455  401 
Estimation  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
This table provides evidence that stock return has a negative impact on 
executive salary pay. This finding is confirmed through out the estimations. 
Furthermore, OCF has a negative impact on executive salary pay in 
corporate-owned firm at 5% statistically significant. However, this finding is not 
robust through out the estimation.  
The result supports Unite et al (2008); that size is the key determining factor 
of executive pay in the Philippines. Recently, Zhou et al (2011) provided 
evidence that firm size is the only factor that determines the Chinese 
executive pay. Also, Oviantari (2011) suggests that firm size is the only factor 
that played a key role in Indonesian director compensation during 2008-2009. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2.1 is rejected because that is no evidence on how 
ownership structure moderates the pay-performance sensitivity.  The next table 
(Table 6.6) provides empirical evidence on the way in which executive bonus 
relates to firm performance using ownership structure as the moderation 
variable.  
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Table 6.6 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of executive 
bonus pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive bonus using model 2. The first two columns 
deploy OLS estimation. The third column controls for firm effects. EPS represents earnings 
per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock returns. L. indicates the 
lagged value of these variables. FAM is family-owned firm, COR is corporate-owned firm, 
and FOR is foreign-owned firm.  The coefficient is shown in the first line of each variable. 
Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity and 
consistent covariance. The T-value is presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Bonus 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  90750.63  498841.16  3694331.61 
 
(0.43)  (1.06)  (0.85) 
FAM  36496.87  213627.53  200165.61 
 
(0.74)  (1.36)  (1.10) 
COR  -21027.03  195715.44  -16908.62 
 
(-0.31)  (0.89)  (-0.12)    
FOR  178882.91  486639.88  -618536.49** 
*  
 
(1.34)  (1.38)  (-2.04)    
FAMEPS  -27126.15  25737.51  31786.97 
 
(-0.71)  (0.67)  (0.98) 
COREPS  18092.58  19135.96  27604.67 
 
(1.40)  (1.13)  (1.08) 
FOREPS  -19261.72  15158.4  52045.69 
 
(-0.73)  (0.37)  (1.56) 
DISEPS  66143.81**  58080.09***  63247.11***   
 
(2.33)  (2.49)  (2.36) 
FAMOCF  -290.65  -706.19  -1315.16 
 
(-0.33)  (-0.80)  (-1.07)    
COROCF  -913.73  -638.67  -1655.58 
 
(-0.50)  (-0.32)  (-0.64)    
FOROCF  562.16  2626.41  771.7 
 
(0.25)  (1.00)  (0.30) 
DISOCF  7876.24  1018.81  1979.95 
 
(0.84)  (0.40)  (0.59) 
FAMR  -4093.76  -4909.58  -3504.82 
 
(-0.80)  (-0.66)  (-0.31)    
CORR  -2486.75  -2806.13  -4210.91 
 
(-0.95)  (-1.10)  (-1.59)    
FORR  -4997.09  7006.94  -66471.41**   
 
(-0.66)  (0.81)  (-2.32)    
DISR  -1135.67  -2870.51  -1315.25 
 
(-0.70)  (-0.96)  (-0.76)    
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Independent variable  Dependent variable: Bonus 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
L.FAMEPS 
 
48147.9  56795.85 
   
(1.31)  (1.35) 
L.COREPS 
 
12608.5  18873.01 
   
(0.62)  (0.68) 
L.FOREPS 
 
30129.65  48081.97***  
   
(1.21)  (3.09) 
L.DISEPS 
 
  1983.09  -7164.61 
   
  (0.13)  (-0.32)    
L.FAMOCF 
 
700.3  -77.86 
   
  (0.70)     (-0.09) 
L.COROCF 
 
  1451.37  -449.52 
   
  (0.80)  (-0.21)    
L.FOROCF 
 
5762.55  448.17 
   
(1.55)  (0.19) 
L.DISOCF 
 
-2365.54  -588.42 
   
(-0.81)  (-0.29)    
L.FAMR 
 
3915.37  7373.88 
   
(1.11)  (1.01) 
L.CORR 
 
2762.86  2507.05 
   
(0.57)  (0.41) 
L.FORR 
 
-43778.87  -94220.54***   
   
(-1.13)  (-2.50)    
L.DISR 
 
-3708.8  -2464.3 
   
(-0.95)  (-0.82)    
Lequity 
 
48147.9  56795.85 
   
(1.31)  (1.35) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.04  0.10  0.09 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 
Table 6.6 presents an analysis of the moderating role of ownership structure 
on the executive bonus pay-performance sensitivity. The number of 
observations range from 396 to 521 data firms (depending on the amount of 
data which are required in each equation). The results of the regression 
analyses indicate that the OLS and FE regression do not represent the raw 
data very well (with a range of R
2 from 0.04 – 0.10). However, the FE with 
instrumental variables show limitations over the estimation due to using 
lagged performance as the IV. Further investigation into the detail of 203  
 
estimations also provides an opportunity to better understand the issue. 
Column 1 indicates that only the EPS coefficient is positive and statistically 
significant at the level of 5% with executive bonus when the only ownership 
structure is dispersed. Further OLS estimation using both contemporaneous 
and lagged firm performance confirms the early findings. Column 3 confirms 
the early findings and adds that the EPS coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% with executive bonus in foreign ownership.  
This section provides supportive evidence that ownership structure moderates 
the pay-performance sensitivity. It indicates that dispersed and foreign 
ownership positively influences the relationship between firm performance (EPS) 
and executive bonus. The executive pay and EPS as firm performance 
sensitivity finding supports Leone et al (2006), who detect the sensitivity of 
cash compensation to EPS. Mengistae and Xu (2004) report pay-
performance sensitivity, particularly in Chinese state-owned enterprises. Buck 
et al (2008) reveal the pay- performance sensitivity in 601 Chinese listed 
companies from 2000 to 2003.  
It provides further empirical evidence that foreign ownership structure has a 
positive effect on executive compensation. These results align with early 
study such as Firth et al (2006) who has stated that in cross border investment, 
foreign investors are likely to exert pressure on the firm to adopt a pay-
performance within executive compensation system. The authors state that 
foreign investors are in favour of this because they have a wider choice of 
investments and it is more likely that it will be a firm with good corporate 
governance, one characteristic of which is the close link between 
compensation and firm performance. 
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Table 6.7 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of executive 
bonus pay-performance sensitivity 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive bonus using model 2. Each column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in 2SLS estimation. EPS represents 
earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock returns. L. 
indicates the lagged value of these variables. FAM is family-owned firm, COR is corporate-
owned firm, and FOR is foreign-owned firm. The coefficient is shown in the first line of each 
variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and consistent covariance. The T-value is presented in brackets ( ). *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Bonus 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -21900000  258692  393145  -10800000 
 
(-0.09)  (0.69)  (0.98)  (-0.06) 
EPS 
   
27405.51*  216762.68 
     
(1.78)  (0.10) 
OCF 
 
-112.22 
 
21690.87 
   
(-0.12) 
 
(0.09) 
R 
 
-2981.37  -2926.05 
 
   
(-1.56)  (-1.51) 
  FAM  -376703.75  168964.63  172543.62  -108145.2 
 
(-0.08)  (1.16)  (1.29)  (-0.02) 
COR  -1709595  139979.11  145532.31  -5055991.76 
 
(-0.02)  (0.68)  (0.74)  (-0.07) 
FOR  -26500000  432775.33  438934.85  -753551.25 
 
(-0.14)  (1.51)  (1.59)  (-0.02) 
FAMEPS  5547848.68  -531627.71 
   
 
(0.15)  (-1.14) 
    COREPS  379674.87  -30781.68 
   
 
(0.01)  (-0.45) 
    FOREPS  -2408251.46  -52910.03 
   
 
(-0.15)  (-1.34) 
    DISEPS  741871.5  41256.6 
   
 
(0.31)  (0.50) 
    FAMOCF  322.61 
 
(1.82) 
 
 
(0.00) 
 
(-0.00) 
  COROCF  13180.91 
 
-1694.98 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-0.52) 
  FOROCF  692651.68 
 
-6596.37 
 
 
(0.15) 
 
(-1.60) 
  DISOCF  -117480.24 
 
351.18 
 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(0.08) 
  FAMR  -881496.23 
   
2624325.65 
 
(-0.10) 
   
(0.07) 
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Independent variable  Dependent variable: Bonus 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
CORR  -636023.2 
   
-2197356.31 
 
(-0.02) 
   
(-0.06) 
FORR  -7676534.43 
   
776996.55 
 
(-0.15) 
   
(0.31) 
DISR  78945.19 
   
243805.21 
 
(0.08) 
   
(0.12) 
Lequity  1509190.4  -26834.76  -36690  1219123.6 
 
(0.09)  (-0.76)  (-1.00)  (0.06) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  .  .  0.05  . 
Observation  396  449  455  401 
Estimation  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
This table further investigates the effects of ownership structure on the pay-
performance sensitivity, using OLS with the instrumental variable of 2SLS in 
order to treat the endogeneity issue. No evidence has been found when this 
sophisticated estimation is deployed. Thus, Hypothesis 2.2 cannot be 
rejected because the higher EPS in dispersed ownership will higher bonuses 
to their executive managers.  The next table (Table 6.8) provides empirical 
evidence on the pay-performance sensitivity in the case of total 
compensation, using ownership structure as the moderating variable. 
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Table 6.8 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of the executive 
total pay-performance sensitivity  
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive total compensation using model 2. The first two 
columns deploy OLS estimation. The third column controls for firm effects. EPS 
represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock 
returns. L. indicates the lagged value of these variables. FAM is family-owned firm, COR  
is corporate-owned firm, and FOR is foreign-owned firm. The coefficient is shown in the 
first line of each variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of equity. The estimates are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and consistent covariance. The T-value is presented in 
brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Total compensation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept  -398342  -145237.11  7238515.57 
 
(-0.89)  (-0.20)  (1.28) 
FAM  38615.48  197897.26  467553.89* 
 
(0.62)  (1.34)  (1.74) 
COR  -46468.1  195197.9  -280687.22 
 
(-0.60)  (0.90)  (-0.76)    
FOR  -11466.83  114987.44  -300554.03 
 
(-0.08)  (0.39)  (-0.62)    
FAMEPS  -51046.93  17540.53  22270.04 
 
(-0.93)  (0.34)  (0.41) 
COREPS  29869.25  29312.98  55110.9 
 
(1.46)  (1.38)  (1.31) 
FOREPS  -75185.49  54630.85  94807.54 
 
(-1.37)  (0.64)  (1.43) 
DISEPS  56097.12  44322.62  50373.33 
 
(1.38)  (1.04)  (0.95) 
FAMOCF  -2109.19  -3028.13*  -3180.11 
 
(-1.63)  (-1.94)  (-1.37)    
COROCF  -2479.31  -2309.45  -6539.19**   
 
(-1.01)  (-0.95)  (-2.23)    
FOROCF  4506.71  -1420.76  -2505.65 
 
(1.04)  (-0.33)  (-0.67)    
DISOCF  9923.07  1420.18  3631.81 
 
(1.03)  (0.48)  (0.97) 
FAMR  -16451.62*  -17529.27  -12243.51 
 
(-1.75)  (-1.50)  (-0.84)    
CORR  -8063.56  -10431.48  -12142.23 
 
(-1.22)  (-0.92)  (-1.07)    
FORR  -13343.46  -8795.47  -114697.89***  
 
(-0.59)  (-0.43)  (-3.00)    
DISR  -5075.01***  -7372.47***  -6568.41*** 
 
(-2.52)  (-2.62)  (-3.91)    
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Independent variable  Dependent variable: Total compensation 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
L.FAMEPS 
 
109479.94*        126432.14**   
   
(1.95)  (2.10) 
  L.COREPS 
 
25951.57  40389.56 
 
   
(0.69)  (0.73) 
  L.FOREPS 
 
92582.38***  124219.46*** 
 
   
(3.04)  (4.12) 
  L.DISEPS 
 
7558.78  1315.99 
 
   
(0.27)  (0.05) 
  L.FAMOCF  1108.59  124.8 
   
(0.69)  (0.07) 
  L.COROCF 
 
2646.8  -2378.85 
 
   
(1.10)  (-0.94)    
  L.FOROCF 
 
4318.6  -428.76 
 
   
(0.84)  (-0.10)    
  L.DISOCF 
 
570.41  3276.76 
 
   
(0.23)  (0.96) 
  L.FAMR 
 
7926.23             22690.76 
   
(0.61)  (1.16) 
  L.CORR 
 
11875.66  12945.39 
 
   
(0.91)  (0.76) 
  L.FORR 
 
-137299.66  -192567.06**   
 
   
(-1.47)  (-2.18)    
  L.DISR 
 
3068.2                4088.33 
   
(0.74)  (1.07) 
  Lequity  45713.97  11059.17  -496903.18 
 
(1.49)  (0.20)  (-1.26)    
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.05  0.12  0.16 
Observation  521  396  396 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE 
Table 6.8 presents an analysis of the moderating role of ownership structure 
on the pay-performance sensitivity by controlling for size, industry and year 
effect. The number of observations ranges from 396 to 521 data firms. The 
results of the regression analyses indicate that the OLS and FE regression 
do not represent the raw data very well (with a range of R
2 from 0.05 – 0.16).  
Column 1 indicates that executive total compensation is a function of stock 
return by statistics significant at 5%. Further OLS estimation in Column 2 208  
 
confirms early finding and indicates that foreign ownership has a positive 
statistical influence at 5% on the rise in lagged EPS coefficient and the 
increase in the executive total compensation coefficient. Column 3 provides 
the FE estimation which confirms early findings, indicating that ownership 
structure plays a moderating role in the pay-performance sensitivity. This 
column also adds that family ownership has a positive statistical influence at 
5% on the rise in lagged EPS coefficient and the increase in the executive 
total compensation coefficient.  
These results align with early studies such as Firth et al (2006), who stated 
that foreign investors are likely to exert pressure on the firm to adopt a pay-
performance sensitivity scheme. Using year 1998 to 2000 data from the 
Taiwan Stock Market, the study found the positive role of foreign ownership 
in the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. 
The authors state that foreign investors are in favoured because they have a 
wider choice of investment and it is more likely that it will be a firm with good 
corporate governance, one characteristic of which is the close link between 
compensation and firm performance. Thus, it logically follows that 
performance sensitivity in foreign investments is likely to be higher than in 
domestic investments. 
In addition, table 6.8 also provides further empirical evidences that being a 
family owner does tighten the pay-performance relationship, because it 
explicitly and implicitly involves the heads of families in monitoring their firm’s 
wealth through the quasi-rents which relatives earn from employment in order 
to prevent poor management performance which might lead to a loss of the 
heads’ control and wealth (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). The evidence 
supports Gomez-Mejia et al (2003) who empirically reported that family 
ownership took a positive part on driving American listed companies to set 
the firm performance as a criteria of executive pay during 1995-1998. 
Besides, Cheung et al (2005) showed that Hong Kong pay-performance 
sensitivity varies across the industry where family ownership does affect the 209  
 
executive pay level. Sakawa and Watanabel (2009) also provided similar 
results by reporting that there is pay-performance sensitivity in Japanese 
listed companies where family ownership does affect the executive pay level. 
Kato et al (2007), using 246 Korean listed firms, revealed that the cash 
compensation of Korean executives correlates with stock returns in other 
ownership structures but not in family businesses. Connelly et al (2010) 
added that collective power of those holding ownership in family business 
allows them to monitor the manager directly; thus the pay-performance 
sensitivity for the executive managers should be stronger. 
Table 6.9 Regression results of ownership structure as moderating of the executive 
total pay-performance sensitivity  
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the effects of ownership structure on 
the influence of performance on executive total compensation using model 2. Each column 
deals with the endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in 2SLS estimation. EPS 
represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, where R is stock 
returns. FAM is family-owned firm, COR is corporate-owned firm, and FOR is foreign-owned 
firm. The coefficient is shown in the first line of each variable. Lequity is natural logarithm of 
equity. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity and consistent covariance. The T-
value is presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 
1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: Total compensation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  10949391.43  -308273.3  -69781.3  96829039.72 
 
(0.03)  (-0.61)  (-0.13)  (0.08) 
EPS 
   
25932.12  -1083338.08 
     
(1.34)  (-0.08) 
OCF 
 
-1838.22 
 
-121305.47 
   
(-1.22) 
 
(-0.07) 
R 
 
-9005.57***  -8676.84*** 
 
   
(-3.50)  (-3.40) 
  FAM  1028393.81  159598.09  172675.38  -1856607.23 
 
(0.17)  (1.02)  (1.35)  (-0.04) 
COR  8397611.43  125466.83  151418.27  36376839.19 
 
(0.10)  (0.61)  (0.79)  (0.08) 
FOR  163885.13  167472.13  155050.4  25260956.61 
 
(0.00)  (0.68)  (0.66)  (0.09) 
FAMEPS  -1062357.78  -991020.87 
   
 
(-0.02)  (-1.15) 
    COREPS  -3951751.27  -63353.14 
   
 
(-0.12)  (-0.45) 
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Independent variable  Dependent variable: Total compensation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
FOREPS  -472481.2     -140388.54** 
 
 
(-0.01)  (-2.11) 
    DISEPS  44573.65  -19115.02 
   
 
(0.01)  (-0.09) 
    FAMOCF  -56519.31 
 
-2111.93 
 
 
(-0.15) 
 
(-0.55) 
  COROCF  -242295 
 
-6438.51 
 
 
(-0.13) 
 
(-1.48) 
  FOROCF  58958.37 
 
-9662.97 
 
 
(0.01) 
 
(-1.65) 
  DISOCF  3298.83 
 
-1845.05 
 
 
(0.00) 
 
(-0.35) 
  FAMR  -49543.29 
   
-17600000 
 
(-0.01) 
   
(-0.07) 
CORR  3885328.37 
   
17385727.56 
 
(0.10) 
   
(0.08) 
FORR  -468393.52 
   
874195.79 
 
(-0.00) 
   
(0.06) 
DISR  -135770.51 
   
-1019706.92 
 
(-0.13) 
   
(-0.08) 
Lequity  -942377.72  31303.53  14746.39  -9813341.73 
 
(-0.03)  (0.73)  (0.33)  (-0.08) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  .  .  0.06  . 
Observation  396  449  455  401 
Estimation  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
This table further investigate the effects of ownership structure on the pay-
performance sensitivity using OLS with the instrumental variable of 2SLS in order 
to treat the endogeneity. It provides no positive evidence that either the 
contemporaneous or lagged firm performance is positive and statistically 
significant at 5% with executive total compensation in any ownership structure. 
Thus, Hypothesis 2.3 is not rejected because the higher EPS in firms with family 
ownership has award on total compensation to their executive managers. 
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6.3 Chapter summary  
This chapter provides empirical evidence which reveals that there is pay-performance 
sensitivity in Thai listed companies, which can be illustrated as follows:  
Table 6.10 Summary of pay-performance sensitivity results 
This table reports summary of the regression analysis of executive pay-performance 
sensitivity. EPS represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash flow, 
where R is stock returns.BON represents executive bonus, TOT shows executive total 
compensation. FAM stands family-owned firm, COR represents corporate-owned firm, 
FOR is foreign-owned firm, where DIS shows dispersed-owned firm. 
Hypothesis  Independent variable  Dependent 
variables 
Hypothesis 
testing 
H1  EPS, OCF, R  Executive salary,   Not rejected 
  EPS, OCF, R  Executive bonus   Rejected 
  EPS, OCF, R  Executive total 
compensation 
Rejected 
H2  BONFAM, BONCOR, 
BONFOR, BONDIS, 
TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
Executive salary,   Not rejected 
  BONFAM, BONCOR, 
BONFOR, BONDIS, 
TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
Executive bonus   Not rejected 
  BONFAM, BONCOR, 
BONFOR, BONDIS, 
TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
Executive total 
compensation 
Not rejected 
The first section reveals that there is executive pay-performance sensitivity in 
Thai listed companies. Section 2 provides evidence which aligns with that in the 
early part of this chapter which are that corporate ownership moderates OCF 
consequences of executive bonus, and the family-owned firm moderates the 
executive total pay-performance sensitivity.  212  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Research finding:  
Subsequent firm performance 
 
Early compensation studies were aware that it is important to understand 
whether or not executive compensation correlates with firm performance. The 
empirical examination of the pay-performance sensitivity began in the early 
1990s but not much work has been done on the evidence of performance 
consequences of executive compensation (Heugens et al, 2009). Kabo (2000) 
provides Asian evidence. The study provides positive result which indicates 
that executive compensation causes company performance.  The hypothesis 
development chapter indicates that executive compensation has a positive 
effect on firm performance where it also expects ownership structure to 
moderate the relationship. This study employs three performance measures 
which are EPS, OCF and stock returns. In additional, the earning 
management section will be supplementary to explore the unintended 214  
 
consequences of executive compensation. Thus, this chapter is structured in 
four sections. The first section presents various regression analyses of the 
performance consequences of executive bonus. Section 2 presents various 
regression analyses of the performance consequences of executive total 
compensation. Section 3 presents regression analyses of the moderating 
effect of ownership structure on the performance consequences of executive 
compensation. Section 4 provides unintended consequences of executive 
compensation. The last section provides a summary of this chapter. 
 
7.1 Performance consequences of executive bonus 
This section aims to verify Agency theory; it is hoped in this section to find a 
positive influencing power of executive compensation over firm performance. 
The empirical model is called model 3a: 
∆(Firm performance) it = β0 + β1 ∆(executive bonus) it + β2 (Lequity) it +          
β3 (dummy industrial) it + β4 (dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Firm performance = either EPS, OCF, or stock returns 
β0 = intercept term 
β1 – β4 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
Executive bonus = Average bonus pay per executive manager 
Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
Dummy industrial =  one of eight groups to which the listed company 
may belong: Manufacturing, Mining and quarrying, Real 215  
 
estate and construction, Finance and insurance, Services, 
Technology, Consumer product, Agricultural and food 
products and Medium-sized enterprises: shown as 1 if a 
specific industrial interest is required, zero otherwise. 
Dummy Year =  one of seven groups in which data have been 
observed; 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: 
shown as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise 
The hypotheses are tested using the OLS in the first two columns of each 
executive compensation element. Column 3 of each panel provides the FE to 
treat the structure of the panel data. All the other variables are the same as in 
the OLS estimation but include ε i which is the unobserved individual (firm) 
effect. This study introduces the IV variable in 2SLS estimation in order to 
treat the endogeneity issue, shown in Column 4. In order to better understand 
how executive compensation influences the performance, this study 
approaches the three performance matrices – EPS, OCF and R. Thus, this 
section begins the investigation with the effects of the executive compensation 
on the determinants of EPS by controlling for size, industry and year effect. 
Next, the OCF consequences of executive compensation are investigated. 
The last panel investigates the R consequences of executive compensation. 
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Table 7.1 Regression results of EPS consequences of executive bonus 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive bonus using model 3a. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS estimation. 
Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The coefficient 
is reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: EPS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -1.2700  -0.4360  -1.9210  0.0000 
 
(-1.14)  (-0.37)  (-0.28)  (0.00) 
Bonus  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.10)  (-1.39)  (-1.51)  (-0.19) 
L.bonus 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
   
(-0.12)  (-0.86) 
 
Lequity  0.0820  0.0300  0.1490  0.0100 
 
(1.09)  (0.37)  (0.30)  (0.40) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0520  0.0500  0.0250  0.0490 
Observation  602  484  484  484 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
 
Table 7.1 begins the investigation with the affects of the executive bonus on the 
determinants of EPS by controlling for size, industry and year effect. The 
number of observations ranges from 484 in the FE estimation to 602 in the 
Poole-OLS estimation. This indicates that most of the regressions moderately 
represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.0250 – 0.0520). Column 1 
shows the estimation of contemporaneous compensation with EPS using OLS 
estimation. It indicates that there is no evidence supporting the assumption 
which believes that there are performance consequences of executive 
compensation. Column 2 puts in the lagged executive bonus but, there too, no 
evidence supports the claim. Column 3 deploys an FE estimation whereas 
Column 4 deploys 2SLS-IV. The findings support all the earlier results in showing 217  
 
that no evidence supports the performance (EPS) consequences of the 
executive bonus.  
The table above provides no further evidence of EPS consequences of 
executive compensation. Ittner et al (1997) state that the performance 
consequences of compensation may not exist because of a large number of 
factors which all influence executive compensation practice and this makes it 
even more difficult to compare the role of compensation across firms. This 
trialling shows that neither the executive bonus nor executive total 
compensation coefficient is statistically significant with EPS. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3.1 has been rejected, because no evidence suggests that 
executive compensation has any performance consequences.  
Table 7.2 Regression results of OCF consequences of executive bonus 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive total compensation using model 3a. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS 
estimation. Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with 
the endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The 
coefficient is reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Independent variable 
   Dependent variable: OCF 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  2.5790  11.2323  -111.818  0.0000 
 
(0.23)  (0.99)  (-0.76)  (0.00) 
Bonus  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.09)  (-0.04)  (0.25)  (0.02) 
L.bonus 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
   
(-0.07)  (-0.11) 
 
Lequity  -0.2354  -0.1684  7.9358  0.5664** 
 
(-0.36)  (-0.22)  (0.76)  (2.19) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0167  0.0208  0.0125  0.0199 
Observation  615  497  497  497 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 218  
 
Table 7.2 begins the investigation with the effects of the executive bonus on 
OCF consequences by controlling for size, industry and year effect. The 
number of observations ranges from 497 in the FE estimation to 615 in the 
Poole-OLS estimation. The table indicates that most of the regressions 
moderately represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 only from 0.0167 – 
0.0208). Column 1 indicates the finding that bonus has no influence on the 
level of the current operation cash flow. Column 2 confirms that neither the 
contemporaneous nor the lagged bonus has an influence on net operation 
cash flow. The FE and 2SLS estimations provide no evidence that the bonus 
influences earnings per share. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.2, experimentation 
showed that executive bonus has no influence on operation cash flow.  
Table 7.3 Regression results of stock returns consequences of executive bonus 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive bonus using model 3a. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS estimation. 
Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The coefficient is 
reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: stock returns 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  0.3002  -3.7386  47.9016  0.0000 
 
(0.05)  (-0.62)  (1.15)  (0.00)    
Bonus  -0.0000***  -0.0000***  -0.0000*  -0.0000*** 
 
(-2.99)  (-2.62)  (-1.73)  (-2.69)    
L.bonus 
 
0.0000***  0.0000***                  
   
(6.92)  (7.56)                  
Lequity  0.2804  0.0159  -3.5802  -0.2061 
 
(0.74)  (0.04)  (-1.23)  (-0.97)    
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0233  0.0209  0.0162  .    
Observation  543  475  475  475 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 219  
 
Table 7.3 begins the investigation with the effects of the executive bonus on the 
determinants of R by controlling for size, industry and year effect. The 
number of observations ranges from 475 in the FE estimation to 543 in the 
Poole-OLS estimation. The table shows the results of the stock returns 
regression analyses which indicate that most of the regressions moderately 
represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.0162 – 0.0233. Column 1 is 
the estimation of contemporaneous compensation with stock returns, using 
OLS estimation. It indicates that bonus has a negative effect on the 
presenting of stock returns at 1%. Column 2 adds lagged compensation 
using the same estimation. The early evidence has been confirmed but 
added that lagged bonus having a positive effect on stock returns. The FE 
estimations support the earlier result that there is evidence to support the 
stock returns consequences of an executive bonus. Column 4 confirms the 
early findings that lagged bonus has a positive while contemporaneous 
bonus has a negative effect on the presenting of stock returns at 5%.  
this finding aligns with Anderson et al (2000) who investigated the 
relationship between executive compensation and contemporaneous stock 
returns which leads to their conclusion that incentive pay leads to a positive 
effect on firm performance. Along with Conyon et al (2000) who indicate that 
stock returns is preferred since at least two supplementary reasons are 
given; it reflects the expectation of shareholders and the efficient market 
hypothesis that share prices can intermediately reflect executive actions.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 3.3, experimentation showed that executive 
bonus and total compensation have power over firm performance. 
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7.2 Performance consequences of executive total compensation 
This section aims to trace the performance consequences of executive pay. 
In order to verify Agency theory, it is hoped in this section to find a positive 
influencing power of executive total compensation over firm performance. 
The empirical model is called model 3b: 
∆(Firm performance) it = β0 + β1 ∆(executive total compensation) it + β2 (Lequity) it 
+ β3 (dummy industrial) it + β4 (dummy year) it + ε it 
where: 
Firm performance = either EPS, OCF, or R 
β0 = intercept term 
β1 – β4 = Slope coefficients 
ε  = random error term 
  i = the i
th firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 and 
  t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008. 
Executive total compensation = average total compensation per manager 
Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
Dummy industrial = one of eight groups to which the listed company may  
belong: Manufacturing, Mining and quarrying, Real estate 
and construction, Finance and insurance, Services, 
Technology, Consumer product, Agricultural and food 
products and Medium-sized enterprises: shown as 1 if a 
specific industrial interest is required, zero otherwise. 
Dummy Year = one of seven groups in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown as 
1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
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In order to better understand how executive compensation has an impact on 
performance consequences, this study approaches the three main 
performance matrices - earning per share, net operation cash flow and stock 
returns - by providing the following three tables. The first table represents the 
role of executive pay on the earning per share consequences. The next table 
provides the role of executive pay on operation cash flow consequences. The 
last table provides the role of executive pay on stock returns consequences. 
The hypotheses are tested using the OLS in the first two columns of each 
executive compensation element. Column 3 of each panel provides the FE to 
treat the structure of the panel data. All the other variables are the same as in 
the OLS estimation but include ε i which is the unobserved individual (firm) 
effect. This study introduces the IV variable in 2SLS estimation in order to 
treat the endogeneity issue, shown in Column 4.  In order to better 
understand how executive compensation influences the performance, this 
study considers the three performance matrices – EPS, OCF and stock 
returns. Thus, this section begins the investigation with the effects of the 
executive compensation on the determinants of EPS by controlling for size, 
industry and year effect. Next, the OCF consequences of executive 
compensation are investigated. The last panel investigates the stock returns 
consequences of executive pay. 
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Table 7.4 Regression results of EPS consequences of executive compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 3b. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS 
estimation. Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The coefficient is 
reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: EPS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -1.7150  -0.3800  -1.5200  -0.2030 
 
(-1.61)  (-0.31)  (-0.22)  (-0.18) 
Total  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000*  0.0000 
 
(-0.93)  (-1.46)  (-1.84)  (-0.51) 
L.total 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
   
(0.21)  (-0.03) 
 
Lequity  0.0770  0.0220  0.1280  0.0160 
 
(1.01)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.20) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0520  0.0480  0.0220  0.0460 
Observation  600  481  481  481 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
Table 7.4 begins the investigation with the effects of the executive total 
compensation on the determinants of EPS by controlling for size, industry and 
year effect. The number of observations ranges from 481 in the FE estimation 
to 600 in the Poole-OLS estimation. It indicates that most of the regressions 
moderately represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.022 – 0.052). It 
provides empirical evidence on how executive total compensation affects EPS. 
The first two columns provide the OLS estimations. No evidence has been 
found. However, when the FE estimation is deployed, the table indicates that 
the total compensation coefficient is positive and statistically significant but at 
10% with EPS. However, the last column confirms the earlier evidence that 
there is no EPS consequence of executive bonus. Thus, there is insufficient 
evidence to claim that is EPS consequences of executive compensation. This 
finding aligns with Leonard (1990) and Hogan and Lewis (2001) who also 223  
 
found no EPS consequences of executive compensation.  Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3.1 has been rejected, because no evidence suggests that 
executive compensation has any performance consequences.  
Table 7.5 Regression results of OCF consequences of executive compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 3b. Column 1-2 are dedicated to OLS estimation. 
Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with the 
endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The coefficient is 
reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-
consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: OCF 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  2.3745  3.6466  -118.813  11.6517 
 
(0.21)  (0.31)  (-0.80)  (0.99) 
Total  0.0000  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000 
 
(0.23)  (2.08)  (2.13)  (-0.51) 
L.total 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
   
(0.91)  (0.93) 
 
Lequity  -0.2172  0.1538  8.5333  -0.3113 
 
(-0.34)  (0.20)  (0.82)  (-0.36) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.016  0.0294  0.0237  . 
Observation  613  494  494  494 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
Table 7.5 begins the investigation with the effects of the executive total 
compensation on OCF consequences by controlling for size, industry and 
year effect. The number of observations ranges from 494 in the FE 
estimation to 613 in the Poole-OLS estimation. It indicates that most of the 
regressions moderately represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 only from 
0.016 – 0.0294). Column one and two provide the OLS estimations. When 
the bonus is replaced by executive total compensation, it indicates that 
executive total compensation has a positive influence on the OCF, 224  
 
conditional on the presenting of lag total compensation. When the FE 
estimation is deployed, the table indicates that the total compensation 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 5% with OCF. However, 
the last column confirms the earlier evidence that there is no EPS 
consequence of executive compensation. This surprise evidence proved that 
sufficient total compensation improves firm cash performance as a 
consequence. Consistent with Hypothesis 3.2, experimentation showed that 
total compensation as the proxy of executive compensation has an influence 
on operation cash flow.  
Table 7.6 Regression results of stock return consequences of executive compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 3b. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS 
estimation. Column 3 controls for the firm effects whereas the fourth column deals with 
the endogeneity issue using the instrumental variable in the 2SLS estimation. The 
coefficient is reported in the first line of each variable. The estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: stock returns 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -1.8927  -3.3919  53.921  0.0000 
 
(-0.32)  (-0.63)  (1.27)  (0.00) 
Total  -0.0000*  -0.0000*  -0.0000*  -0.0000** 
 
(-1.87)  (-1.81)  (-1.69)  (-2.21) 
L.total 
 
0.0000  0.0000*** 
 
   
(1.30)  (2.65) 
  Lequity  0.5135  0.0207  -3.9826  -0.0994 
 
(1.15)  (0.06)  (-1.34)  (-0.46) 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0311  0.0356  0.035  . 
Observation  543  475  475  475 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
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Table 7.3 begins the investigation with the effects of the executive total 
compensation on the determinants of R by controlling for size, industry and 
year effect. The number of observations ranges from 475 in the FE estimation 
to 543 in the Poole-OLS estimation. It shows the results of the stock returns 
regression analyses which indicate that most of the regressions moderately 
represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.0311– 0.0356). The first 
two columns deploy OLS estimation to investigate the performance 
consequences of executive total compensation. In these cases, no evidence 
is found. The FE estimation provides no evidence that the executive total 
compensation coefficient is positive with R. 2SLS estimation confirms that 
there are no performance consequences of executive compensation. Thus, 
inconsistent with Hypothesis 3.3, experimentation showed that executive total 
compensation has no power over firm performance. 
 
7.3 The moderating effects of ownership structure on the 
performance consequences of executive compensation 
This section tests whether ownership structure moderates the effect of 
executive compensation on firm performance. It begins with the standard 
model of the performance consequences of executive compensation which 
are moderated by the ownership structure. The research model of the role of 
ownership structure on the determinants of firm performance is shown as 
model 4: 
∆(Firm performance) it = β0 + β1 (FAM)it + β2 (COR)it + β3 (FOR)it + β4 
∆(executive compensation*FAM)it + β5 ∆(executive 
compensation*COR)it + β6 ∆(executive compensation* 
FOR)it + β7 ∆(executive compensation*DIS)it + β8 
(Lequity)it + β9 (dummy industrial)it + β10 (dummy year)it + εit 226  
 
where: 
 Firm performance = either EPS, OCF, or R 
FAM = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as family shareholders 
COR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest shareholders 
are classified as corporate shareholders 
FOR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest shareholders 
are classified as foreign shareholders 
Executive compensation*FOR = joint effect between executive compensation 
and the family shareholder type of ownership  
Executive compensation*COR = joint effect between executive compensation 
and the corporate shareholder type of ownership  
Executive compensation*FOR = joint effect between executive compensation 
and the foreign shareholder type of ownership  
Executive compensation*DIS = joint effect between executive compensation and 
no concentrated shareholder type of ownership structure 
 Lequity = natural logarithm of equity 
Dummy industrial = one of eight groups which list which sector the 
company belongs to: Manufacturing, Mining and 
quarrying, Real estate and construction, Finance and 
insurance, Services, Technology, Consumer product, 
Agricultural and food products and Medium-sized 
enterprises: shown as 1 if a specific industrial interest is 
required, zero otherwise. 
Dummy year = one of seven groups in which data have been observed; 
2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008: shown 
as 1 if a specific year is required, zero otherwise. 
i = the ith firm, i = 1,2,3 … 124 
t = 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 or 2008 
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In order to better understand how executive compensation influences the 
performance consequences of executive compensation, this study 
approaches the three main performance matrices; earning per share, net 
operation cash flow and stock returns. The first table represents the role of 
executive compensation on the determinants of earning per share. The next 
table provides the role of executive compensation on the determinants of 
operation cash flow. The last table provides the role of executive 
compensation on the determinants of stock returns. 
The hypotheses are tested using the OLS in the first two columns of each 
compensation element. Column 3 provides the FE to treat the structure of the 
panel data. All the other variables are the same as in the OLS estimation but 
include ε i which is the unobserved individual (firm) effect. The treatment of 
endogeneity using an instrumental variable in 2SLS is used in Column 4.  In 
order to better understand how executive compensation influences 
performance, this study approaches the three main performance matrices – 
earnings per share, net operation cash flow and stock returns. Thus, this 
section begins the investigation with the effects of the executive compensation 
on the determinants of EPS by controlling for size, industry and year effect. 
Next, the OCF consequences of executive compensation are investigated. 
The last panel investigates the stock returns consequences of executive 
compensation. 
 228  
 
Table 7.7 Regression results of EPS consequences of executive compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 4. Executive compensation proxies are bonus and total 
compensation, which are presented in the first four columns and last four columns in this table. 
The first two columns are dedicated to OLS estimation. Column 3 controls for the firm effects. 
The coefficient is reported in the first line of each variable. FAM means family-owned firm. 
COR means corporate-owned firm. DIS is dispersed-owned firm. BON represents executive 
bonus. TOT is executive total compensation. L is lagged value. The estimates are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: EPS 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -3.1829**  -1.9591  -2.4977  -2.0468 
 
(-2.17)  (-1.21)  (-0.35)  (-1.41) 
FAM  -0.2817  -0.2841  -0.3464  -0.2708 
 
(-1.20)  (-1.40)  (-0.64)  (-1.35) 
COR  -0.235  0.0083  0.2684  -0.0018 
 
(-0.84)  (0.03)  (0.41)  (-0.01) 
FOR  -0.2997  -0.4404  2.3250**  -0.3939 
 
(-0.97)  (-1.37)  (3.03)  (-1.28) 
BONFAM  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(1.21)  (-0.07)  (-0.37)  (-0.16) 
BONCOR  0.0000  -0.0000**  -0.0000**  0.0000 
 
(-1.40)  (-2.05)  (-2.29)  (-0.28) 
BONFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(0.32)  (-0.63)  (-0.49)  (0.79) 
BONDIS  0.0874  0.0129  -0.663  0.3846 
 
(0.39)  (0.04)  (-1.06)  (0.94) 
L.BONFAM 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(0.08)  (-0.32) 
 
L.BONCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(-0.22)  (-0.35) 
 
L.BONFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(1.46)  (0.73) 
 
L.BONDIS 
 
0.1073  0.5092 
 
 
 
(0.28)  (1.14) 
 
Lequity  0.2508**  0.1614  0.1716  0.1729 
 
(2.27)  (1.35)  (0.35)  (1.56) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0392  0.0388  0.0292  0.0289 
Observation  602  484  484  484 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
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Table 7.7 (cont) 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: EPS 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept  -3.6008***  -2.0949  -2.1501  -1.8872 
 
(-2.45)  (-1.25)  (-0.32)  (-1.10) 
FAM  -0.1852  -0.0137  -0.1221  -0.4364* 
 
(-0.94)  (-0.07)  (-0.21)  (-1.71) 
COR  -0.2286  0.2073  0.3487  -0.2359 
 
(-0.96)  (0.90)  (0.49)  (-0.73) 
FOR  -0.2122  -0.1792  2.4568*  -0.5232 
 
(-0.82)  (-0.64)  (1.84)  (-1.33) 
TOTFAM  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(1.52)  (0.95)  (0.07)  (-0.49) 
TOTCOR  -0.0000**  -0.0000**  -0.0000***  0.0000 
 
(-2.19)  (-2.29)  (-3.81)  (-0.99) 
TOTFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(0.68)  (0.67)  (1.01)  (0.03) 
TOTDIS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-0.70)  (-1.04)  (-1.12)  -0.61 
L.TOTFAM 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(1.06)  (0.01) 
 
L.TOTCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(0.71)  (0.59) 
 
L.TOTFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(0.10)  (-0.20) 
 
L.TOTDIS 
 
-0.0000**  -0.0000*** 
 
 
 
(-2.46)  (-3.34) 
 
Lequity  0.2472**  0.159  0.1497  0.1505 
 
(2.27)  (1.29)  (0.33)  (1.27) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0429  0.05  0.0436  . 
Observation  600  481  481  481 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
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Table 7.7 investigates the role of executive compensation in firm performance by 
controlling for size, industry and year effect. The number of observations ranges 
from 481 in FE estimation to 600 in OLS estimation. The results of the regression 
analyses indicate that most of the regressions moderately represent the raw data 
(with a range of R
2 from 0.0429 – 0.05). Column 1 is the estimation of 
contemporaneous compensation with EPS using FE estimation. Here also there 
is no evidence to support the claim. Column 2 inserts lagged firm performance. It 
provides evidence to claim that there is EPS consequence of executive bonus in 
corporate-owned firm. Column 3 is controlled for the effect of firms; it indicates 
that foreign ownership has a direct impact on firm performance (EPS). However, 
the result shows an interaction effect, which indicates that there is a moderating 
effect of corporate ownership on the performance consequences of executive 
bonus. The fourth column controls for the endogeneity issue by adopting 2SLS. 
The finding is not support by FE estimation but confirms that there is no evidence 
to support the EPS consequences of an executive bonus. However, when the 
bonus is replaced by executive total compensation, the OLS estimation indicates 
that corporate ownership moderates the EPS consequences of executive total 
compensation. This finding is confirmed in the later FE estimation. However, 
2SLS provides no evidence that ownership structure moderates the performance 
consequences of executive total compensation.  
The result confirms contradicts early findings such as those of Hartzell and 
Starks (2003) who reveal that the percentage of corporate holdings positively 
affects the sensitivity of performance-related pay. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 
4.1, experimentation shows that executive bonus and total compensation have 
no positive power over EPS. The next table provides empirical evidence on the 
OCF consequences of executive compensation using ownership structure as 
the moderating variable.  
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Table 7.8 Regression results of OCF consequences of executive compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 4. Executive compensation proxies are bonus and total 
compensation, which are presented in the first four columns and last four columns in this 
table. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS estimation. Column 3 controls for the firm 
effects. FAM means family-owned firm. COR means corporate-owned firm. DIS is 
dispersed-owned firm. BON represents executive bonus. TOT is executive total 
compensation. L is lagged value. The coefficient is reported in the first line of each variable. 
The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in 
brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
Independent variable  Dependent variable: OCF 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  5.5474  26.2952**  -113.384  11.6974 
 
(0.56)  (2.54)  (-0.80)  (0.96) 
FAM  1.6077  -0.4527  4.4959  -0.8774 
 
(0.63)  (-0.17)  (0.13)  (-0.33) 
COR  -0.6709  0.3021  8.8094  -0.0251 
 
(-0.39)  (0.13)  (0.59)  (-0.01) 
FOR  7.6679  6.7111  4.3426  2.7792 
 
(1.54)  (1.13)  (0.30)  (0.38) 
BONFAM  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(0.18)  (1.02)  (1.72)  (-0.77) 
BONCOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(0.35)  (1.05)  (1.14)  (0.16) 
BONFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-0.23)  (0.67)  (-0.66)  (1.00) 
BONDIS  -17.2527**  -68.5295***  -57.1917***  2.7029 
 
(-2.62)  (-5.71)  (-5.61)  (0.22) 
L.BONFAM 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(1.35)  (1.26) 
 
L.BONCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(0.02)  (0.12) 
 
L.BONFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(0.66)  (0.07) 
 
L.BONDIS 
 
51.4402***  64.4881*** 
   
(4.00)        (4.17) 
Lequity  -0.4291  -1.1652*  7.715  -0.703 
 
(-0.75)  (-1.75)  (0.74)  (-0.94) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0242  0.0685  0.0714  . 
Observation  615  497  497  497 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 232  
 
Table 7.8 (cont) 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: OCF 
  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept  2.0213  11.5767  -139.509  22.6675 
 
(0.20)  (0.98)  (-0.99)  (0.92) 
FAM  2.2162  1.0683  8.5345  -3.4626 
 
(0.78)  (0.33)  (0.25)  (-0.61) 
COR  -0.3645  -0.1435  8.021  -0.0627 
 
(-0.21)  (-0.06)  (0.55)  (-0.02) 
FOR  2.5707  2.5003  -0.616  -9.0577 
 
(0.62)  (0.46)  (-0.02)  (-0.35) 
TOTFAM  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000*  0.0000 
 
(0.62)  (1.59)  (1.74)  (-0.30) 
TOTCOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(0.57)  (1.33)  (1.36)  (0.18) 
TOTFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001 
 
(-0.63)  (0.59)  (-0.44)  (-0.48) 
TOTDIS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.00)  (-0.20)  (-0.36)  (0.46) 
L.TOTFAM 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
-0.69  (0.76) 
 
L.TOTCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
-0.3  (0.32) 
 
L.TOTFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
-0.73  (0.84) 
 
L.TOTDIS 
 
0.0000  0.0000 
 
 
 
(-0.48)  (-0.96) 
 
Lequity  -0.2714  -0.4484  9.7212  -1.1637 
 
(-0.48)  (-0.64)  (0.94)  (-0.96) 
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0200  0.0359  0.0389  . 
Observation  613  494  494  494 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
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Table 7.8 investigates the role of executive compensation on OCF by 
controlling for size, industry and year effect. The number of observations 
ranges from 494 in FE estimation to 615 in OLS estimation. The results of the 
regression analyses indicate that most of the regressions moderately 
represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.0200 – 0.0714). Column 1 
shows the estimation of contemporaneous compensation with OCF using 
OLS estimation. It indicates that, in dispersed ownership, the bonus has a 
negative influence on OCF. Column 2 also uses OLS but includes a lagged 
year bonus in the equation. The finding confirms that, in dispersed 
ownership, a bonus has a negative influence on OCF. Column 3 confirms the 
two findings about lagged bonus. Column 4 is controlled for the effects of 
endogeneity, thus adopting 2SLS. The regression does not support the 
earlier result because there is no evidence that a bonus has a positive effect 
on OCF. When the bonus is replaced by total compensation, there is no 
evidence of any OCF consequences of executive total compensation. As a 
result, Hypothesis 4.2 cannot be rejected, because executive bonus plays 
role in the movement of operation cash flow when the ownership structure is 
dispersed. The next table (Table 7.9) provides empirical evidence on the 
stock returns as the firm performance consequences of executive 
compensation using ownership structure as the moderating variable.  234  
 
Table 7.9 Regression results of stock returns consequences of executive 
compensation 
This table reports the regression analysis to evaluate the performance consequences of 
executive compensation using model 4. Executive compensation proxies are bonus and 
total compensation, which are presented in the first four columns and last four columns in 
this table. The first two columns are dedicated to OLS estimation. Column 3 controls for 
the firm effects. FAM means family-owned firm. COR means corporate-owned firm. DIS 
is dispersed-owned firm. BON represents executive bonus. TOT is executive total 
compensation. L is lagged value. The coefficient is reported in the first line of each 
variable. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as 
presented in brackets ( ). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively.   
Independent variable  Dependent variable: stock returns 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  0.3868  -2.5464  6.5005  3.8075 
 
(0.05)  (-0.37)  (0.29)  (0.46) 
FAM  4.1500*  5.2473*  47.0449  6.9789**   
 
(1.70)  (1.72)  (1.55)  (2.11) 
COR  3.1639  4.3453  13.7012  7.389* 
 
(1.32)  (1.26)  (0.93)  (1.83) 
FOR  2.7012  4.5131  8.6637  7.3168 
 
(0.86)  (1.05)  (0.69)  (1.47) 
BONFAM  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.26)  (-1.08)  (-0.50)  (-0.04)    
BONCOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-0.39)  (-0.90)  (-0.99)  (-1.44)    
BONFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-0.61)  (-0.39)  (-1.55)  (0.98) 
BONDIS  -0.0000***  0.0000*  0.0000  -0.0000*** 
 
(-3.66)  (-1.92)  (-0.98)  (-9.34)    
L.BONFAM 
 
0.0000  0.0000                  
   
(-0.62)  (0.47)                  
L.BONCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000                  
   
(1.29)  (-0.01)                  
L.BONFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000                  
   
(0.57)  (0.42)                  
L.BONDIS 
 
0.0000***  0.0000***                  
   
(4.53)  (5.38)                  
Lequity  0.0987  -0.3039  -2.1023  -0.9569 
 
(0.20)  (-0.47)  (-1.31)  (-1.23)    
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.031  0.0334  0.0771  .    
Observation  543  475  475  475 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
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Table 7.9 (cont) 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: stock returns 
(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Intercept  0.2822  -2.1040  13.3734  0.0000 
 
(0.04)  (-0.29)  (0.55)  (0.00)    
FAM  4.1521*  5.0558*  45.937  5.2392* 
 
(1.73)  (1.75)  (1.50)  (1.66) 
COR  3.0197  4.3548  11.5438  4.3907 
 
(1.36)  (1.35)  (0.80)  (1.30) 
FOR  2.3534  4.4032  7.5373  3.8434 
 
(0.77)  (1.04)  (0.56)  (1.02) 
TOTFAM  0.0000*  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.86)  (-1.23)  (-0.90)  (-0.88)    
TOTCOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-0.91)  (-1.21)  (-1.26)  (-0.54)    
TOTFOR  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
 
(-1.34)  (-1.40)  (-0.65)  (0.27) 
TOTDIS  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000***  
 
(-1.26)  (-1.22)  (-1.02)  (-2.81)    
L.TOTFAM    0.0000  0.0000                     
   
(0.35)  (0.20)                     
L.TOTCOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000                     
   
(0.19)  (-0.41)                     
L.TOTFOR 
 
0.0000  0.0000                     
   
(-0.47)  (0.06)                     
L.TOTDIS 
 
0.0000  0.0000                     
   
(0.90)  (1.02)                     
Lequity  0.1590  -0.3141  -2.4962  -0.4268 
 
(0.33)  (-0.45)  (-1.50)  (-1.37)    
Industrial  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R
2  0.0394  0.0562  0.1029  0.0175 
Observation  543  475  475  475 
Estimation  OLS  OLS  FE  2SLS 
 
   236  
 
Table 7.9 investigates the role of executive compensation in firm performance 
by controlling for size, industry and year effect. The number of observations 
ranges from 475 in FE estimation to 543 in OLS estimation. The results of the 
regression analyses indicate that most of the regressions moderately 
represent the raw data (with a range of R
2 from 0.031 – 0.0771). Column 1 
estimates the contemporaneous compensation with stock returns, using OLS 
estimation; it indicates that dispersed ownership moderate the associated 
between contemporaneous bonus and stock returns. Column 2 includes the 
lagged year bonus in the equation. This column reveals that dispersed 
ownership has influenced power over a positive relation between lagged 
bonuses on stock returns. Controlling for the effect of the firm, Column 3 
investigates the role of bonus (and lagged bonus) on stock returns, using FE 
estimation. It confirms that dispersed ownership influences the association 
between lagged bonus and stock returns. Column 4 confirms the finding in the 
first column. When the bonus is replaced by executive total pay, FE and FE 
with IV using 2SLS, the bonus finding is confirmed that there is no influence 
from executive total compensation on stock returns. At the same time, there is 
no association between particular forms of ownership structure and the 
executive total compensation effect on the movement of stock returns.  
Conyon et al (2000) believe that stock returns reflects the expectation of 
shareholders and the efficient market hypothesis is that share prices can 
intermediately reflect executive actions.  However, the result contradicts 
Cooper et al (2009) who found that CEO pay is negatively related with 
shareholder return. Consistent with Hypothesis 4.3, experimentation shows 
that dispersed ownership moderates the executive bonus coefficient to 
associate with stock returns. Thus, Hypothesis 4.3 is not rejected.  
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7.4 Unintended consequences
5 
Incentives are introduced to align the interests of the Principal and the Agent. 
However, without careful design, this mechanism can cause side effects in 
driving the manager to manipulate accounting numbers. Healy (1985) 
suggests using the discretionary value of Total Accruals as the proxy of earning 
management. Chen (2008) was the first to explore how executive incentive 
influences earning management in Thailand, while this study adds the role of 
ownership structure to the earning management literature. This archival 
research uses 132 data sets from Thai listed companies. The data were 
collected from annual reports, SET database and DataStream. These were 
analysed by means of a cross-sectional multiple regression structure. The 
main regression equation, so called model 5, was as follows: 
Earning managementi = β0 + β1Incentivei + β2 ROAi + β3 OCFi + β4 Ri + β5 (FAM)it 
+ β6 (COR)it + β7 (FOR)it + β8 industriali + β9 sizei + ε i   
where: 
    Incentive = Executive bonus pay  
    ROA = return on asset 
    OCF = net operation cash flow 
    R = stock returns 
    FAM = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as family shareholders 
COR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as corporate shareholders 
FOR = ownership structure where the first 20% of the biggest 
shareholders are classified as foreign shareholders 
                                                 
5 Based on a paper presented at the European Academy of Business in Society 2 009 at 
Navarra University, Spain, entitled ‘The Role of Executive Remuneration in Earning 
Management in Thailand’ by Swatdikun, T. Vernon, G. Nisar, T. and Chen, X. 238  
 
  Dummy industrial = one of eight groups which list which sector the 
company belongs to: Manufacturing, Mining and 
quarrying, Real estate and construction, Finance and 
insurance, Services, Technology, Consumer product, 
Agricultural and food products and Medium-sized 
enterprises: shown as 1 if a specific industrial interest is 
required, zero otherwise. 
The value of earning management is calculated by the standard approach 
from McNichols (2000), which uses the Total Accrual (TA) concept.  
    TAt = ΔCAt – ΔCasht - ΔCLt + ΔDebtt - DEPt     
where ΔCAt is change in current assets; ΔCasht is change in cash and cash 
equivalents; ΔCLt is change in current liabilities; ΔDebtt is change in debt 
which is a combination of current liabilities and long-term debts, such as 
loans; DEPt is depreciation and amortisation.  
The concept has been warmly welcomed, because it builds on financial 
reporting and all the information needed can be obtained from the financial 
statement. Using the TA concept, Healy (1985) introduced the proposition 
that non-discretionary accrual (NDA) in the current year is the value of total 
accruals scaled by lagged asset.  
NDAt =  1  x  ∑     TAt             
         n        
t     At-1 
where NDA is the estimation of non-discretionary accruals in the current year 
scaled by the lagged total assets of the previous year. Note that the model 
can be criticised over its accuracy, on the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals are constant over time. However, there is no single technique to 239  
 
detect the issue of total accrual, discretionary accrual and non-discretionary 
accruals. In any case, the cross-sectional model is widely accepted as a 
useful statistical approach to estimating earning management, because it 
requires fewer data than either statistical techniques using time series of the  
‘Jones approach’ or the qualitative method using accounting technique to 
evaluate the quality of disclosure in the identification of red flags.  This table 
provides regressions which aim to estimate the factors influencing earning 
management.  
Table 7.10 The determination of earning management 
This table reports the regression analysis of model 5, which investigates the influence of 
executive compensation on earning management, using OLS estimation techniques. The 
first column is dedicated to bivariate analysis between executive bonus and earning 
management. The second adds further firm performance and ownership structure where 
Column three adds interaction variable. Column four and five detect the determination using 
family and corporate ownership structure, respectively. ROA means return on asset. OCF 
represents operation cash flow, R is stock returns. FAM means family-owned firm. COR 
means corporate-owned firm. DIS is dispersed-owned firm. BON represents bonus. L is 
lagged value. The estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as 
presented in brackets ( ).  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: earning management 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Bonus  0.00003***  0.00003*  0.00003*  -0.00003  0.00009 
  (2.78)  (1.89)  (1.73)  (-0.32)  (0.55) 
ROA     0.00371***  0.01171***  0.00041  0.00177 
    (3.47)  (3.77)  (0.16)  (0.36) 
OCF      -0.07832*  -0.17000  -0.05766  -0.06579 
    (-1.9)  (-1.59)  (-0.69)  (-1.62) 
R     0.00000   -0.00007*  0.00002*
* 
-0.00003 
    (0.25)  (-1.85)  (2.32)  (-0.99) 
FAM     0.00345  -0.00624     
    (0.11)  (-0.21)     
COR     0.01838  0.02420     
    (0.64)  (0.65)     
DIS     0.01740  0.03672     
    (0.57)  (0.94)     
FAMROA        -0.00866***     
      (-2.82)     
CORROA        -0.00970**     
      (-2.04)     
DISROA       -0.00547     
      (-1.28)     
FAMOCF       0.09111     
      (0.70)     
COROCF       0.12466     240  
 
Independent variable  Dependent variable: earning management 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
      (1.04)     
DISOCF       -0.10555     
      (-0.78)     
FAMR       0.00009**     
      (2.20)     
CORR       0.00006     
      (1.39)     
DISR       0.00006     
      (1.43)     
Bonus: First quartile        -.01620  -0.03962 
        (-0.38)  (-0.86) 
Bonus: Median        .06626  -0.09500 
        (1.48)  (-1.13) 
Bonus: Last quartile        .079597  -0.14814 
        (0.74)  (-0.46)  
 
 
 
 
Constant  -0.08388***  -0.07791  -0.07710  -0.16275  -0.02606 
  (-7.07)  (-0.65)  (-0.61)  (-0.62)  (-0.08) 
Size  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-square  0.0343  0.3347  0.3852  0.6086  0.2906 
Using Healy (1985) to estimate non-discretional accrual, this study finds that 
the Thai listed companies in the year 2007 utilised earning management. This 
table provides regressions which aim to estimate factors influencing earning 
management. Using Bivariate regression, unlike Healy (1985) this research 
finds no evidence as to how incentive pay influences earning management. 
The second regression reveals that bonus, firm performance, and industries 
have an influence on earning management. However, there is no evidence of 
how ownership structure affects earning management activities. The third 
column indicates that lower ROA participates upward on the earning 
management, especially when the firm is owned by a family or is a corporate 
firm. The fourth column splits family-owned firms into three groups; based on 
first, median, and last quartile of their executive bonus. However, there is no 
concrete evidence of a particular quartile playing a part in earning management. 
The last column splits corporate-owned firms into three groups;  according to 
the first, median, and last quartile of their executive bonus. There is no 
evidence that corporate-owned firms take part in earning management.  241  
 
Note that the previous section assumes that the zero pay bonus firms also 
employ incentive plans but the manager are unable to exceed the target. For 
that reason no bonus has been paid. This following table is using Healy’s 
idea by omitting zero-bonus pay firms because he assumes that zero pay 
bonuses means no incentive has been adopted.  
Table 7.11 The association between the quartile of bonus pay and earning 
management in family business 
This table reports the regression analysis of model 5 which analyses the relationship between 
executive compensation and earning management in family ownership, using OLS estimation 
techniques. The first column is dedicated to those 25% highest bonus pay. The second is the 
firms who pay are the median bonus pay. Column three is dedicated to those 25% lowest bonus 
pay. ROA means return on asset. OCF represents operation cash flow, R is stock returns. The 
estimates are corrected for heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance, as presented in brackets ( ).  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
Independent variable  First  quartile          median  Fourth quartile 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Bonus  0.00003  0.00006*  0.00000 
  (0.70)  (1.70)  (0.02) 
ROA  0.00042  0.00075  0.00031 
  (0.11)  (0.19)  (0.06) 
OCF  -0.06033  -0.06459  -0.10006 
  (-0.63)  (-0.64)  (-0.96) 
R  0.00001  0.00001  0.00002* 
  (1.61)  (1.52)  (1.85) 
Bonus quartile1   -0.06394*     
  (-1.82)     
Bonus quartile2-3    0.02802   
    (0.63)   
Bonus quartile4      0.06123 
      (0.41) 
Constant   -0.06492*   -0.10901**   -0.08607*** 
  (-1.95)  (-2.26)  (-2.64) 
R-Squared  0.1879  0.1468  0.1543 
Table 7.11 focuses on family businesses; it provides the evidence as to how 
the quartile of bonus pay influences the earning management. This table 
reveals that the first quartile bonus pay group has negative correlation with 
the level of earning management. That means the managers who get paid the 
lowest bonuses do take part in earning management by trying to decrease the 
accounting number in their financial reporting. However, this research finds 242  
 
no evidence for how the other quartile firms manipulate their accounting 
number. Not as Incentive theory expected, this research cannot confirm that 
there is upward manipulating when the firms are located in median bonus 
pay. Also, no evidence can be provided in the case of the highest bonus paid 
or whether the manager decreased their accounting performance.  
 
7.5 Chapter summary  
Since only few of the early compensation studies provide empirical evidence 
of performance consequences of executive compensation, this chapter 
provides empirical evidence which reveals that there are performance 
consequences of executive compensation in Thai listed companies. The 
hypothesis testing can be illustrated as follows:  
Table 7.12 Summary of performance consequences of executive pay results 
This table reports the summary of the regression analysis of performance consequences of 
executive compensation. EPS represents earnings per share; OCF stands for the operation cash 
flow, where R is stock returns. BON represents executive bonus, TOT shows executive total 
compensation. FAM stands family-owned firm, COR represents corporate-owned firm, FOR is 
foreign-owned firm, where DIS shows dispersed-owned firm. 
Hypothesis  Independent variables  Dependent 
variable 
Hypothesis testing 
H3  BON              EPS, OCF, R  Not rejected 
  TOT  EPS, OCF, R  Not rejected 
H4  BONFAM, BONCOR, BONFOR, 
BONDIS, TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
EPS  Rejected 
  BONFAM, BONCOR, BONFOR, 
BONDIS, TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
OCF  Not rejected 
  BONFAM, BONCOR, BONFOR, 
BONDIS, TOTFAM, TOTCOR 
TOTFOR, TOTDIS 
R  Not rejected 243  
 
The first section presents various regression analyses of the performance 
consequences of executive bonus. It reveals that there is R consequences of 
executive bonus. Section 2 presents various regression analyses of the 
performance consequences of executive total compensation. It reveals that 
there is OCF consequences of executive total compensation. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 3 is not rejected. Section 3 presents regression analyses of the 
moderating effect of ownership structure on the performance consequences of 
executive compensation. It provides evidence which aligns with findings earlier 
in the chapter which are that corporate ownership moderates OCF 
consequences of executive bonus, and dispersed ownership moderates R 
consequences of executive bonus. Consequently, Hypothesis 4 is not 
rejected. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Discussion 
 
This chapter discusses the empirical evidence that executive compensation 
has a relation with firm performance, as Agency theory would expect. 
Regarding the nature of the market, this study found that ownership structure 
differs on the relation between executive compensation and firm performance. 
The finding chapters examine the existing theories reviewed in Chapter 2; the 
discussion moves to the theoretical development in Chapter 3; and to the 
methodological issues in Chapter 4. The present chapter, in particular, 
provides discussions of the research findings which were presented in 
Chapters 5-7. This chapter is organised in the following five sections. The 
first section seeks to improve the understanding of the executive 
compensation trend. The next section provides a review of the findings. 
Section three provides a symposium of the pay-performance sensitivity, and 
section four provides a symposium of the performance consequences of 
executive compensation. The final section summarises the chapter. 246  
 
 
8.1 Trend of executive pay in Thai listed companies 
This section discusses the findings on the executive compensation in Thai 
listed companies during 2002 to 2008. As expected, all executive managers 
in Thai listed companies received a salary in return for their responsibilities. 
The value of salary was worth more than three quarters of executive total 
compensation. Bonus was the most common executive incentive; this was 
worth about 20% of executive total compensation. The rest, about 5%, was 
accounted for by other forms of compensation such as honoraria and perk 
such as housing, insurance, and the funding of education for their family 
members. The finding confirms early Thai finding in which Connelly et al 
(2010) indicated that only salary and bonus is commonly used in the 
executive pay package. The author also states that other forms of compensation 
(e.g., stock options) are, on the odd occasion, used in Thailand.  
Unlike American and British findings, Thai findings, shown in Figure 5.2, 
show that only approximately 65% of all executive managers in this sample 
are in receipt of an annual bonus compared to 90% in  the UK (Fattorusso, 
2005) and 98% in the US (Leonard, 1990). However, the average bonus pay 
in the US is 2% (OECD, 2005) compared to salary where is eight to 10 times 
greater, ranging from 15 to 22%, in the Thai listed companies. Implausible as 
it seems, 52% of American managers receive stock option (Lowry and 
Murphy, 2007) while  only 10% of Thai managers received a stock option as 
part of their compensation package. Investigating this in greater detail, this 
study found no emerging trends in stock option practice in Thai listed 
companies. This might deal with the fluctuation of the stock market in 
Thailand, which causes too unpredictable a value of the stock that is being 
granted. Thus, it should be claimed that this is a unique aspect of the 
executive compensation in Thai listed companies.  247  
 
This study further investigates the amount of executive pay during 2002 to 
2008. Early chapters provide empirical evidence which suggests no 
fundamental shifts in the executive compensation pay level in Thai listed 
companies during the period. This is the result of post-regulation restructure 
and best practice in the early 2000s, shortly after the financial crisis took 
place in Bangkok before spreading throughout the rest of Asia. However, 
there are two noteworthy points which should be taken up. 
Firstly, the median salary dropped in 2005. This movement was the first major 
change of compensation structure since the last long period of financial 
trouble in 1997-2001. The tsunami on 26 December 2004, avian ’flu and 
global petrol prices repeatedly rising, with trading volume, were a drag on 
growth in 2005. This showed in the rapid fall by 20% in the trading of the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand. The Bank of Thailand (2005) further explained 
that the manufacturing productivity index gave stability from the domestic 
purchasing power and export industry. However, the private consumption 
index was in decline, falling from 5.1% growth in 2004 to 4.0% in 2005. This 
caused a severe slowdown of private investment from 16.3% in 2004 to 
11.0% in 2005. As a result, the year 2005 was the first year of the weakening 
of economic growth from above 6% in 2002-2004 to 4.5% in 2005 since the 
end of the Asian financial crisis (Asian Development Bank, 2006; Bank of 
Thailand, 2005). The economic red flag then recalls the earlier financial crisis. 
All the factors together caused a drop in executive salaries in 2005. Further 
investigating finds that some top salary-paying firms have appointed new 
executive managers to cover risk management and accounting policy in order 
to cope with the up-coming financial difficulties. Events such as the reversal of 
allowances for doubtful accounts, losses in the decline in the value of 
inventories and loss on exchange rate were seen in 2005.   248  
 
Second, both the mean and the median of bonuses dropped in 2006. Unlike 
the salary drop in 2005, all firms (both big and standard size) announced 
lower bonuses. The Bank of Thailand (2006) indicated that the tourist industry 
went back on track with a rise of 20% after the rapid fall in the wake of the 
tsunami disaster. Furthermore, the economy took advantage of the expanding 
international trade at 17.4%. However, the private sector still worried about 
the continual rise in petrol prices and the statistically high inflation rate at 6% 
(compared to about 2% during 2002-2005). This caused a slowdown in 
private investment to a statistical low at 4.47% of total fixed investment 
(compared to the average of 10.93% during 2002-2005) which directly 
affected the import volume. This contradiction between import and export 
firms caused the difference between mean and median in the stock market return. 
BOT (2006) believes that the growth of the Thai economy in the first half of 
the decade was the product of the different government policy approach of 
Thaksin Shinnawatra after he won the election in early 2001. However, like 
other Southeast-Asian countries, Thailand is still not politically stable. During 
September 2006 there was a coup by the Royal Thai Army coup against 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra for his unlawful business activities and 
he was prohibited from doing business with the government office which the 
officers were working for. This unexpected political activity led to seven bomb 
explosions in Hat Yai, the biggest city in the south of the country and one 
bomb in Bangkok. The political unrest led to economic instability, since the 
coup was the first for 15 years. It may have also led to negative confidence 
over economic transactions in general and thus may have produced the 
sudden fall in bonus figures in every listed company during the year 2006. 
Figure 5.7 provides controversial evidence that, unlike anywhere else, 
Thailand’s highest executive compensation is paid in the Mining and 
quarrying industry. This industry covers a combination of electricity, gas, 
water and the mining and quarrying sector. The biggest segment is that of 
petroleum and natural gas which is piped to households; and raw materials 
for plastics, chemicals, medicines, etc. The Encyclopaedia of the Nations 249  
 
(2010) reports the growth in the production of crude petroleum and natural 
gas; however, the products of this industry are mostly used domestically. The 
United States Department of Labour (2010) indicates that there is high pay in 
oil and gas extraction (22% higher than average pay) and support activities 
for mining (5% higher than average pay); however, the mining section itself 
yielded 2% (lower than average profit). The unusual and possibly dangerous 
work, in particular in offshore oil rigs and underground mining, makes 
demands of a particular nature on executive managers which might drive up 
the level of executive pay, since firms have to pay what these workers ask. 
 
8.2 Summary of empirical evidences 
This study draws on two remarkable works on the relation between executive 
compensation; the relation between executive pay and firm performance 
(Jensen and Murphy, 1990), which reveals that there is pay-performance 
sensitivity in listed companies, and institutional investors and executive 
compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003), which reveals that is moderation 
role of ownership structure on the executive pay. Combining these two 
crucial pieces of knowledge, the finding chapters provide empirical evidence 
to support the fact that performance sensitivity does exist. Gomez-Mejia 
(2003), however, indicates that firm size is the most important variable in 
explaining the movement of the element of executive compensation. Besides, 
firm size shows that industry and year also affect the pay of executive 
managers. These findings verify the early Asian findings of Wang and 
Stammerjohan (2004) who reported that size and industry are the two main 
factors significantly affecting the executive compensation pay in Chinese 
listed companies. It further provides evidence that there is a relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance, and that ownership structure 
is included, as shown below.  250  
 
Table 8.1 Summary of evidence on the relationships between executive 
compensation and firm performance 
This table provides evidence on the relation between executive pay and firm performance.  
EPS stands for earning per share; Bonus is executive bonus. Total is executive total pay. 
Hypo-
theses 
Independence 
Variable 
Moderating Variable  Dependence Variable  Sign 
H1: Firm performance has a positive influence on executive compensation. 
    Stock return  -  Executive salary  + 
H2: Ownership structure moderates the positive influence of firm performance on 
executive compensation. 
  EPS  Foreign ownership  Executive salary  + 
  Stock return  Dispersed ownership  Executive salary  + 
  EPS  Dispersed ownership  Executive bonus  + 
  EPS  Foreign ownership  Executive bonus  + 
  EPS  Foreign ownership  Executive total compensation  + 
H3: Executive compensation has a positive influence on firm performance 
  Bonus  -  Stock return  + 
  Total  -  Operation Cash Flow  + 
H4: Ownership structure moderates the positive performance consequences of executive 
compensation 
  Total  Corporate ownership  EPS  - 
  Bonus  Dispersed ownership  Operation Cash Flow  + 
  Bonus  Dispersed ownership  Stock return  + 
Table 8.1 contains the econometrics results of the positive relations between 
executive pay and firm performance. The first panel reveals that pay-
performance sensitivity has been established in Thailand. The second panel 
confirms that ownership structure plays a mediation role in the relation 
between executive compensation and firm performance. It reveals that 
foreign, and dispersed ownership moderates the positive pay-performance 
sensitivity. This finding is comparable to Asian findings such as those of 
Mengistae and Xu (2004), Bai and Xu (2005) and Firth et al (2006) which all 
report that the state-owned enterprise moderates the relation between 
executive compensation and firm performance.  251  
 
Moreover, the third panel reveals that executive total compensation positively 
influences both operation cash flow and stock return. This finding is verified 
by early American finding which indicates that executive compensation has a 
positive effect on firm performance. The last panel reveals regression results 
which indicate three main findings. Corporate ownership moderates the 
negative performance (EPS) consequences of executive compensation. 
Disperse ownership affects the OCF and R consequences of executive 
bonus.  This research finding confirms that the incentive mechanism causes 
the performance consequences of executive bonus pay.  
 
8.3 The pay-performance sensitivity  
Since the announcement that there is a greater nexus of contract between 
shareholder and manager in non-entrepreneurial firms which causes the 
problem of the distribution of firm wealth (Fama and Jensen, 1983b), incentive 
compensation has become a key player in aligning the interest between 
shareholder and manager (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The shareholder 
would design the executive working contract to direct and motivate the 
managers to serve their own interest (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). If this is the 
case, the pay-performance sensitivity should exist (Murphy, 1999).   
In addition to theoretical consideration, this study considers the estimation 
issue by drawing a comparison between the widely used OLS-regression, 
with FE and 2SLS-IV. Most results from the first two estimations are robust; 
however almost all results are swept out when IV is deployed. The problem 
arises when, as proposed by Palia (2001), the OLS estimation on the 
detection of relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance is suffering from the endogeneity problem. However, the 
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firm performance might result in the omission of findings in the early 
estimations. Guy (2000) and Lilling (2006) revealed that, when heterogeneity 
biases have been taken into consideration, the pay-performance sensitivity no 
longer exists. However, this study finds most result consistent with OLS and 
FE estimations.  
Chapter 6 and 7 provide comparable evidence, particularly when lagged 
variables are added. Most OLS provides similar evidence to FE estimations. 
However, most of the findings are eroded when 2SLS was developed. These 
chapters also reveal that is a positive relation between executive salary and 
stock return in the Thai Stock Market. The result confirms US findings such as 
those of Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kaplan (1994) and Murphy (1999),as 
well as China (Mengistae, 2004), Korea (Kato et al, 2007), and the Philippines 
(Unite et al, 2008) Malaysia (Salim and Wan-Hussin, 2009), Thailand 
(Connelly, 2010), and Indonesia (Suherman et al, 2011).   
 
8.4 Ownership structure relating to the pay-performance 
sensitivity  
Given that the capital market as an external market for corporate control plays 
an important role in the market-oriented system of the traditionally well-
developed mainly Anglo-Saxon countries, but not in network-oriented systems 
such as continental Europe and Asia (Moerland, 1995), this study provides 
evidence that more than 75% of Thai listed companies are of concentration 
ownership. This finding confirms that of Wiwattanakantang (2000) who 
revealed that the Thai stock market presents high intensely concentrated 
ownership. Ali and Chen (2006) provided American evidence that lower levels 
of total compensation pay occur when families take control of the CEO 
compensation contract. Core et al (1999) explain that unnecessary pay is 253  
 
reduced, thus pay-performance sensitivity should be established. Connelly et 
al (2010) indicated that ownership structure is expected to play a partial role 
in control and coordination, thus, the shareholders’ desire should be 
considerably reflected by tightening executive compensation with realisable firm 
performance when the shareholder is from a concentrated firm.  
8.4.1 The moderation of the dispersed ownership on the pay-
performance sensitivity  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that the use of incentives is made part of 
executive compensation to raise the Agent’s motivation by observing the pay-
performance sensitivity.  However, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) believe that 
executive compensation is the source of inefficiencies in the design of 
executive compensation packages. The Thai evidence, however, does not 
lend supportive evidence to Bebchuk and Fried (2003) who expressed 
concerns about managerial power on the board of director activity. The 
evidence indicates that executive compensation design is the result of greater 
power of the shareholder through voting rights.  As a result, the change in 
performance might lead to adoptions of executive pay (Hall and Liebman, 
1998). Thus, it might not require a further form of mechanism since corporate 
governance has capacity in all economic systems which include the form of 
concentrated ownership. The empirical evidence supports findings on early 
large western economies such as the US (Jensen and Murphy, 1990), the UK 
(Gregg et al, 2005) and Australia (Langfield-Smith, 2005), and Asian studies 
such as Korea (Kato et al, 2006), Japan (Basu et al, 2007), China (Buck et al, 
2008), the Philippines (Unite et al, 2008), and Malaysia (Sulivan et al, 2010). 
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8.4.2 The non-moderation of the family ownership on the pay-
performance sensitivity  
Despite being part of one of the world most famous issue-executive 
compensation, family-involved CEO pay is a mystery in a wealth of executive 
pay-performance sensitivity arenas. La Porta et al (2000) indicated that good 
attention should be taken since the family-owned firm is the world’s dominant 
ownership structure form. The claim is valid in the Thai Stock Exchange 
since early discussion in Chapter 5 reveals that the biggest portion of Thai 
listed companies is classed as the family-owned firm.   
The ideas of the impact of family ownership on the relation between 
executive pay and firm performance are divided into two schools. The 
mainstream idea is concern that family business is likely to perform worse 
than dispersed-owned business.  Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Connelly et 
al (2010) take this approach by indicating that separation of ownership and 
control in the family-owned business is not distinct; thus the conflict between 
Principal and Agent might have less chance to occur. However, this author 
raises the alarm on potential conflict of interest between family owners, being 
a majority shareholder, and the minority shareholders. Connelly et al (2010) 
believe that it is the separation between ownership and control in large firms 
owned by one group of investors which left so little power in the hands of the 
minority investor. The family are in the position to control and monitor the 
management or even divert the firm’s wealth to meet their own interests 
(Otten, 2007). Mallin (2007) provided a user-friendly explanation that a 
family-owned firm still ultimately needs to make a profit but that it is less likely 
to be driven by the short-term demands of the market. It has more flexibility 
as to when and how profit is sought. This study provides supportive evidence 
for this view. That is no evidence on the direct controlling power of the family-
owned firm to cause the alignment between executive compensation and firm 
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Alternatively, Suehiro (2001) believes that family ownership provides benefits 
on the enhancing operations efficiency.  Ali and Chen (2006) believe that 
direct control over executive causes the avoidable unnecessary pay; thus 
executive compensation in family control should be low. Also, the lower level 
of executive compensation of family firms causes the removing of unnecessary 
pay which causes the sensitivity between executive compensation and firm 
performance. This thought aligns with Oreland (2007) who found the same 
situation in Swedish listed companies during 2004. Even though the 
moderation effect was expected on the negative relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance, the Swedish result indicates that the 
family-owned firm has not differed from those executive compensation 
practices in the Anglo-Saxon culture setting. Groci et al (2010) show that the 
pay-performance sensitivity would strengthens when executive compensation 
is designed under the guided direction of interest of the family. Early Asian 
findings such as those of Cheung et al (2005) also found that Hong Kong 
family-controlled firms moderate the positive relation between executive 
compensation and firm performance. 
8.4.3 The moderation of the corporate and foreign ownership on the 
pay-performance sensitivity  
Since concentrated ownership can accumulate direct power through the 
voting right, this collective power could become one mechanism to control 
the managers’ behaviour. One might expect that ownership concentration 
negatively affects the level of executive compensation pay, but links 
executive compensation with firm performance. Evidence from Germany 
indicates that institutional ownership has a negative impact on the level of 
executive pay (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This study provides supportive 
evidence to these early claims that there is a positive effect of corporate 
ownership on the pay-performance sensitivity, as shown above. It also provides 
sympathetic results for the original work on institutional ownership of Hartzell 
and Starks (2003), which proposes that the institutional investor is positively 256  
 
related to pay-performance sensitivity. The evidence also verifies early Asian 
finding such as those of Lee and Chen (2011) who reveal that Taiwanese 
institution ownership causes the relation between executive compensation and 
their firm performance. Salim and Wan-Hussin (2009) provide Malaysian 
evidence that institutional shareholders enhance the pay-performance 
sensitivities. 
The concentration owner proves that an investor has the opportunity, 
resources, and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence management 
mechanisms that include compensation design (Cornett, Marcus and 
Tehranian, 2008). CIMA (2010) reminds us that the significance of the 
collective power of those investor interactions has been proved to produce 
benefits for the majority shareholders. La Porta et al (2000), Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) and Jiang (2009) all indicate that large shareholders can 
exercise their right by the approach of value maximisation of their interests. 
Since typical performance indicators such as EPS in executive bonuses 
contract is subject to adjustment and unwinding, corporate ownership seems 
take the more realisable of the performance indicators, which is OCF.  
 
8.5 The performance consequences of executive compensation 
Since executive managers are the decision maker in the organsation, 
increasing compensation should cause increasing motivation in decision 
making, which results in better firm performance. Wasserman et al (2010) 
indicate that executive compensation does contribute to firm performance, 
but less than 5%. Milkovich and Newman (2008) indicate that even though all 
elements of compensation are crucial, bonus is the key incentive mechanism 
to motivate managers in order to achieve the desired goal since the 
increasing salary involves long-term commitment and is expensive. Thus, this 257  
 
section tests whether compensation - bonus and total compensation - increases 
the executive’s motivation which causes action in the organisation. It hopes to 
establish that using incentive compensation should cause the improvement 
of an organisation’s performance (Mackey, 2006). The findings section of this 
study provides empirical evidence which is stated in Section 5.3.3. It confirms 
that there is higher executive total compensation which causes a better OCF. 
However, the magnitude of the performance consequences of executive 
compensation is low.  
This evidence supports early American research such as those of Abowd 
(1990), Leonard (1990),and Anderson et al (1999), which show a weak but 
positive relation between executive compensation and firm performance; 
Gerhart and Milkovich (1990), Palia (2001) and Grunditz and Lindqvist (2004) 
provide no evidence that this relation is a performance (ROA) consequence 
of long-term incentive compensation. The evidence supports Mackey (2006), 
which claims that a proper use of estimation technique has little or no 
performance consequences of executive compensation.  Also, this study 
provides supportive evidence to the only Asian finding (Kubo, 2005) on the 
performance consequences of executive compensation. The OCED (2005) 
indicates that the low-powered forms of executive pay and derived effects 
might explain the low impact of incentive compensation on firm performance.  
 
Source: OECD (2005) 
Figure 8.1 Performance consequences of executive compensation model 
Incentive pay 
Derived effects 
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Mackey (2006) also indicates that there are at least five possible explanations 
for this. The first is population constraints – ecologists’, institutional and 
legitimacy constraints. The next is the interchangeable management position 
which might affect the impact of executive compensation on firm performance. 
The third is that executive compensation has a symbolic rather than a 
substantive role in the organisation. The fourth explanation is the role of a 
board of directors, which may have a greater influence on firm performance 
than the CEO as an individual. The last explanation is the estimation 
technique, which cannot control the power of industry, firm factors and CEO 
characteristics. Armstrong and Baron (2007) assert that human capital 
strategy consists of six inter-connected factors; people, work processes, 
managerial structure, information and knowledge, decision making, and 
reward. In order to create the best shareholder value, this human asset 
together with capital assets, as well as organisational architecture, needs to 
be well designed.  
 
8.6 The ownership structure and its performance consequences 
The impact of ownership structure on firm performance attracts the interest of 
researchers who focus on the choice of ownership structure which is believed 
to play an important role in the development of the theory of the firm. Since 
the ownership structure creates direct controlling power over the agency 
conflict, the agency costs decrease (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). However, 
type of ownership structure plays a different role in monitoring activities. The 
main American concentration ownership is the financial institution, and 
foreign ownership, which are believed to be active and have a positive impact 
on monitoring.  259  
 
Family ownership, however, is believed to have a negative impact since it 
provides opportunity for the majority shareholder to divert that wealth to 
become their own. Later, Villalonga and Amit (2006) confirm that 
descendants who serve as CEOs with no control in family ownership have 
negative effect on firm value. Two Thai studies indicate that the founding 
family has a negative effect on firm performance (Athiapinya, 2005; 
Suktitipat, 2009). This study (Tables 7.7 and 7.9) provide empirical evidence 
that family ownership causes better RI. This finding verifies most of the 
research on the effects of ownership structure on firm performance using 
Thai data. Wiwattanakantang (2001) first propounds that family ownership 
plays a positive role in firm value. It also is the first study to particularly focus 
attention on the ownership structure in Thai listed companies. Soon 
afterward, Yammeesri and Lodh (2003) provided supportive evidence by 
indicating that family business positively affects stock return. 
Tontivanichanon (2004) also confirms that family ownership has a positive 
relationship with stock return. Boonlert-U-Thai and Kuntisook (2009) support 
the view that, after controlling for industry and year-fixed effects, family 
ownership has a positive role in firm performance (EPS).  
 
8.7 Chapter summary  
This chapter began with a review of the pay-performance sensitivity and its 
consequences. The next section discussed the trend of executive pay in Thai 
listed companies in which there was no structural change during the 
observation period. The third section presents the regression results. It 
reports that EPS and RI influence executive bonuses and total 
compensation. Interaction effect reports the role of ownership structure on 
the pay-performance sensitivity when size, industry and year are controlled 
for. It begins with the discussion of the role of EPS and RI in the determination 260  
 
of executive compensation in dispersed ownership. Then, the role of the OCF 
on the determination of executive compensation in corporate ownership is 
considered. After this, the performance consequences of executive 
compensation are discussed. An additional discussion explains the side-
effect of executive compensation on earning management and the direct 
effect of ownership structure on firm performance. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study examines the relation between executive compensation and firm 
performance in The Stock Exchange of Thailand during 2002-2008. Both 
accounting- and market-based performances have been used as firm 
performance. The three pay measurements used were salary, bonus, and 
total compensation. The role of ownership structure is placed at the heart of 
this study. Using archival data extracted from the annual registration 
statement, annual corporate report, DataStream and SETSMART of Thai 
listed companies during 2002-2008, this study tests the four hypotheses. 
Various estimation techniques are deployed in order to verify the 
understanding of the pay-performance sensitivity and its performance 
consequences, while earning management as a side effect of the incentive 
pay is also considered. Giving the first priority to fixed effects, the research 
findings are summarised below. 262  
 
The overview to this study is in five sections. The first section reviews the 
research objective presented in the first chapter. The second provides a 
review of the research findings and then links to section three, on the way in 
which this research results relates to executive compensation. The fourth 
section discusses the research implications. The last section presents the 
research limitations and suggestions for further research, before drawing 
some research conclusions.  
 
9.1 Introduction 
In the middle of a financial crisis, the executive pay is often blamed as not 
reflecting the performance of the executive had performed. This study set out 
to advance the current state of executive compensation knowledge with 
respect to Agency theory using advanced statistical techniques, on the basis 
of publicly available executive compensation data in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand. It began with the empirical investigation of the forms of executive 
compensation and the level paid in listed companies, and second, it 
empirically examined the pay-performance sensitivity in Thai listed 
companies. Its third objective was to investigate the role of ownership 
structure in the determination of executive compensation and firm 
performance in Thai listed companies. The fourth objective was to evaluate 
the performance consequences of executive compensation. The final 
objective was to provide further investigation of the role of ownership 
structure in moderating the performance consequences of executive 
compensation. A theoretical model was derived from four hypotheses. These 
hypotheses were tested using archival data extracted from annual 
registration statements, and annual corporate reports in DataStream and 
SETSMART of Thai listed companies during 2002-2008. 263  
 
 
9.2 Review of the hypotheses and findings 
Agency theory expects that incentive compensation can be utilised to minimise 
agency cost and maximise firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Pay-
performance sensitivity was thus expected. This study targets this approach by 
re-evaluating the role of ownership on the moderating effect of pay-performance 
sensitivity. It was also hoped to demonstrate the performance consequences 
of executive compensation. Four hypotheses were constructed as follows. 
Hypothesis one predicted a positive influence of firm performance on executive 
compensation. This study provides confirmation evidence for the theory since 
a relation between executive salary and stock return has been found. 
Hypothesis two predicts a moderating effect of ownership structure on the 
pay-performance sensitivity. This study provides supportive evidence that 
foreign and dispersed ownership moderate the pay-performance sensitivity. 
The finding responds to the Agency theory assumptions on the role of the 
separation between ownership and control. Since the distance between 
ownership and control plays a key part in organisation design, the finding 
shows that firm performance positively influences executive compensation in 
dispersed ownership. Another finding responds to the concentrated 
ownership literature, which affirms that firm performance positively influences 
executive compensation in foreign ownership.  
Hypothesis three predicts a performance consequence of executive pay. The 
result indicates that there is stock return as a performance consequence of 
executive bonus. Hypothesis four predicts that ownership structure influences 
the performance consequences of executive compensation. The result 
indicates that there is a positive performance consequence of executive 
bonus in dispersed ownership.     264  
 
Unlike other Thai executive compensation studies (e.g Connelly, 2010; 
Kaewkumson, 2009; Puttaphiwat, 2007; and Sitthiharn, 2006), using panel 
(seven-year) data, this study takes advantage of the most recent time series 
of cross-sectional data to explore in greater depth our knowledge on the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance 
concerns. Recent econometric development provides a good chance to 
deploy a new estimation technique which controls endogeneity in executive 
compensation. This study begins the estimation using the Poole-OLS. This 
method is of benefit in exploring the characteristics of the overall data but 
leaves out the panel structure. It is hoped to produce understandable results 
which are comparable with previous findings. The fifth chapter reveals that 
most results confirm the early evidence. In order to control for firm effect, the 
panel data provide an opportunity to explore the state using the FE technique. 
The FE are applied to treat the structure of the panel data. All other variables 
are the same as the OLS estimation, but include єi , which is the unobserved 
individual (firm) effect. Using FE helps to control the effect of individual firms 
on overall data. However, the causality of executive compensation and firm 
performance is believed to cross over the assumptions of OLS and FE 
estimation. This study goes beyond the research agenda in tracking the 
endogenous issue by means of the instrumental variable, using the two-stage 
least square method. 2SLS-IV was the preferred estimation method, and this 
it is reported as the main result.265  
 
Table 9.1 Summary of the findings 
Objective  Hypotheses  Independence variable  Dependence variable  Expected 
sign 
Result of 
hypotheses testing 
Result table 
1 To investigate the pay-performance sensitivity 
  H1.1  EPS  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.1 
  H1.2  OCF  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.1 
  H1.3  R  Executive salary  +  Not rejected  column 3 table 6.1 
  H1.4  EPS  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 6 table 6.2 
  H1.5  OCF  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 6 table 6.2 
  H1.6  R  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 6 table 6.2 
  H1.7  EPS  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 9 table 6.3 
  H1.8  OCF  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 9 table 6.3 
  H1.9  R  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 9 table 6.3 
2. To investigate the role of ownership structure on the pay-performance sensitivity 
  H2.1  FAMEPS  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.2  FAMOCF  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.3  FAMR  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.4  COREPS  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.5  COROCF  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.6  CORR  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.7  FOREPS  Executive salary  +  Not rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.8  FOROCF  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.9  FORR  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.10  DISEPS  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.11  DISOCF  Executive salary  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.12  DISR  Executive salary  +  Not rejected  column 3 table 6.4 
  H2.13  FAMEPS  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.14  FAMOCF  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.15  FAMR  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 266  
 
Table 9.1 (cont’d.) 
Objective  Hypotheses  Independence variable  Dependence variable  Expected 
sign 
Result of 
hypotheses testing 
Result table 
  H2.16  COREPS  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.17  COROCF  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.18  CORR  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.19  FOREPS  Executive bonus  +  Not rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.20  FOROCF  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.21  FORR  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.22  DISEPS  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.23  DISOCF  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.24  DISR  Executive bonus  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.5 
  H2.25  FAMEPS  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.26  FAMOCF  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.27  FAMR  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.28  COREPS  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.29  COROCF  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.30  CORR  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.31  FOREPS  Executive total compensation  +  Not rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.32  FOROCF  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.33  FORR  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.34  DISEPS  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.35  DISOCF  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
  H2.36  DISR  Executive total compensation  +  rejected  column 3 table 6.6 
3. To investigate performance consequences of executive compensation 
  H3.1  executive bonus  EPS  +  rejected  column 3 table 7.1 
  H3.2  executive bonus  OCF  +  rejected  column 3 table 7.2 
  H3.3  executive bonus  R      +          Not rejected     column 3 table 7.3 
  H3.4  executive total 
compensation 
EPS  +  rejected  column 7 table 7.4 267  
 
Table 9.1 (cont’d.) 
Objective Hypotheses  Independence variable  Dependence variable  Expected 
sign 
Result of 
hypotheses testing 
Result table 
  H3.5  executive total 
compensation 
OCF  +   Not rejected  column 7 table 7.5 
  H3.6  executive total 
compensation 
R      +  rejected  column 7 table 7.6 
4. To investigate the role of ownership structure on the performance consequences of executive compensation 
  H4.1  BONFAM  EPS  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.7 
  H4.2  BONCOR  EPS  +/-  Not rejected  column3 table 7.7 
  H4.3  BONFOR  EPS  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.7 
  H4.4  BONDIS  EPS  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.7 
  H4.5  TOTFAM  EPS  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.7 
  H4.6  TOTCOR  EPS  +/-  Not rejected  column7 table 7.7 
  H4.7  TOTFOR  EPS  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.7 
  H4.8  TOTDIS  EPS  +/-  Not rejected  column7 table 7.7 
  H4.9  BONFAM  OCF  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.8 
  H4.10  BONCOR  OCF  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.8 
  H4.11  BONFOR  OCF  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.8 
  H4.12  BONDIS  OCF  +/-  Not rejected  column3 table 7.8 
  H4.13  TOTFAM  OCF  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.8 
  H4.14  TOTCOR  OCF  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.8 
  H4.15  TOTFOR  OCF  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.8 
  H4.16  TOTDIS  OCF  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.8 
  H4.17  BONFAM  R  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.9 
  H4.18  BONCOR  R  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.9 
  H4.19  BONFOR  R  +/-  rejected  column3 table 7.9 
  H4.20  BONDIS  R  +/-  Not rejected  column3 table 7.9 
  H4.21  TOTFAM  R  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.9 
  H4.22  TOTCOR  R  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.9 
  H4.23  TOTFOR  R  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.9 
  H4.24  TOTDIS  R  +/-  rejected  column7 table 7.9 268  
 
Table 9.1 confirms that pay-performance sensitivity does exist, where 
ownership structure plays a crucial part in determining the strength/weakness 
of the link. This study contributes to the concentration ownership literature in 
that corporate and family ownership does play a role on the diversion of the 
pay decision to their own interests. The performance consequences section 
reveals the consequences of OCF on executive total pay. Further information 
shows that dispersed and corporate ownership moderates the consequences 
of executive pay. 
 
9.3 Review of discussion 
This study provides confirmatory evidence that widely held firms are 
efficiently tailoring their executive salaries to EPS and stock returns, which 
indicates transparency of compensation policy-making on the reflection of the 
high demand for a good quality CEO (Chalmers et al, 2006). The bonus 
finding provides supportive evidence to Jensen and Murphy (1990); the 
Principal thus offers working contracts in order to encourage the Agent’s 
motivation to serve the Agent’s need through performance criteria. An 
efficiency contract proved right in dispersed ownership but wrong in family 
ownership, because family owners are not maximising the utility of the firm 
but their own aims. It insists that management behaviour is not as 
straightforward. Family-owned firms do attempt to tighten the pay-performance 
sensitivity. The evidence indicates the role of the owner in the mechanism 
design even without a good governance request. Hence, the success of 
working contracts is not based on a sole designed. It interplays with others’ 
control and coordination mechanisms.  Thus, the display of power should 
then be added to the Agency theory since the evidence indicates that market 
influence proves to push the compensation design toward value-maximising 
the contract (widely-held firm in the case of salary). The performance 269  
 
consequences section reveals that dispersed and corporate ownership 
moderates the consequence. It should be emphasised that dispersed 
ownership influences the incentive pay and it does receive reward in the 
performance consequences form. This confirms that well-designed executive 
compensation does receive its deserved firm performance. 
 
9.4 Contributions of the study 
In addition to a comprehensive synthesis literature on executive 
compensation to date, this section provides the methodological, theoretical 
contributions and the policy implications of this study. As the first study on the 
moderating role of ownership structure in the pay-performance sensitivity, 
this provides original ideas on the interplay between incentive compensation, 
the separation between ownership and control and the performance 
consequence of executive compensation in Thai listed companies. It is also 
the first pay-performance sensitivity study that takes account of the causal 
relationship between these two variables using 2SLS-IV. Furthermore, this 
original work is the first to provide a complete picture of the determination of 
executive compensation and firm performance in Thai listed companies. It 
should contribute to executive compensation practice and determinant 
requirements for researchers, authorities and practitioners.  
9.4.1 Methodological contributions 
As with other emerging economies, the availability of data is the key concern. 
Unlike the developed market where data on executive pay have been widely 
available since 1992 (Florin, Hallock and Webber, 2010), the executive 
compensation data in Thailand has only developed recently. In 2006, SET 
published the first research on executive compensation in Thailand using the 270  
 
data from the year 2005. Surprisingly, the data were hand collected. Even pay-
performance sensitivity cannot be found due to the estimation issue, but 
technically it reveals that undertaking executive compensation research is 
possible and thus a concern of the authorities.  
The selection of Thai listed companies allows this study to explore the 
specific environment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand. There is less 
influence of Anglo-Saxon cultures, in which setting Agency theory setting is 
primarily used to test whether or not dispersed ownership, as an 
organisational structure, deploys incentive compensation theory in its 
executive compensation pay. Similar forms of ownership but variations in 
remuneration committee regulations may contribute to the unique perception 
and awareness of executive compensation practice in Thailand. Further data 
allow testing of the different forms where ownership is concentrated.    
The measurement of variables contributes to this research methodology 
area, since most of the American literature focuses on Stock-Option, salary 
and bonuses as the key components of the executive compensation 
package. Less than 10% of listed companies offer their executive manager a 
stock option. The rest of the literature uses total compensation as a proxy of 
incentive compensation. Since the objectives of salary, bonus and stock 
option are all different, it is hard to interpret the findings. The measurement of 
firm performance is another concern.  The ability of accounting and market 
performance to do this has long been debated. This study deploys the claims 
of both of them.  
The third methodology is the estimation technique. OLS regression has been 
used since executive compensation began to attract public interest. This 
estimation is simple but entails inconsistent error. Since executive compensation 
and firm performance are endogenous by nature, most research tests only 
one way or the other. This study is one of the very few pieces of research 271  
 
that takes the opportunity to use newly developed techniques such as 2SLS 
and GMM to allow the data to be treated as they really are. Treating them in 
a two-way direction reduces the level of bias, thus, it is hoped, providing a 
more valid result, which in turn gives better understanding of this research 
area.  
9.4.2 Theoretical contributions 
Based on the findings from this research, the novel underpinning to Theory of 
the Firm should add the limitations of the incentive compensation knowledge 
in respect of ownership structure before embarking on the best practice; that 
is, high incentive compensation causes better performance. 
This study verifies the implication of the Agency theory that there is pay-
performance sensitivity in well-balanced power settings. The role of a 
performance matrix in executive compensation design is another 
contribution. Not only RI and EPS but also OCF provide useful information to 
the firm on executive compensation design. The three performance proxies 
provide the different approaches of the firms on operations outcome.    
The moderating effect of ownership on pay-performance sensitivity is raised. 
Since not all listed companies have asymmetric information between groups 
of investors, incentive compensation may be used to divert the wealth. The 
conflict of interest between majority and minority shareholders is considered 
to be a recent phenomenon. Also, most of ownership concentration research 
focused on total ownership concentration; this study, aligned with that of 
Jiang (2009), classifies sub-categorisation of large shareholders which 
proved to influence the firm in different ways.  With or without expectations of 
Agency theory, this study provides empirical evidence to confirm that there is 
performance consequence of executive compensation.    272  
 
9.4.3 Policy implications of the study  
At least three important regulatory implications can be suggested from this 
study. First, it provides the primary suggestion to the policy makers in 
Thailand to review executive compensation practice in the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand, particularly in the family-owned firm. The setting, however, did 
prove to have a problematic issue since the distinction between ownership 
and control is not clear and problems between the majority and minority 
shareholders occur. 
The second regulatory implication is the listed companies, with their 
remuneration committee in particular. Benefits are realised  by talking about 
the importance of transparency and disclosure. The awareness of the separation 
between ownership and control should be raised. Transparency and 
information disclosure about compensation design can differentiate well-
governed firms from others. 
Lastly, this study provides some implications for investors’ decisions. Having 
the evidence of particular ownership is becoming less required than their 
personal judgement on management control system. It also suggests that 
shareholders are actively taking part in the structure of executive 
compensation.    
 
9.5 Limitations of the study 
Having listed the benefits of this study, the chapter should also indicate its 
limitations. Two limitations of this study are the data and the variable set. 
Firstly, the sample size is a primary constraint since executive compensation 
data are not compulsorily required except for the total executive 273  
 
compensation for the current year. Although robust testing confirms the 
reliability of the data, having a whole population should allow further detailed 
testing. Also since the data have been extracted from the annual registration 
statement, they may have been subject to the judgement of the collector. 
Secondly, a range of variables such as corporate governance is not included. 
The reason behind this is that the primary focus of this study is the role of 
ownership structure as a control mechanism which substitutes for 
concentrated ownership.  
 
9.6 Future research 
Three recommendations can be made for further studies to anyone who 
wishes to extend the present study, since it surveys a limited number of 
ownership structures on pay-performance sensitivity and also a limited 
number of forms of executive compensation in Thailand. 
First is the role of foreign portfolio investment in the determination of 
executive compensation. Extending the number of foreign portfolio 
investment observations might allow further study by which to understand 
more about the role of these investors on management practice in Thailand. 
Second is tax motivation on the determination of executive compensation in 
family ownership, since the transferring of wealth using executive 
compensation is complicated and under-observed. Including a variable set of 
corporate governance codes of conduct might allow further research to 
understand the effect of tax practice, using compensation as a tool. 
Last is earning management as a side-effect of the use of accounting 
numbers on the executive compensation package. This study explores the 274  
 
issue and finds signs of some problems. Future research might go beyond 
the basic earning management model to provide rich evidence of whether or 
not executive compensation has side-effects to motivate the executive 
manager to put effort into manipulating numbers.  
 
9.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of the whole study. It begins with an 
explanation of research objectives. A review of the hypotheses and findings 
is provided in the second section. Both supportive and non-supportive 
hypotheses are provided. The next section provides a research discussion 
regarding these findings. The following section provides the research 
contribution in which both theoretical and policy implications are mentioned. 
After this, the research limitations are discussed, before the last section 
suggests future directions for research in the field.  
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Appendix 
 
Linear assumptions 
 
In order to use regression analysis properly, Kennedy (1999) and Gujarati 
(1999) mentioned that the classical assumptions of the linear regression 
model should be investigated. These are linearity, randomness of variables, 
homoskedasticity and exogenous and linear independence. Details of 
linearity, normality, heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity, and endogeneity 
assumption are provided below. 
1. Linearity 
The relationship between each independent variable and dependent variable 
is required to have a linear form on which a dependent variable can be 
calculated as a linear function of a specific set of independent variables, plus 
a disturbance term. If this assumption is violated, the linear regression will try 276  
 
to fit a straight line to data that do not follow a straight line. Kennedy (1999) 
indicates that a problem may arise if the equation omits relevant independent 
variables or includes irrelevant independent variables or if the relation 
between the dependent and dependent variables is not linear. A problem may 
also arise if the parameters do not remain constant. To detect nonlinearity, 
Ayyangar (2008) suggests graphical techniques, using a scatter plot of 
dependent variables and residuals. The consequence of using multiple 
regressions in nonlinearity is biased parameter estimates, which lead to 
underestimating the estimators and R-square. This study uses multiple scatter 
plots for the variables used in equations but found no issue. 
2. Normality 
The second assumption requires all variables to be normally distributed, 
since highly skewed variables or those with substantial outliers can affect the 
relationships and significance tests. This assumption suggests that small 
errors provide higher confidence intervals for the predicted values; however 
normality is not required in multiple regression (Regression with Stata web 
book) because Agency theory puts forward the assumption that executive 
compensation and firm performance are linear in nature. Like other incentive 
compensation research, this study found that there is a skewness and 
kurtosis issue in these data. This study goes further in data transformation 
using the transformation techniques which are logarithm, square root, 
reciprocal and square transformation. Since all transformation methods 
require the data to be greater than zero where firm performance - EPS, OCF 
and RI - could be negative, it systematically scraps all negative data. This 
study also sketches in the potential issues: outliers, leverage and influence 
data. Since a single observation may deeply affect the estimation, this study 
rechecks all possible causes: data entry error and sampling error, but found 
no issue. 277  
 
3. Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation 
The third assumption requires the disturbance terms all to have the same 
variance and not to be correlated with one another. If this is ensured, even 
the parameter estimates are unbiased but the P-values are unreliable. 
Ayyangar (2008) suggests plotting the residuals against the predicted value. 
Then the patterns in the graph will reveal the problem.  
Heteroskedasticity arises when not all the disturbances have the same variance. 
It indicates that the variance of the independent variable does not equally 
explain the variance of the dependence variable which results from limiting 
the explanation of the effects of the regressors. Ayyangar (2008) indicates 
that the results of heteroskedasticity are inefficient estimators and show 
biased standard error, rendering the t-test and confidence intervals unreliable. 
Thus, the test for heteroskedasticity of such writers as Breushch and Pegan 
(1979), White (1980) and Cook and Weisberg (1983) should be adopted. If 
heteroskedasticity is discovered, its causes if known must be corrected; 
otherwise the estimator will probably make heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors for the regression coefficients and linear restrictions. Regarding 
this potential problem, this study provides the standard performance indicators 
of return on assets, operation cash flow per share and stock return, rather 
than performance itself. Also, all estimation deploys robust standard errors. 
Kennedy (1998) indicates another potential problem, which is autocorrelation. 
Autocorrelated error arises when the disturbances are correlated with one 
another. Ayyangar (2008) suggests the problem arises when the 
observations are not independent, for in this case the regression analysis will 
suffer, leading to the problem of biased intercept (Kennedy, 1998).  However, 
this issue does not threaten the estimation since panel data obtain the 
character of a cross-section. The most recent econometrics development on 
the autocorrelation of panel data is GMM estimation, using Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel estimation which is also reported in this study. 278  
 
4. Multicollinearity 
Regression analysis assumes that the number of observations is greater than 
the number of independent variables and there are no exact linear relationships 
between independent variables; it avoids the problem of two or more variables 
which convey essentially the same information but do not contribute 
significantly to the model if another is included, yet together they over-contribute. 
Gujarati (1999) suggests that the problem arises when there are high R
2 but 
few significant at t ratios also this issue can be seen through partial correlations. 
To avoid the problem, all but one of the highly correlated variables should be 
removed from the analysis. The alternative is to combine the variables but, in 
order to do this; support from a theoretical background is needed. Thus, this 
study has checked correlation between independent variables because of its 
concern over multicollinearity. Table 5.4 confirms that there is no correlation 
between executive compensation components and that firm performance and 
firm size proxies are higher than 50%. There is no small t with large R-squared 
reported, thus this study claims that is no severe multicollinearity in this study. 
5. Endogeneity 
Since this study approaches simultaneous equations between executive 
compensation and firm performance, the endogeneity issue arises. The 
observations on the independent variable can be considered fixed in 
repeated samples. This causes parameter estimates to become biased. 
Kennedy (1998) indicates that violation of this assumption is referred to as 
‘endogenous’, which renders the equations simultaneous. The problem of 
auto-regression may arise when using a lagged value of the dependent 
variables to regress with independent variables. To fix the problem, a two-
stage least squares regression should be employed. The problem in 
employing this technique is the existence of strong instrumental variables to 
put into the equation. 279  
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